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ABSTRACT
RE-EVALUATING AUGUSTINIAN FATALISM THROUGH THE
EASTERN AND WESTERN DISTINCTION BETWEEN
GOD’S ESSENCE AND ENERGIES

Stephen J. Plečnik
Marquette University, 2019

In this dissertation, I will examine the problem of theological fatalism
in St. Augustine and, specifically, whether or not Augustine was philosophically justified
in his belief that his views on divine grace and human freedom could be harmonized. As
is well-known, beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and
continuing through his works against the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429), Augustine
espoused the Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace: that the fallen will’s ability to
accomplish the good is totally a function of God’s elective grace. What, then, does the
fallen will do to work out its own salvation? There is the further issue of how to reconcile
Augustine’s rather extreme emphasis on grace in his later works with the more balanced
picture we receive in his sermones ad populum, written throughout his forty-year
preaching career. In many of these sermons, even those written during the Pelagian
controversy, Augustine is careful to leave space for both divine and human initiative in
the process of our justification within the totus Christus, or ‘whole Christ.’ How we can
understand Augustine in his role as doctor gratiae and as preacher of human freedom will
be a major inquiry of this dissertation.
The most serious obstacle to moving forward on these problems has been and
remains the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology by most
commentators. On their interpretation, Augustine thought that there were no real
distinctions within the Trinity, with each of the three divine persons and their actions
sharing in the absolute unity of the divine essence. Holding this interpretation not only
does away with the distinctness of each of the persons, but also requires all of God’s
different powers and attributes, including willing and foreknowing, to be coalesced into
one another without distinction in the divine essence. God’s foreknowledge is thereby
identified with God’s will, which necessarily leads to theological fatalism: God would
have to will everything that He foreknows, and God would have to foreknow everything
that He wills. Since God is omniscient, He wills everything that will happen, including
the future willings of the fallen human will.
It cannot be denied that there are texts in the Augustinian corpus that seem to
point to a reading of the Trinity as absolutely simple. But this study will endeavor to
show that there are also other largely overlooked texts in On the Trinity, the Confessions,
and his Commentaries on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (among others) that argue
for various distinctions within the Trinity to make sense of the relation between Creator
and creature, and the differences between the divine processions of generation/spiration,

and the act of creation. These texts will be shown to parallel very closely the position of
the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, which consistently uses the real distinction
between God’s essential being and energetic activities (also known as the essence-energy
distinction) to avoid the problem of theological fatalism. This rich theological and
philosophical tradition, from the time of the fourth-century Greek Fathers to the
Byzantine tradition that followed, differs less with Augustine concerning the essentials of
Trinitarian theology and its practical implications for solving the problem of making
human freedom and divine grace compatible than has been hitherto thought.
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1
Chapter 1
Statement of the Problem

In religion it must be the case that corresponding to every level of devoutness
there is a form of expression that has no sense at a lower level. For those still at
the lower level this doctrine, which means something at the higher level, is null
and void; it can only be understood wrongly, and so these words are not valid for
such a person.
Paul’s doctrine of election by grace, for instance, is at my level irreligious and
ugly nonsense. So it is not meant for me since I can only apply the wrong picture
offered me. If it is a holy and good picture then it is so for a quite different level,
where it must be applied in life quite differently than I could apply it.1
This quotation from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Culture and Value sums up rather
well the common reaction to both Saint Paul’s doctrine of election by grace and the
mature theology of sin and grace defended by Saint Augustine (354-430), who explicitly
and frequently invited the comparison of Paul’s doctrine to his own. As is well-known,
beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and continuing through his
last four works sent to the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429),2 Augustine often espoused the
Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace from Romans 9: that fallen humanity’s ability to
do the good, whether in thinking, in willing, or in acting, is totally a function of God’s
grace, and that, on its own, the fallen will only has the power to accomplish evil, because
of the damaging effects of original sin. The worry, of course, is that under the thralldom
of sin, by which we all find ourselves trapped, we can only be freed by God choosing to
bestow His graces upon us according to His unchanging redemptive purposes. We can do
nothing to merit or earn these graces, for they are by definition gratuitous (free) gifts of

1

Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (1937), 37e.
These works are On Grace and Free Choice, On Rebuke and Grace, On the Predestination of the
Saints, and On the Gift of Perseverance.
2

2
God. Such a position, however, appears to present God’s salvific decisions as being made
regardless of the lives we may lead. And yet, somewhat paradoxically, He also winds up
being totally responsible for the lives we end up leading, either by His granting or
withholding His graces.
Augustine maintains this somewhat strange-sounding position because of his view
of God’s grace, which he tells us God grants or withholds solely as the effects of His
predestination, for which Augustine gives the now famous definition: “This is the
predestination of the saints, nothing else: plainly the foreknowledge and preparation of
God’s benefits [or graces], by means of which whoever is to be liberated is most certainly
liberated.”3 The definition of predestination given here by Augustine has typically been
interpreted in one of two distinct ways, both of which appear problematic. First, it could
be taken to mean that Augustine defended a doctrine of predestination whereby God is
causally responsible for saving those who are righteous, while permitting (i.e., not willing
to prevent) all others to be damned. Second, it could be taken to mean that he defended a
doctrine of double-predestination whereby God is causally responsible for both saving
those who are righteous and damning those who are not. Whichever of these two
meanings one applies to Augustine’s definition of predestination, there does not seem to
be a way to integrate his predestinationism into a coherent theology of redemption.
Indeed, whether God merely permits people to be damned because of their own sinful
behavior, or whether He contributes to the condemnation of some by directly hardening
their hearts, He appears lacking in moral goodness. After all, how could an all-good God

3

De dono perseverantiae. 14.35.
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allow part of his rational creation to be lost forever, or what is even worse, actively help
to bring this loss about? How could this not be “irreligious and ugly nonsense?”
The problem that Augustine’s doctrine of predestination poses, in the seemingly
dominating power God exercises over and against the powerless fallen human will
remains an infuriating conundrum for theologians and philosophers and, unfortunately, a
perennial sticking point in efforts at East-West rapprochement. Gerald Bonner, one of the
most respected twentieth century Augustine scholars, writes: “Predestination is, however,
too fundamental to Augustine’s mature theology, and too much a part of the heritage of
Western Christian theology, to be ignored in serious ecumenical debate.” He thinks if we
are to move beyond publishing statements of mere doctrinal agreement, and if East and
West are to achieve a “common theological mind” with each other, then the doctrine of
predestination in Augustine must be dealt with, and not in the typical dismissive fashion
as being “the rationalization of the mystery of human freedom and divine grace.”4 Bonner
made this statement in 1986. However, some twenty years later he gives up on this
admirable idea, claiming instead that Augustine’s doctrine of divine predestination was
just such a rationalization: one that prioritizes God’s contribution to the accomplishing of
good works at the expense of the human, with nothing more than the unconvincing,
inconsistent, and unhelpful explanation that how all of this works will be revealed on the
Last Day.5 Bonner is not alone in his opinion, with many other scholars offering similar

4
Bonner, Gerald. “Augustine’s Conception of Deification.” Journal of Theological Studies (1986),
Vol. 37, Issue 2: 369-386. P. 385.
5
See Bonner, Gerald. Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine’s Teaching on Divine Power and Human
Freedom. The Catholic University of America Press: Washington D.C, 2007. P. 109.
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negative appraisals of Augustine’s mature theology of sin and grace and/or its foundation
in God’s predestination.6
It must be admitted that prima facie Augustine does not do himself any favors in
answering these kinds of objections. Two of the more pronounced examples of this can
be found in his The City of God and Retractions, both of which were works of his
maturity. First, there is his famous discussion of fatalism and foreknowledge against
Cicero in The City of God, Book V.IX, where Augustine affirms God’s prescience of the
future as a necessary “aspect” of His Godhood. Indeed, Augustine will argue that God is
not God if He does not know the future, “for one who is not prescient of all future things
is not God.”7 Nevertheless, at the same time, he also affirms man’s freedom of will as
necessarily part and parcel of his created and rational nature. It is important to note that
Augustine is dealing here primarily with the issue of divine fatalism, election,
predestination, or whatever one wishes to call it, but he never viewed this to be
theologically or philosophically separate from the issue of divine foreknowledge, because
he believed the former to necessarily hinge on the latter. This is an idea we have already
seen in Augustine’s definition of predestination given above: God’s granting or
withholding of His predestinating graces is dependent on His foreknowledge. Speaking

6

See for example, Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. Volume II. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich:
New York, 1978. Burnaby, John. Amor Dei: A study of the Religion of St. Augustine. Hodder and
Stoughton: London, 1938. Wetzel, James. Augustine and The Limits of Virtue. Cambridge University Press:
New York, 1992. Karfikova, Lenka. Grace and the Will according to Augustine. Trans. by Marketa
Janebova. Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden, The Netherlands, 2012. Pelikan J. The Christian Tradition: A
History of the Development of Doctrine. Volumes 1 and 2. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1971.
Cary, Phillip. “Augustinian Compatibilism and the Doctrine of Election,” Augustine and Philosophy. Ed.
by Phillip Cary, John Doody, and Kim Paffenroth. Lexington Books: Lanham, Maryland, 2010. Louth,
Andrew. “‘Heart in Pilgrimage’”: St. Augustine as Interpreter of the Psalms,” taken from Orthodox
Readings of Augustine. Ed. by George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou. St. Vladimir’s
Seminary Press: Crestwood, NY, 2008.
7
Ibid.

5
anachronistically, Augustine reports that Cicero has a much different position from his
when it comes to the issue of fatalism and the precise knowledge of the future it
inevitably entails.
According to Augustine, in order to refute the Stoical idea of fate, Cicero thought
that he needed to destroy the idea of there being divination, and he attempts to do this by
denying that there is fore-knowledge, i.e., knowledge in the sense of having an exact
vision of what future actions and events are going to happen and their causal order for
coming to be. Augustine summarizes Cicero’s objection to there being divination, and so
foreknowledge, as follows:
What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it
was this—that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the
order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order,
there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of
things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not
preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes
according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he,
all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then there is nothing in our
own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that,
says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted.
In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is
no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments
for the wicked.8
To avoid these unacceptable consequences, Cicero rejects the idea of knowledge of future
contingents simpliciter. Knowledge of future contingents, whether this knowledge is had
by God or by man, and free will are mutually exclusive: If one of them is affirmed, the
other is immediately denied. In this way, I think, Cicero can be seen as the originator of
the opinion so commonly held among philosophers and scholars as illustrious as
Wittgenstein and Bonner in more recent times that divine election (which is the causal

8

City of God 5.9.
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consequence of divine foreknowledge9) is, quite frankly, nothing more than religious
mumbo jumbo. Augustine, however, believes that the “religious mind chooses both,
confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety.”10
We find the second example of Augustine wholeheartedly embracing the kind of
doctrine of divine election gainsaid by the scholarly majority in his final statement on
how God’s grace interacts with the freedom of the human will in Book II of his
Retractions (ca. 428 AD). It reads as follows: “I labored indeed on behalf of the free
choice of the human will, but God’s grace overcame, and I could only reach that point
where the apostle is perceived to have said with the most evident truth, For who makes
you to differ? And what have you that you have not received? Now, if you have received
it, why do you glory as if you received it not? (1 Cor 4:7).11 Here we have Augustine
apparently conceding that God’s grace overcame the free choice of the human will in his
theological teaching; that he could do no better than Paul in explaining their interaction
with each other than to affirm the priority and unmerited nature of God’s grace; and that
the latter was the only relevant factor in making the elect to differ from the non-elect.
Augustine does not hesitate to affirm that Paul spoke in all of these respects “with the
most evident truth.” We might well ask: In what was his final chance to set the record
straight, did he offer a statement of mere Christian belief as a substitute for a rational
explanation of how grace co-operates with the human will? While many say that not just
this final instance but his whole theology of sin and grace is representative of this sort of
ad hoc solution, I for one think that would be uncharacteristic, to say the least, of a man

9
The relationship between divine election and divine foreknowledge will be discussed in greater
detail passim Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
10
Ibid.
11
Retractions, 2.1.2.
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who took as the motto of his entire theological perspective, “crede, ut intelligas” (believe,
so that you may understand),12 which points to the fact that Augustine was never
interested in belief as an end in itself, even if that belief pertained to the faith of the
Church. For if “faith is not charged with thought, it is nothing.”13 Being satisfied with
one’s own philosophically untested beliefs might be the stance of someone like
Tertullian,14 but not Augustine.
The real question then becomes: How did Augustine understand his belief in the
Pauline doctrine of election by grace, and did he understand it in such a way that passes
philosophical as well as theological muster? This is the question of interest to my
dissertation and, while it is too complex to be answered in a few introductory remarks, I
will provide some indication of how I will go about answering it in subsequent chapters
at this point. The good news is that Augustine is actually very forthcoming about how he
understands God’s elective grace most fundamentally in the person of Christ. He claims
that there is nowhere else that God’s grace appears to better effect than in Christ, and that
it is “through Jesus Christ our Lord that we should understand God’s grace. It alone sets
human beings free from evil. Without it they do nothing good at all, whether in thinking,

12

See for example, Tract. Ev. Jo. 29.6. His motto was itself based on his favorite scriptural quotation
from Isaiah 7:9: Unless you believe, you will not understand. In a letter to Consentius, Augustine will even
say that those who understand their faith are better off than those who merely believe it:
“Heaven forbid, I say, that we should believe in such a way that we do not accept or seek a rational
account.” (120.3) And a little later on, he says: “One who now understands by true reason what he before
only believed should certainly be preferred to one who still desires to understand what he believes.” (120.8)
13
On the Predestination of the Saints, 5.
14
As is well-known, it was Tertullian who famously warned against the “wretched Aristotle” and
asked the question of all questions when it comes to the relationship (or lack thereof) between faith and
reason: “what then hath Athens in common with Jerusalem?” (Tertullian, “On the ‘Prescription’ of
Heretics,” Chapter 7, taken from Tertullian: On the Testimony of the Soul and On the ‘Prescription’ of
Heretics, trans. by T. Herbert Bindley (London: SPCK, 1914), P. 45. Shortly after asking this question,
Tertullian answers his own question by emphatically denying the need for philosophical understanding, for
“we have no need of speculative inquiry after we have known Christ Jesus; nor of search for the Truth after
we have received the Gospel. When we become believers, we have no desire to believe anything besides;
for the first article of our belief is that there is nothing besides which we ought to believe” (Ibid, P. 46).
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or in willing and loving, or in acting.”15 Speaking of predestination in particular,
Augustine writes of Christ: “But there is no more illustrious instance of predestination
than Jesus Himself ... [and] in the end of this [work] I have chosen to insist upon it. There
is no more eminent instance, I say, of predestination than the Mediator Himself. If
any believer wishes thoroughly to understand this doctrine, let him consider Him, and in
Him he will find himself also.”16
Because of the perfect union of Christ’s human and divine natures, accomplished
by God’s grace (also referred to as the ‘grace of union’), the singular person of Christ
lived a life in complete obedience to the will of the Father.17 That is, Christ’s life was one
of perfect freedom, unable to sin, unable to die, and unable to abandon the good. Christ’s
human will willed what it willed, but by its own graced liberty it could only will the will
of the Father, to which it was obedient even unto death on a cross (Phil 2: 8). Since
Augustine says that Christ’s inability to sin (non posse peccare) is the model of our
perfect freedom, it is imperative that we get some initial clarity on this concept before we
explain it further in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. The inability to sin of Christ,
according to Augustine, should not be understood as being devoid of the consent of his
human will. If it could, then many questions and objections about the authenticity of
Christ’s ministry on earth would have to be raised. We might say that Christ’s
maintaining of his sinless moral character (Heb 4:15), resistance to the temptations of the
devil, and all of his morally praiseworthy actions were hollow achievements, or that they
lacked true virtue. If he was a mere conduit of the Father’s will, lacking any initiative of

15

Rebuke and Grace 2.3.
On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 67.
17
doctr. chr. I.10.10.22-3.
16

9
his own, then in what legitimate sense could we say that Christ was responsible for his
triumphs of will that ultimately led to the redemption of human nature? As it is, however,
Augustine thinks that Christ in his humanity was unable to sin in the sense of being
unwilling to sin by willingly following not his own will, but that of his Father in heaven.
This is precisely the same kind of freedom enjoyed by the saints in heaven, whereby they
cannot fall away from God. Unlike Adam, who had the power not to sin (posse non
peccare) but sinned, Christ, because of the unique grace given to him, was unable, or
perfectly unwilling, to sin.
For Augustine, those who cannot understand Christ’s necessary freedom, which
was predestined according to the will of the Father, and which is to be a model for our
true liberty, do not yet have a proper understanding of the Christian faith itself. This is so
because the Christian faith cannot be understood by those who lack humility, precisely
because that faith comes from faith in Christ, who is himself only present to us when we
humble ourselves down to the level at which he chose to live, that of scarred and broken
humanity.18 He writes in this connection:
[Christ] whose power was so great hungered, thirsted, grew weary, fell asleep,
was taken prisoner, was beaten, crucified, slain. This is the way: walk through
humility that you may come to eternity. Christ-God is the homeland to which we
are going; Christ-man is the way by which we are going (Deus Christus patria est
quo imus; homo Christus via est qua imus).19
Augustine further maintains that Christ’s perfected human nature, like our own fallen
human nature, could not merit the graces it received, or cause itself to differ from the rest
of sinful humanity in and of itself: “Look at Christ the Lord, Word, soul, and flesh, as I
said; God is there, there also are you; and it’s one Christ. So what puts you there? For

18
19

conf. 7.18.24.
Sermo 124.3.3; PL 38.685.
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what merit, for what free choice, did the Lord take on human nature, was the Word
clothed with human nature? What merit of that particular human nature came first?”20
The answer is none whatsoever. There was no merit attributable to even Christ’s human
nature before the Word took on that particular flesh.
Augustine’s conception of true human liberty as Christological therefore requires
us to recognize two important points. First, the grace of God the Father, God the Son, and
God the Holy Spirit is required for all human beings, including Christ in his humanity, to
freely carry out anything good and avoid anything evil.21 Second, God’s grace is
completely unmerited. Since Christ provides us with the brightest example of both
points,22 it makes sense for Augustine to say that we should understand our graced human
liberty through him. This is what I intend to do in my dissertation.
However tempting it may be, we must avoid any desire to import more modern
notions of freedom and autonomy into Augustine’s philosophical-theological
anthropology to “save it” from what many view as its theological fatalism. Augustine
does not argue for a radical form of freedom, or a conception of the human self that is
proto-Cartesian/proto-Kantian, which is to say a self that is a complete and unconditioned
law unto himself. For Augustine, not even humanity in its paradisal state enjoyed such a
freedom. Writing of Adam, Augustine tells us, he was only able not to sin, able not to die,
and able not to abandon the good; but he possessed all three of these capacities because
of God’s grace. Once he refused such grace, by insisting to follow his own will, God

20

Sermon 265D.7, 417. See also trin.13.17.22.
Augustine believes, for example, that in the case of Christ in his humanity it is not only the Father
and the Holy Spirit who provide such graces, but also Christ in his divinity, i.e., the Son. All three persons
of the Trinity act inseparably in this regard. See trin.1.3.14-21 for Augustine’s position on this and how
closely it resembles St. Paul’s in his Letter to the Philippians.
22
See City of God 10.29.
21
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justly withdrew from him.23 Whether we are considering humanity’s previous
unblemished ahistorical state, or its current fallen condition, God always remains
humanity’s law and life. We are never emancipated from God our creator or God our
redeemer—the Word made flesh. Any discussion of Augustine’s notion of true human
liberty must therefore take place in what he believes to be its proper supernatural context.
As I will show throughout the course of this dissertation, Augustine anchors
man’s true liberty specifically in his doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and imago Dei.
Because we were created out of nothing, which is itself a grace according to Augustine, 24
we are totally dependent on God for our being; and because we were created in God’s
image, we are totally dependent on God for our well-being. In other words, God is the
source of both our ontological and moral good, respectively. The autonomous (autonomos) human self, in itself, and by itself, at least for Augustine, is a metaphysical and
moral fiction. As human beings, we have no autonomous good independent from God.
Augustine takes this as a super-natural dimension of human life, which he thinks has its
specific point of origin and return in the God-man, Christ, who is himself the mediator
between God and man. We might say, then, to borrow the expression of Wittgenstein,
that Christ is the “higher level” through which we may correctly picture man’s supreme
good and freedom.
Nevertheless, merely asserting that Christ is the “higher level” through which we
must understand the supreme good of humanity (including its liberty) under the auspices
of divine grace will not by itself be enough to legitimately quell the complaints we have
seen raised against Augustine. To discuss the Christological focus of Augustine’s

23
24

See for example, Rebuke and Grace 12.33.
See Sermo 258.2. See also On Nature and Grace, Chapter 62.
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conception of human freedom, and to give it the proper philosophical support, I think
there is a need to examine how he more broadly conceived of God’s roles in the divine
economy as creator and redeemer. That is, how Augustine actually saw the two-natured
Christ as harmoniously interacting with human beings.
However, this quickly becomes a problem because of the dominant scholarly
interpretation of Augustine’s approach to God as being fundamentally concerned with the
unity of the divine essence, and how that essence is radically unlike anything created. It is
well-known that such an interpretation first gained its foothold in the Western scholarly
milieu from the work done by Theodore de Régnon, a nineteenth century French Jesuit
theologian. He argued that, at least since the time of Saint Augustine, the Western
theological tradition began with the oneness of God (de Deo uno), whereas the Greek
Fathers began with God as Trinity (de Deo Trino) in the economy of creation and
redemption.25 Most scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have continued to
operate under this interpretive paradigm to perpetuate the claim that Augustine’s
theological conception of God prioritizes the absolute unity of the divine essence over
and above how that essence is expressed in the distinct persons of the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, both in the essential life of the “inner” Trinity (ad intra) and in the economic
life of the “outer” Trinity (ad extra).26

25

Theodore de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité. Victor Retaux: Paris, 1892.
Michel René Barnes has an article entitled, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 5179, that has proven authoritative on the subject of De Régnon’s immense influence on Augustine
scholarship in this regard.
26
For some good examples of the De Régnon interpretive paradigm hard at work in the secondary
literature, see G. L. Prestige’s God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1952); Duncan Reid’s Energies of
the Spirit: Trinitarian Models in Eastern Orthodox and Western Theology. Scholars Press: Atlanta, 1997;
Boris Bobrinskoy’s Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic
Tradition. Trans. by Anthony P. Gythiel. St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press: New York, 1999; and John
Zizioulas’ Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: T&T
Clark, 2006).
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These scholars often refer to Augustine’s approach to God as ‘Latin essentialism,’
both because of its origin in the Latin-speaking West and because of its supposedly allencompassing concern with preserving the picture of God as absolutely simple and
undifferentiated essence. With this said, Latin essentialists do allow for a distinction of
the divine essence from the three persons and from their various attributes, but they
diminish the latter two realities in God to preserve His simplicity. They do this, first, by
labeling the divine persons as purely ‘relational’ entities, not as subsistent individuals
possessing a real existence of their own. It is their opinion that real, ‘personal’ differences
in God would amount to differences in the being of God. Latin essentialists, in other
words, do not understand the existence of Father, Son, or Holy Spirit as one which is
distinct but not divided from each other and the divine essence which they commonly and
equally share. Rather, they think that everything in God pertains to and is explained by
the divine essence, as this is the only way to guarantee that God’s simplicity remains
unthreatened.
They do this, second, by claiming that the various attributes of the persons are not
‘really’ distinct from the three persons, the divine essence, and even from each other, but
only ‘logically’ distinct. This amounts to them rejecting the less extreme theological
position wherein the divine attributes are said to be distinct but not divided from the
various realities that pertain to God as God.27 The unwillingness of Latin essentialists to
make real distinctions in the Godhead when it comes to the persons and their attributes
subsequently make it impossible for them to keep distinct God’s temporal missions in the
economy of salvation from the eternal divine processions. On their view, the economic
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missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit must be ontologically identified with the intratrinitarian relationships to which they correspond.
Two theologically unsettling conclusions are left in the wake of the doctrine of
divine simplicity as defended by Latin essentialism. First, the economic sendings of the
Son and the Holy Spirit would give us a window through which to view the essential life
of God, thereby destroying His transcendence. Second, we could no longer make a real
distinction between God freely creating and redeeming according to the divine will, and
the intra-trinitarian processions, i.e., the begetting of the Son and the procession of the
Holy Spirit, all of which take place according to the necessary divine essence. Rather,
creation, redemption, and procession would be one and the same essential and, therefore,
necessary activity.28 This in turn would make any kind of real divine and human
interaction impossible, because the wholly simple, necessary, and eternal being of God
has no way of interacting with the inherently complex, contingent, and temporal reality of
human beings.
Contrary to Latin essentialism, the Greek-East is said to have an appreciation for
both the essential and economic realities of God, because of the ‘real distinction’
(pragmatike diakrisis) but not ‘real division’ (pragmatike diairesis) it maintains between
God’s essential self, which always remains beyond the horizon of created being, and
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God’s energetic self, which is expressed in creation, missions, and Incarnation. Often
referred to as the essence-energy (ousia-energeia) distinction, this has been the hallmark
feature of Eastern Orthodox theology from the time of the fourth century Greek Fathers
to the later Byzantine theological tradition, found especially in the works of John of
Damascus and Gregory Palamas. The philosophical groundwork of this distinction is
found in their unilaterally shared claim that the divine essence cannot lack its
corresponding energies, or natural activities by which it becomes manifest, through the
Trinity of the divine hypostaseis that share that essence, to realities other than itself. It
follows that, if one were to collapse the three persons and their energies into the divine
essence, then it would lack any kind of real presence or existence beyond itself. That is, it
would lack subsistence and could not be considered to hypostatically and energetically
exist ad extra. All of the above Greek-speaking theologians were therefore careful to
maintain the distinction between ousia, hypostasis, and energeia in God, so that He could
simultaneously subsist and exist for Himself (essentially) as Father, Son, and Spirit and
for creation (energetically).
The essence-energy distinction, unlike Latin essentialism, made it possible for the
Greeks to ontologically differentiate God’s creating and redeeming, which are free
activities according to the energy, from the Father’s generation of the Son and procession
of the Holy Spirit, which are necessary actions according to the essence. It also made it
possible for them to keep all of God’s energies distinct but not divided from each other,
and so safeguard against paradoxes that would result from their coalescence. Take, for
instance, the situation in which God’s will and foreknowledge are identified. If God were
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to will everything he foreknows, and God foreknows everything that happens whether
good or evil, He would be responsible for willing evil; which is absurd.29
It should come as no surprise, then, that the essentialist interpretation of
Augustine’s approach to God is commonly criticized in Eastern Orthodox circles
specifically for its lack of an essence-energy distinction. Georges Florovsky, for instance,
thinks that it is not just Augustine but Western theology in general that fails to make this
distinction: “The Eastern patristic distinction between the essence and energies of God
has always remained foreign to Western theology.... St. Augustine decisively rejects it.”30
Duncan Reid writes of Augustine’s entire corpus that “there is no hint here of the
distinction between essence and energy that will later (some 1000 years later with
Palamas) be developed in Eastern Orthodox theology.”31 Rather, he thinks that in its
place Augustine left us with a view of God in which the outer side of the Trinity—the
temporal missions—is the same as the inner side of the Trinity—the eternal
processions.32 Reid calls this the ‘identity principle’ or the ‘simplicity model’ for
understanding God, which has remained commonplace in western theology from the time
of Augustine all the way up to the post-Reformation present.
Even today no one has been more directly critical of Augustine’s theology than
John Romanides. In his An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmatics,33 Romanides notes
that the key theological error of Augustine was his failure to make an essence-energy

For an excellent rendition of this paradox, see Capita 100 of St. Gregory Palamas’ 150 Capita.
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distinction such as that found in the Eastern Orthodox tradition since the fourth century
onwards. This failure in turn made it impossible for him to have an accurate
understanding of the developmental process in which humanity achieves its finite
perfection, made possible by the Word’s incarnation and brought about through God’s
grace or energy in harmonious co-operation (sunergia)34 with the human will, which the
East refers to as the doctrine of deification (theosis). For Romanides, “St. Augustine
himself does not appear to have accepted this [sc. essence-energy] distinction.... This
identification of essence and energy in the West led Western theologians to articulate the
thought that God is ‘pure energy.’”35 As a result of such an identification, we see that “in
the theological tradition of the Franks, beginning with Augustine, there is no doctrine of
deification.”36 Rather, all we see in the West since Augustine is a doctrine of an
absolutely simple, purely actual, and completely necessary God that exists in and for
Himself.
Clearer than most, then, Romanides explains the real practical issue at stake in
discussions pertaining to divine simplicity in Augustine, i.e., the freedom of humanity
and its deification. His informal argument above can be broken down into three distinct
conditional statements:
1) If Augustine does not have an essence-energy distinction, then he cannot make
sense of the concept of deification.
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2) If he cannot make sense of the concept of deification, then there is no
harmonious co-operation possible between God and human beings.
3) Therefore, if Augustine does not have an essence-energy distinction, then there
is no harmonious co-operation possible between God and human beings.
Romanides’ argument is meant to sharpen what he takes to be the opposition between the
Latin (and supposedly Augustinian) idea of absolute simplicity and the Greek concept of
deification. On the one hand, the doctrine of deification holds there to be a harmonious
co-operation between the divine will and the human will within the context of salvation
history. On the other hand, the doctrine of essentialism holds that the divine will,
including its economic functions of creation and redemption, must be absolutely and
unqualifiedly identified with the divine essence.
The problem, of course, is that that the reality of the divine essence is completely
necessary, whereas the divine will is that reality in God which is supposed to be
completely free. Not merely ‘free’ in the negative sense of being free from constraints to
will this or that, but ‘free’ in the positive sense to choose amongst different alternatives to
do this or that, e.g., to create this or redeem that. If one were to identify the divine will
with the divine essence, then God would cease to be free in the positive sense but able to
be free in the negative sense. He would cease to have a free will for the activities of
creation and redemption, all the while remaining free from constraints.37 It also would
follow that there could not be a synergy between the divine and human wills, because
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there would no longer be a divine will with which the human will could co-operate. This
entails that there is no freedom possible for human beings, because our freedom, in the
Augustinian/Pauline sense of the term, completely depends on God’s energies or graces
co-working with our individual wills in a way that is in consonance with their created,
rational, and free nature.38 These are meant to conform us to the image of the Son in such
a way that, God willing, we become like Christ, unable to sin, unable to die, and unable
to abandon the good.
As we can see, the validity of Romanides’ argument ultimately comes from the
perceived truth of the claim that Augustine does not have an essence-energy distinction.
While the validity of this assumption has been granted by the majority of both Eastern
and Western theologians alike over the past three centuries, I believe to further illuminate
the mystery of divine and human freedom we must re-evaluate the assumption that the
essence-energy distinction was somehow exclusively Eastern in origin and design. To
that end, one of my primary aims in this dissertation will be to show that there are
ontological grounds in Augustine’s writings, which are akin to those found in the Eastern
Orthodox tradition, for maintaining a distinction between the necessity of God’s essence
and His free activities of choosing to create and redeem.
Through a close analysis of certain passages from Augustine’s earlier and later
writings, I will prove that he himself uses this distinction in at least three important
respects that directly resonate with the Eastern Orthodox tradition. First, he uses this
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distinction to argue that there is a difference between the eternity of the divine essence
and the eternity of the divine ideas; the former kind of eternity being unknowable and
imparticipable by creation, the latter being knowable and capable of being participated in
by creation. Second, he uses this distinction to prevent the confusion of God’s essential
activities of generation and procession (ad intra) with His economic activity as the
productive source of creation (ad extra).39 Augustine believes this in turn safeguards the
Creator-creature distinction, which is itself meant to prevent a pantheistic conception of
created reality whereby it would achieve an equal ontological status to God the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit. Third, he uses this distinction to maintain that there is a distinction
without division between God’s essence and God’s will,40 the latter being especially
crucial to Augustine’s claim in Books II-IV of On the Trinity that the inner trinity, as
expressed in the eternal processions, cannot be identified with the outer trinity, as
expressed in the temporal missions.
While qualitative differences may remain among Eastern and Western theologians
with respect to the making of this distinction and how it is used in their respective
theological traditions, I will show that the fundamental metaphysics of each of their
positions remain consistent with and complimentary of the other. With Augustine’s
version of the essence-energy distinction and its uses in hand, I will then attempt to
explain his Christocentric solution to the predestination problem seemingly entailed by
Paul’s words at 1 Cor 4:7 and by much of what Augustine himself had to say about how
to reconcile man’s liberty with God’s causality beginning with his second response To
Simplician onwards. Augustine himself may have never explicitly purposed this
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distinction to solve the issue of divine and human interaction, but I believe it can be used
as the logical and metaphysical foundation to construct such a solution, and even a valid
argument to prove the existence of human liberty, in co-operation with God’s grace. As I
have suggested earlier, previous attempts at solving this problem have been frustrated, or
perhaps not even attempted, because of the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s
Trinitarian theology that has predominated in the past and still holds great appeal among
scholars working today. On such an interpretation, there is simply no ontological room
for human freedom to live and move and have its own being in the presence of God’s will
and knowledge, both of which are identified with each other, and both of which are
collapsed into the necessity of the divine essence. It is my claim, however, that
Augustine’s approach to God is not of necessity beholden to Latin essentialism, and that
there are clear non-essentialist tendencies in his extensive corpus that should make us reevaluate Augustine’s so-called ‘Western’ Trinitarian theology and his own final solution
to the predestination problem found in Book II of the Retractions.
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Chapter 2
Augustine’s Teachings on Sin and Grace

In order to come up with a convincing solution to the predestination problem in
Augustine, we must first gain a clearer understanding of the problem itself. This requires
us to explore two interrelated themes in Augustine’s thought: sin and grace. Augustine’s
position on these two themes was not monolithic. In On the Gift of Perseverance,
Augustine tells his readers that over time he made progress in his understanding of God’s
grace, and that it would be unfair for them not to allow him to change his theological
position as is necessary to accord with what is true by reason and what is right by
Christian doctrine.41 He claims that the biggest change made to his position occurred in
his second response To Simplician, where for the first time he “realized and stated that
the beginning of faith (initium fidei) is also the gift of God.”42 Augustine specifically
cites his greater understanding of Paul’s Letter to the Romans (9: 10-29) as granting him
this realization. Considering the importance that Augustine places on his second response
To Simplician for his own better understanding of God’s grace, this work serves as a
natural entry point for its discussion.
Augustine begins his second response To Simplician with what he takes to be St.
Paul’s main insight from Romans 9, namely: no one should boast of the merits of his
works, for any merit they do possess is wholly because of God’s merciful grace.
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Following St. Paul, Augustine claims that grace is not grace if it is not given gratuitously.
Grace thus comes before any kind of merit, before good works and faith; and a person
cannot “do good works unless he has obtained grace through faith,”43 a faith that is given
to him by an internal or external urging of the Holy Spirit. Grace is not the result of merit,
but merit is the result of grace. For if “grace comes from merit, it means you have bought
it, not received it free, gratis, for nothing.”44 To illustrate the utter gratuity of grace,
Augustine uses an example given by Paul: the twins Jacob and Esau (Rom 9:13). Since
they did not yet exist, they were deserving of nothing; neither one of them was more
praevisa merita than praevisa demerita; yet God chose to love Jacob and hate Esau.45
According to Augustine, it was God’s redemptive purpose that was the deciding factor in
choosing to give grace to Jacob but not to Esau. The twins’ future merits or demerits
played no part in God’s choice, which was made ante praevisa merita.46 The same goes
for all of us: whether our fate is that of Jacob or Esau is a matter ultimately determined by
God.
In her recent book, A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of Signs,
Susanna Ticciati argues that it is precisely this claim, “that only some are predestined to
salvation, while others are left to perdition,”47 that cannot serve any beneficial,
transformative, or salvific purpose for the individual. It is a problematic aspect within
Augustine’s “doctrine of predestination which cannot be integrated into its broader
trajectory.”48 Essential to her argument is the assertion that Augustine makes God
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responsible for both our good and evil wills: “not only is the good will to be attributed to
God, but so is the evil will... a will which is nevertheless genuinely the human’s own ... in
such a way that it is to be attributed wholly to God and wholly to the human being.”49 For
Ticciati, Augustine makes divine agency out to be one part liberating grace for human
agency and one part divine judgment. This divided “divine agency draws focus back
again to the question of choice between alternative options: will the human choose good
or evil? And this question is replicated on the divine plane: will God give or withhold
grace?”50 While Ticciati admits that God is not the direct cause of the evil will, she still
makes His withholding of grace from the Esau’s of the world a kind of sin of omission.
The problem is Augustine believes that God always offers everyone equal access to
sufficient graces for their salvation.51 Ticciati confuses the point that, while God does not
give grace to all,52 which is certainly true, this does not mean he does not offer it to all,
which he does. The distinction made between “giving” and “offering” grace is not mere
wordplay, but rather a real distinction that Augustine makes use of on multiple occasions
to avoid just such a confusion. Augustine believed that God offered sufficient salvific
graces to everyone. Or as he will say, God “makes his sun rise on the good and the bad,
and sends rain on the just and the unjust, inviting them of course to repentance by his
patience, so that those who are indifferent to his goodness may experience at the last his
severity.”53 And elsewhere we are told by him that, “God grants well-being or salvation
in the present to both human beings and animals, to both good and bad alike.”54
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Augustine makes this point so that not even those who have an evil will can complain of
God’s justice and goodness. I think it safe to conclude from these texts that Augustine
believed in the doctrine of universal grace, or that God offers sufficient graces to all for
their salvation, but not the stronger doctrine of universal salvation, both of which can be
interpreted as being consistent with the claim found at 1 Tim 2: 4 that God wills all to be
saved. Certainly God wills all to be saved, but that does not mean everyone will accept
his grace and actually be saved.
We might say that God’s “standing offer” to give sufficient graces for everyone’s
salvation must be co-operatively accepted by our wills to do any real work, to be
effectual in our lives. After all, for it to be properly said that God makes good on this
offer of salvation in actually giving us these graces, we must be said to accept them. I
believe it is therefore helpful to think of God’s giving His graces and our accepting of
them as two inseparable parts of one redemptive process. Take one or the other part
away, and there really cannot be said to be a giving or receiving, for if there is no giving
on the part of God, there cannot be a receiving on the part of man; and if there is no
receiving on the part of man, there cannot be a giving on the part of God. However,
God’s offering of grace, as opposed to Him giving it or our accepting it, is perfectly
intelligible without a faithful response or otherwise from us: God can offer grace, and we
can either choose to accept it or not; but the offering of His grace does not depend on
anything we do. As Augustine has said before, God offers sufficient salvific graces to all,
to all persons who are good and bad alike.
Augustine is aware that the preceding—even with the distinctions he makes
regarding offering, giving, and accepting grace—may still sound disturbing to the
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believer. God appears to be unjustly arbitrary, giving grace to the Jacob’s of the world
but not the Esau’s even though there are no relevant differences between them. To defend
his position, Augustine first appeals to St. Paul: For Moses says, I will have mercy on
whom I will have mercy, and I will show compassion to whom I will be compassionate
(Rom 9: 15). Later, he will cite Mt 20: 1-12’s parable of the vineyard to make the same
point. The master in this parable hired some workers for the whole day and some for only
one hour, yet he paid both groups of workers the same daily wage. When the first group
of workers complain, the master answers that the fact that he “willed” to be generous to
those who worked for one hour did not mean that they were paid an unjust wage.
Augustine concludes from this parable that God, as our Master, must also be given the
freedom to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, though it cannot be stressed
enough that such mercy is not owed to anyone as a result of the whole human race living
under the tyranny of sin, both original sin and those that are personal. Augustine will
insist that, because of original sin in particular, we all begin life with a hamstrung moral
agency and debilitated ontological being: we are dominated by ignorance of the truth and
lust of the flesh; we sin in every action we perform, unless aided by divine grace; we
have become mortal; and we all constitute a kind of mass of sin (una quaedam massa
peccati), and as such deserve damnation.55
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Accepting the offer of God’s mercy in this life is thus necessary, for it is only by
God’s help that we attain to what is true, good, life-giving, and redeeming. Once again,
however, this idea that God’s grace is the only reality which can aid us in pulling
ourselves out of the swamp of sin we trudge through on a daily basis must be balanced
with the fact that God can only save us from sin if we are willing to accept His help.
Augustine will explicitly claim that God’s mercy is not by itself sufficient for our
salvation. God’s mercy must be joined to the will’s “consent”56 and considered within the
context of the will’s effort to which Paul refers in Phil 12:12: Work out your salvation
with fear and trembling. He makes this quite clear in his discussion of how God calls us
to salvation. For Augustine, there are many who are called and not chosen, not because
God does not call them in the appropriate way, as the kind of person they are, but because
they are not suited to the call since they have hardened their hearts to the Holy Spirit’s
internal and external urgings.57 It is on account of their demerits that they will be
condemned, not because God intends some calls not to be accepted.58 God is thus
sensitive to what they will, and it is they who are the problematic variable in the equation
of divine and human interaction. It is they who refuse to accept the gift of salvation that
God is offering. We might well ask: Why does not God call everyone so that they would
answer? If God were to call them in such a way as to override their freedom of choosing
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what is lower, then He would be forcing them to answer His call. Then, however, His call
would cease to be a call, becoming rather a compulsion, and their answer would cease to
be a free response. Augustine’s position here remains consistent with 1 Tim 2: 4ff:
Almighty God wills that all men without exception be saved, although all are not saved.
Now, that certain ones be saved, this is the gift of Him who saves; and that certain ones
perish, this is the fault (meritum) of those who perish.
Augustine’s view of sin and grace elaborated in his second response To
Simplician would take center stage during his polemical bouts with the Pelagians and the
semi-Pelagians, whose contrary positions, as well as Augustine’s responses to them, will
now be briefly considered. We shall begin chronologically with the Pelagian controversy,
which began around 412. The main opponents of Augustine here were Pelagius and his
followers, Celestius and Julian of Eclanum. Pelagius himself is thought to have been a
British monk, perhaps of Irish descent, who lived in Rome from 384 until its fall in 410 at
the hands of the Visigoths. Fleeing to Africa, he soon came into conflict with Augustine,
then Bishop of Hippo, who wasted no time in publishing two works against Pelagius’
teachings around 411 or 412, the De peccatorum meritis and the De spiritu et littera. In
these works, Augustine accuses Pelagius of heretically teaching that:
1) Adam would have died whether he sinned or not.
2) Adam’s sin was purely personal, affecting him and him alone.
3) Infants are born into the same sinless state Adam enjoyed before his fall, hence
infant baptism is superfluous (Pelagius believed that adult baptism did confer
certain benefits on the believer, however, such as the remission of personal sins).
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4) Adams’s sin did not cause the death of all, and so Christ’s resurrection is not
needed for the redemption of all.
5) Following the Law and Gospel are sufficient for salvation.
6) Before Christ’s redemptive work there were men wholly without sin.
Since Pelagius’ writings are not extant, it is difficult to get a clear and unbiased picture of
his position. What cannot be historically questioned, however, is the fact that the above
teachings of Pelagius were condemned at two African councils at Carthage and Mileve in
416, and later by Pope Innocent I in 417, who excommunicated Pelagius and his follower
Celestius. Julian of Eclanum then inherited the mantle of Pelagianism, but it was a mantle
that proved to be too heavy for his shoulders as well. He was eventually banished by
Pope Zozimus, and is said to have died in Sicily around 455.
While there are many points over which Augustine and Pelagius battled, the entire
controversy can really be seen as one concerned with the power of the human will in its
fallen condition, and how to characterize the help afforded to it by God’s grace.
Augustine, from his own personal experience of the vicissitudes of fallen human nature
and the oppressive hold his bad habits had over his own will,59 and from his zeal to
defend what he took to be right Christian doctrine in accord with the teaching of St. Paul,
emphasizes the fragility of the fallen will’s power. Our desperate need for grace is found
in scripture, which Augustine thought to be authoritative: Without me you can do nothing
(Sine me nihil potestis facere) (Jn 15:5). Pelagius, on the other hand, was more confident
in the power of unaided human nature and its corresponding faculties, emphasizing
instead the sufficiency of these natural gifts given to us by God for right action, provided
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they are used properly. He argued that God would never command us to do anything
unless we had the power to do it (a version of the “ought implies can” principle), and
even cited Augustine’s early work On Free Choice of the Will to make his case.60 His
faith in the strength of human nature and its powers led Pelagius to view God’s grace as
something beneficial to the believer, but not as something necessary to bring about one’s
salvation. While most would agree that Pelagius’ Christian Stoicism does not adequately
acknowledge the positive benefits of God’s grace for the believer, Augustine appears to
go in the opposite extreme direction, portraying human nature and the will as so weak
and so lost without God’s helping hand that there is no possibility for human freedom.
Much more could be said about the Pelagian controversy itself and the many
works that Augustine wrote during this period in response to it. However, my interest at
this point rests primarily in getting clear on what has commonly been seen as problematic
in Augustine’s conception of sin and grace, so that we can more readily come up with an
appropriate solution, and, in particular, a solution that would be acceptable to both East
and West. To that end, the semi-Pelagian controversy proves even more relevant to the
project of this dissertation, in that Eastern Christianity has long viewed the semiPelagians as witnesses to their tradition. Vladimir Lossky, for instance, will call St. John
Cassian of Marseilles—who was perhaps the most prominent of all the semi-Pelagians in
his time—a “representative” of the Eastern tradition in what he wrote concerning the
relationship between God’s grace and the human will.61 Lossky believes he is justified in
making this claim because Cassian, like the entire Eastern tradition, “has always asserted
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simultaneity in the synergy of divine grace and human freedom.”62 However, because
Augustine and the Pelagians lacked such a divine and human synergy in their writings,
they can never be considered as in accord with Eastern Christianity in this regard. My
brief examination of the Pelagian controversy shows that this is a fair estimation of
Pelagius’ position, but can we really transfer the same criticism over to Augustine? To
find out, I will examine in some detail certain relevant parts of the last four major
doctrinal works Augustine wrote and that were sent to the semi-Pelagians at Hadrumetum
and Provence, the latter being mainly from southern Gaul, in the monastic communities
at Marseilles and Lérins.
The first two of these works are On Grace and Free Choice and On Rebuke and
Grace, both of which were sent to the monks at Hadrumetum around 426-427. Like many
modern commentators today, these monks thought that Augustine’s doctrine of grace left
no room for free will, thereby destroying any notion of moral responsibility. Augustine’s
response in these two works, however, seems to tell a different story.
On Grace and Free Choice begins with Augustine affirming the necessity of both
grace and free will, and their undeniable complementarity found in the Old and New
testaments. We see this first and foremost, he thinks, in the commandments present
throughout scripture, which reveal that the will of man is free:
The divine precepts would themselves be pointless for human beings unless we
had free choice of the will, by which we might reach the promised rewards
through carrying them out. For the precepts were given to human beings in order
that they not have an excuse on the grounds of ignorance, as the Lord says of the
Jews in the Gospel: Had I not come and spoken to them, they would have no sin;
but now they have no excuse for their sin (Jn 15: 22).63

62
63

Ibid.
Grace and Free Choice, 2.2.

32
Augustine then goes on to cite many specific passages from scripture which point to there
being free will in man, for instance, Sir 15: 12-18: It was He who made human beings
from the beginning, and left them in the hand of their own counsel. If you are willing, you
shall keep the commandments and keep good faith with his pleasure. He sets fire and
water before you: stretch forth your hand to whichever you will. God could not bid us to
follow such commandments if we did not have free will. Further, there are many
commandments that explicitly reference the will, including: Be unwilling to be overcome
by evil (Rom 12:21); Be unwilling to become as the horse or the mule, which have no
understanding (Ps 31:9); Be unwilling to fall away from the teaching of the Lord (Prv
3:7); and many more.64 It is important to note that all of Augustine’s examples are
rendered using the Latin nolle, which means “to be unwilling [to].” Though commonly
these negative imperatives are translated into English as “Thou shalt not...” or “Do
not...,” I think it is more accurate to recognize the role of the will in these commandments
by translating it more literally, to mirror the original Latin text of Augustine. Taking
scripture as authoritative, Augustine thinks that all of these examples are “sufficient proof
of free choice.”65
Nevertheless, one should not understand these examples as leaving no room for
the necessary help of grace in the carrying out of these commandments. Pelagius made
such a mistake, placing his faith in the natural power of the will to do the good.
Augustine on many occasions would respond to this with the words of the prophet
Jeremiah: Cursed is the man who has his hope in man, and makes strong the flesh of his
arm, and whose heart abandons the Lord (Jer 17:5). Augustine takes “arm” to mean
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power of acting and “flesh” to mean human weakness. It follows that anyone who goes
along with Pelagius in thinking that humanity’s weak and inadequate power is “sufficient
by itself for acting well makes strong the flesh of his arm.”66 What any holy person
should do, however, is put their faith in God’s power. Augustine writes in this
connection: “No holy person rejoices in his own power, but in the power of Him from
whom is derived all potency for fitting action. He knows that it is a mightier thing to be
united in willing worship to the omnipotent, than to display in his own power and will a
potency which is fearful to those who have it not.”67 The freedom of the will is actually
freer in proportion to its inability to display this kind of prideful potency:
One should not think that free choice has been taken away because the apostle
said: God is the one who works in you both willing and doing works in conformity
with good will [Phil 2:13]. Blessed, after all, is the one whose helper is the God of
Jacob, his hope in the Lord his God (Ps 146:5). In addition, if freedom were taken
away, he would not have said immediately before that: Work out your own
salvation with fear and trembling [Phil 2:12].68
But now we appear to wind up in a paradoxical situation, in which God commands us to
do the good but also grants us this very same good. Or as Augustine famously says in the
Confessions, “Command what you will, and give what you command,”69 a statement that
particularly annoyed Pelagius when he heard it during a public reading of the Confessions
in Rome, as it seemingly asked the impossible of human beings.70
In On Grace and Free Choice, Augustine does not back down from this claim,
writing: “It is certain that we will, when we will. But God brings it about that we will
something good.... It is certain that we act, when we act. But God brings it about that we
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act by furnishing our will with efficacious strength.”71 Essentially what Augustine is
saying is that we work with God and God works with us to accomplish good things; and
it is by “working along [with us that] He perfects what He began by working [in us]”
(cooperando perficit quod operando incipit).72 If taken literally, the Latin here reads “by
co-working He completes what by working [alone] He started.” This famous phrase is
commonly seen as the origin of the doctrine of co-operative grace in the West, though
one might argue its beginnings are found just as clearly in St. Paul, who actually uses the
Greek term sunergia.73 Regardless, Augustine believes we must acknowledge God as the
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primary cause who first works without us so that we might have the power to will what is
good within us. God offers these beginning graces to all. But once we will, and will in
such a way so that we may act well, God works within us to make the will efficacious. A
similar idea is found in Chapter 35 of On Nature and Grace, where Augustine writes:
“We ourselves bring it to pass; that is to say, we ourselves justify our own selves. In this
matter, no doubt, we do ourselves, too, work; but we are fellow-workers with Him who
does the work, because His mercy anticipates us. He anticipates us, however, that we may
be healed; but then He will also follow us, that being healed we may grow healthy and
strong.” However, in no uncertain terms does God’s grace take away our free will either
before, during, or after we act. God’s grace turns the will from seeking lower things to
higher things, and gives further help once the will is good so that it may persevere in the
good. He “works in human hearts to incline their wills to whatever he wills, either to
good due to his mercy or to evil due to their deserts.”74 Yet such providentially graced
causation does nothing to vitiate the nature of their wills as free.
Phillip Cary represents the attitude shared in the vast majority of the scholarly
literature well when he says that the just mentioned passage from On Grace and Free
Choice (and the many others that express the same basic point) prove that “in the last
decade of his life Augustine develops a view of free will” that does not allow a person to
control the development of their own character.75 Cary states that, while this is good news
for those who are saved, whose wills are irresistibly bended to God’s will, it is equally
bad news for those who are not. According to Cary, the real problem can be found in
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Augustine’s doctrine of prevenient grace, which holds that for any of us to will anything
that would contribute to our salvation, God must literally “come before” and offer
sufficient graces to strengthen our wills.76 Augustine does adhere to this doctrine: “The
fact is, his mercy gets in ahead of us every single time; to call us when we were lacking
the will, and then to ensure we obtain the ability to do what we will.”77 But even more
problematic is that Augustine “pushes the logic of prevenience back to the very
beginning of every human life.”78 Augustine’s logic of prevenience thus places all of the
power in God’s hands, rendering our wills completely inefficacious and unnecessary in
the process of salvation, and leads to the kind of double-predestination we encounter later
in the Reformation with Luther and Calvin.79 For Cary, this is the only interpretation of
Augustine’s mature theology of sin and grace will allow.
To some extent we can understand Cary’s point, but amassing quotes like the one
from On Grace and Free Choice without giving it, or Augustine’s doctrine of grace as a
whole, proper context does not prove that Augustine was a Calvinist before Calvin. A
fundamental Augustinian idea that Cary’s study completely ignores is that grace has a
mutual affinity for nature, working in harmony with it. Commenting on his work On
Nature and Grace, for instance, Augustine writes: “I defend grace, not indeed as in
opposition to nature, but as that which liberates and controls nature.”80 He will even say
in the work itself that the gift of grace can never take away the nature of the will as free,
for this gift only becomes effectual in the life of the man who “humbly uses ... his own
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will, and makes no boast of the power and energy thereof, as if it alone were sufficient
for perfecting him in righteousness.”81 The latter provides more proof of the idea that the
distinction Augustine makes between God’s offering and giving grace, and our accepting
that grace, are real distinctions: Grace becomes active in the life of man when and only
when he humbly and willingly accepts it as necessary for his perfection.
In Sermo 398 (ca. 425), Augustine further explains why grace cannot override the
will’s freedom. His explanation is founded on the fact that there are many things that God
cannot do, because if He could do them, He would no longer be God:
He is unable to die, unable to be deceived, unable to lie, and as the apostle says,
he cannot deny himself (2 Tm 2:13). How many things he is unable to do, and he
is almighty! And that’s why he is almighty, because he cannot do these things. I
mean, if he could die, he wouldn’t be almighty; if he could lie, could be deceived,
could deceive, could act unjustly, he wouldn’t be almighty, because if it were in
him to do that sort of thing, he wouldn’t be fit to be almighty.82
Focusing on the words of the apostle from 2 Tm, Augustine then gives a short argument
as to why God’s will cannot be contrary to itself: “God, you see, is willingly whatever he
is; so he is willingly eternal and unchangeable and truthful and blessed and undefeatable.
So if he can be what he does not wish, he is not almighty; but he is almighty, which is
why he is capable of whatever he wishes.”83 Coupling this with the fact that the human
will was created by God to be by nature free, it follows that His grace (in any of its many
forms) can never be so overpowering as to make the human will unfree, otherwise God’s
own will would be contrary to itself, thereby contradicting his own almightiness; which is
absurd. By granting the gift of free will to humankind, God has metaphysically and
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morally bound himself not to interfere with its use, even if it is used by them to perpetrate
moral evil. Though, of course, God is powerful enough to also bring moral good out of
their evil, which we can see perhaps most clearly in the death of Christ, unjustly put to
death by the Jews, but which thereby freed all of mankind from the servitude of sin and
the road it paves towards eternal death.
Augustine’s above argument concerning the things God cannot do has been
infrequently touched upon in the scholarship, but one notable exception is Jacques
Maritain, who claims that both Aquinas and Augustine held that every rational creature is
naturally peccable, i.e., capable of sin; and that “God can no more make a creature, angel
or man, naturally impeccable than he can make a square circle.”84 Maritain believes this
is a result of their belief that God “plays fair” with His creatures, dealing with them as He
does according to their natures. When it comes to angels and men, free beings, this means
God must respect their fallible liberty.
In the next work written for the monks of Hadrumetum, On Rebuke and Grace,
Augustine’s main concern is to call attention to what he takes to be the key to
understanding divine and human co-operation in the realm of moral action. While I have
quoted this statement once before, it is worth repeating: “It is through Jesus Christ our
Lord that we should understand God’s grace. It alone sets human beings free from evil.
Without it they do nothing good at all, whether in thinking, or in willing and loving, or in
acting.”85 Upon reading this statement and many others like it from Augustine, the monks
complained that, if God’s grace works in them the thinking and the willing and the
working in accord with what is good, then they do nothing. Another objection Augustine
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heard from these monks pertained to the possible rebuke a monastic superior may give to
his inferiors: if God does not work in them the thinking and the willing and the working
in accord with what is good, then they cannot be blamed by their monastic superiors for
what they have done wrong. After all, if they do not do it, then they should not be
reprimanded; all they should do is pray to God, so that he may give the requisite grace
that he has not yet bestowed.86 Augustine responds to their first complaint by saying that,
while indeed they are “led by the Spirit of God (spiritu Dei se agi) to do that which
should be done,” they are not led in such a way that they do nothing, “for they are acted
upon that they may act.” 87 And he responds to their second complaint by saying that even
in rebuke, the synergy between God and man can be revealed, since a rebuke may be just
the catalyst needed for someone to change the focus of their will from loving evil things
to loving God, a change that is brought to completion by God’s grace, but one that also
requires the free consent of the will. Whether in the salutary effect of a rebuke, or in the
performance of good actions, God gives support “to the weakness of the human will, so
that by divine grace it [leads] unchangeably and insurmountably (Subventum est igitur
infirmitati voluntatis humanae, ut divina gratia indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter
ageretur).88
Augustine chooses his words very carefully here, deftly emphasizing both the
primacy of divine agency and the importance of human agency: divine grace is what
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unchangeably and insurmountably leads the infirm human will in accordance with what is
good, but the human will must follow in harmony with God’s grace. This passage in
particular has frequently been interpreted by scholars as necessarily implying a kind of
moral determinism, when, depending on one’s translation of the original Latin, it need
not. John Rist, for instance, writes that he takes this passage to mean “that God’s grace
moulds the human will to its own purposes, without any vestige of self-determination
remaining for man.... The crux of the problem lies in the meaning of the two adverbs
[indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter].”89 For Rist, these two adverbs do not just imply that
grace is irresistible to and transforming of the human agent, so that we will freely from
our own power, but rather that it is “unswerving and all-conquering,”90 so that we are
slaves of God’s will. Rist concludes that, for Augustine, fallen human beings are like
puppets on the controlling fingers of God, “free in the sense only of being arranged to act
in a way not subject to external pressures.”91 Augustine, however, is not of necessity
bound to understand these two adverbs in this way, either by themselves,92 or in his

89

Rist, 435.
Rist, 436.
91
Rist 440. He takes the same position in his Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. See for example,
p. 133.
92
After conducting a word search in Volumes 44 and 45 of J-P Migne’s Patrologia Latina (PL),
which contain most of the major works at issue in the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian controversies, I have
found that the adverb indeclinabiliter is used only one time by Augustine at Column 0940 in the
controversial text that I have currently been discussing from On Rebuke and Grace 12.38. Here, the
meaning of indeclinabiliter is “unchangeably,” which by itself cannot be used by Rist to argue that
Augustine is a theological determinist. Perhaps more interesting is what my word search turned up (or,
rather, did not turn up) when it came to the adverb insuperabiliter, which does have the meaning of
“insurmountably,” “invincibly,” or as Rist likes to say, “unswerving.” I have found that Augustine will
actually never use the word insuperabiliter in the entirety of Volumes 44 and 45 of the PL. The original
Latin word he does use at Column 0940 and elsewhere (i.e., Columns 0247, 0275, 0277, 0420, 1132, 1250,
1541, 1804, 1828, and 1893) is the adverb inseparabiliter, which he consistently takes to mean
“inseparably” throughout these texts. In the first footnote for Column 0940, the editor explains that many
manuscripts brought in insuperabiliter, including the 1577 ed. Lov. They did this because the context of the
larger work seemed to emphasize the grace of God’s powerful influence on the infirm human will.
However, he notes that in the interest of not committing any possible error with respect to Augustine’s
original Latin manuscript, he is opting to keep the word Augustine himself used, which is inseperabiliter.
90

41
pairing of them with the imperfect passive subjunctive of the Latin agō, namely ageretur,
all of which can be collectively translated as that divine grace “unchangeably and
insurmountably leads” the human will. Translating ageretur in terms of “leads” (not
“drives” or “moves”) is not only in my opinion an equally accurate conversion of this
word into English, but also helps to shed the negative connotations of “compels” or
“determines,” which are meanings usually attendant on these alternate translations, and
ones which inevitably imply that Augustine is describing a kind of moral determinism
with God playing the puppeteer. I would argue that Rist focuses too much on the two
adverbs Augustine uses and not enough on the verb which they are meant to modify and,
specifically, the different meaning of “leads” this verb can possess. In doing this, Rist
misunderstands the larger thought that Augustine is attempting to convey about how
God’s grace works with the fallen human will by unchangeably and insurmountably
providing it with its proper direction and resting place.
Nor would Augustine accept the dichotomy Rist sets up between God’s grace and
the human will. As we have briefly seen in works such as On Nature and Grace,
Augustine does not view these as mutually exclusive realities that have to somehow be
reconciled, and that have to be given their own cordoned off areas of existence apart from
each other; they are, rather, two distinct realities that have a mutual exigency for each
other: the sole function of grace is to complete all finite natures according to the will of
God, including human nature and its conative and cognitive powers; and the sole function
of all finite natures and their corresponding powers is to be completed as such. In short,
the purpose of God’s grace is to “lead” us to our perfection, and the purpose of our wills
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is to “follow” that grace to our perfection.93 One can see the entire work, On Rebuke and
Grace, as a brief attempt to make this point to the monks of Hadrumetum.
The monks of Provence, on the other hand, were mainly worried that Augustine’s
belief in predestination by grace led to defeatism in the moral life. After all, if God has
already decided who He will elect before the foundation of the world, then nothing any of
us do can change that, thus rendering our wills inefficacious. To avoid the total
disempowerment of the will seemingly implied by God’s predestinating grace, these
monks wanted to reserve certain spaces for human freedom that were liberated from the
encroachment of divine causality, namely the beginning of faith and perseverance.
Augustine sent them On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance
in response, which were originally written as one work between the years of 427 and 429.
From the very beginning of On the Predestination of the Saints and all the way to
its end there is one point that Augustine stresses above all else: It is God’s grace that
makes us first believe.94 The way he goes about actually proving this is through the citing
of Church authorities and by giving certain arguments based on what these authorities
have said. It should come as no surprise that the first of these authorities Augustine
mentions is Paul, whom he quotes as saying, Not that we are sufficient to think anything
as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God (2 Cor 3:5). Augustine then reasons that,
since thought precedes belief, and since God graces us with thought, God is responsible
for our belief, which is merely thought with assent. It follows that anyone who believes
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also thinks, meaning “no one is sufficient for himself, either to begin or to perfect
faith.”95
As mentioned before, God offers sufficient beginning and perfecting graces to all,
and Augustine never abandoned this idea: “in a certain sense the Father teaches
all men to come to His Son. For it was not in vain that it was written in the prophets, And
they shall all be teachable of God (John 6:45).”96 All are teachable of God (i.e., all have
the capacity for God), but not all actualize it in faith working through the love of God and
neighbor. Augustine thinks this is why the Gospel writer prefaces this statement with the
claim, Every man, therefore, who has heard of the Father, and has learned, comes to me.
Even though His lessons often fall on deaf ears and go unnoticed by blind eyes,
“God teaches all men to come to Christ, not because all come, but because none comes in
any other way.”97 For Augustine, this is borne out by the fact that some choose to accept
the offer of grace and thereby receive it as a gift from God, whether in its beginning or in
its completion, and some do not, as Scripture clearly bears witness. It follows that both
those who successfully come to Christ and those who fail in this task do so willingly; the
former do so willingly and in co-operation with God, whereas the latter do so willingly
but in separation from God.
It might be helpful to think of what Augustine is saying in the following way:
Those who come to Christ are offered the gift of grace by God; they accept such grace in
co-operation with Him; they then receive that grace, which is both theirs from their
acceptance of it, and God’s from His having given it. Those who fail to come to Christ

95

Chapter 5.
Chapter 7.
97
Ibid.
96

44
are similarly offered the gift of grace by God; but they reject such grace in independence
from Him; they then fail (and justly, Augustine might add) to receive that grace, which
could have been theirs if they had accepted it, but remains only God’s, who never stops
offering it.98 Augustine thinks the believer should not worry about to which group they
belong, however, since all deserve condemnation because of Adam’s sin, “so that even if
none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault
with God.”99 Augustine’s answer here is consistent with the one already given in To
Simplician: It is because of our demerits that we will be condemned, not because God
does not will all to be saved.
Chapter 19 of On the Predestination of the Saints is where talk of the relation
between God’s grace and Augustine’s understanding of predestination100 reaches its
height. To begin the Chapter, Augustine makes a very important distinction between the
two: “predestination is the preparation for grace, while grace is the donation itself.” The
preparation for grace is already accomplished in the mind of God, i.e., in God’s rational
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the relevant chapters of his On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance in what
follows. However, it can be briefly noted that his definition shares certain similarities with, but is also
different from, other major Patristic authors writing before and after him. Matthew Levering (2011)
attempts a definitional comparison between the major Patristic authors regarding predestination. We learn
from Levering, for example, that Origin’s definition of predestination is the same as Augustine’s in terms
of basing it on God’s foreknowledge (i.e., God only grants His benefits or graces according to His
knowledge of the future), but different from Augustine’s in terms of claiming that it is based on God’s
knowledge of the future merits or demerits of individual persons (Levering, 39-40). For more helpful
comparisons between how Augustine understands predestination and that of other theologians form the
Patristic period, see Levering’s book, Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths (Oxford University
Press: New York, 2011).
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plan for creation, whereas the donation itself is dependent on the latter, with God only
granting grace according to it. As Augustine says, “grace is the effect of predestination,”
not the other way around. Another distinction Augustine insists upon in this Chapter is
that between God’s predestination and foreknowledge, where the former cannot exist
without the latter (because it would be nonsensical to say that God’s predestination was
accomplished without knowledge), but foreknowledge is capable of existing without
predestination. This allows Augustine inter alia to say of God that, “He is able to
foreknow even those things he does not Himself do—as all sins whatever,” which
effectively safeguards the predestinating will of God from any taint of the moral evil
rational creatures are prone to commit by their own wills.
Augustine then uses the example of Abraham’s faith in God’s promise to further
illustrate his doctrine of predestination by grace:
Therefore when God promised to Abraham in his seed the faith of
the nations, saying, I have established you a father of many nations
(Genesis 17:5), whence the apostle says, Therefore it is of faith, that the promise,
according to grace, might be established to all the seed (Romans 4:16). He
promised not from the power of our will but from His own predestination. For He
promised what He Himself would do, not what men would do.101
What men would do is uncertain, but what God Himself would do is certain and, in fact,
already accomplished, for He made those things that shall be (Is 45: 11). God’s
predestinating will does not change: from eternity, God has made up his mind, so to
speak, to strengthen those who will the thinking of good thoughts, and to let those harden
their hearts who by their free choice think evil thoughts.
Again somewhat reminiscent of the Confessions, Augustine notes that, “although
men do those good things which pertain to God’s worship, He himself makes them to do
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what he has commanded.” Coming back to Abraham, it was not Abraham that made God
to do what He had promised. It was God. To say otherwise would make the fulfillment of
God’s promise placed in the power of Abraham. Abraham did not think this way, but
rather he believed, giving glory to God, that what he promised he was able also to do
(Rom 4:21). In the same way, our initial faith in God is a gift from Him: “when it is
said, ‘If you believe, you shall be saved,’ faith is required of us, and salvation is proposed
to us as a reward. For these things are both commanded of us, and are shown to
be God’s gifts, in order that we may understand both that we do them, and
that God makes us to do them, as He most plainly says by the prophet Ezekiel. For what
is plainer than when He says, I will cause you to do? (Ezekiel 36: 27).”102
On the Gift of Perseverance is quite similar to On the Predestination of the Saints,
which makes sense since they were originally written as one cohesive work on God’s
grace. However, as the title of the work indicates, it is concerned primarily with the
perseverance by which someone perseveres in the good to the end, and to prove that this
is a gift of God. Here, as in On the Predestination of the Saints, Augustine will rely on
Church authorities and philosophical argument to make his case. The first authority he
relies upon in this work, however, is not St. Paul but St. Cyprian, whose On the Lord’s
Prayer is cited by him as directly contradicting the heresy of Pelagianism in its defense
of two important points. First, the grace of God is not given according to our merits; and
second, no man is without sin. Another principle that Augustine adds as in accord with
right Christian teaching is that we all inherit the condemnation brought about by Adam’s
sin. He writes that, “Of these three points, that which I have placed last is the only one
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that is not treated of in the above-named book of the glorious martyr; but of the two
others the discourse there is of such perspicuity, that the above-named heretics [sc. the
Pelagians], modern enemies of the grace of Christ, are found to have been convicted long
before they were born.”103 Augustine’s opening argument to the monks therefore is that
his position on grace is actually not as radical as they may think, mirroring St. Cyprian’s
work in at least the two previously mentioned ways.
Augustine also rightly notes that it was Cyprian who said, “We must boast in
nothing, seeing that nothing is our own.”104 Augustine takes this to mean that we only
have a proper conception of free will “if we give up the whole to God, and do not entrust
ourselves partly to Him and partly to ourselves, as that venerable martyr saw.”105 To be
clear, this does not mean that we must relinquish our idea of human freedom simpliciter,
but rather that we must relinquish the idea that we can be free in independence from God.
In his famous biography of the African Bishop entitled Augustine of Hippo,106 Peter
Brown claims that this point can be used to illustrate the major difference between
Augustine and Pelagius:
The basic difference between the two men ... is to be found in two radically
different views on the relation between man and God. It is summed up succinctly
in their choice of language. Augustine had been fascinated by babies: the extent of
their helplessness had grown upon him ever since he wrote the Confessions; and
in the Confessions, he had no hesitation in likening his relation to God to that of a
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baby to its mother’s breast,107 utterly dependent, intimately involved in all the
good and evil that might come from this, the only source of life.
The Pelagian, by contrast, was contemptuous of babies. ‘There is no more
pressing admonition than this, that we should be called sons of God.’ To be a
‘son’ was to become an entirely separate person, no longer dependent upon one’s
father, but capable of following out by one’s own power, the good deeds that he
had commanded. The Pelagian was emancipatus a deo; it is a brilliant image
taken from the language of Roman family law: freed from the all-embracing and
claustrophobic rights of the father of a great family over his children, these sons
had ‘come of age.’ They had been ‘released,’ as in Roman Law, from dependence
upon the pater familias and could at last go out into the world as mature, free
individuals, able to uphold in heroic deeds the good name of their illustrious
ancestry: ‘Be ye perfect, even as Your Father in Heaven is perfect.’108
Unlike Pelagius, Augustine thought we could not cordon off a space for human autonomy
that exists in and for itself, whether that be how we initially come to have faith in God, or
how we persevere in that faith to the end, or indeed anything good that we will or think or
do. In all of these respects, Augustine states we are radically dependent on God, but it is
nonetheless a willing dependency, because it is a relation we enter into if and only if we
accept it by the humble consent of our wills. In short, it is a co-operative relationship.
God does not force us to accept this dependence relationship with Him, even if it would
be for our own good. For He has left us in the hands of our own counsel (Sir 15: 12-18),
and the grace that would bring us into such a relationship with Him could not properly be
called a gift unless it could be accepted or rejected. One thing we can always count on,
however, is that God is there in the background, constantly working even up until now,
offering graces that would establish this relation, but not compelling us to accept them.
Augustine thus encourages the monks that this co-operative relationship he is describing
leaves room for both humans and God to act freely, inasmuch as when we will what is
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good, “God works in us to will also. We therefore work, but God works in us to work
also for His good pleasure.”109 If, on the other hand, we prefer to will what is evil and
thereby reject God’s help to work with us to accomplish good things, He will nonetheless
maintain his “standing offer” to provide help to our fallen wills; but He will respect our
free choice to stand in separation from Him by not actually giving support to our fallen
wills by gifting us with His grace. Whether the monks work with God or against God,
then, Augustine believes their free will is on display for all to see.
Starting with Chapter 34, Augustine shifts his focus to the doctrine of
predestination, and makes the somewhat unexpected claim that predestination, at least
how he teaches it, and moral exhortation are not opposed to each other. After all, he tells
us, “Did not that teacher of the heathen [sc. St. Paul] so often, in faith and truth, both
commend predestination, and not cease to preach the word of God? Because he said, It
is God that works in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure (Phil 2:13), did he
not also exhort that we should both will and do what is pleasing to God?” In Chapter 36,
he also cites Cyprian, saying that he actually “pronounced predestination to be most
assured. For if we must boast in nothing, seeing that nothing is our own, certainly we
must not boast of the most persevering obedience.” But the objection rears its head again:
If God works in us both to will and to do, and if we cannot boast in anything, because
nothing is our own, then does this not make human beings passive agents in the working
out of their own salvation? Augustine recounts a story he once heard coming from a
monastery in which one of the brothers was rebuked for doing things he should not have
done, and for not doing things that should have been done. When he was rebuked, the
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monk replied, “Whatever I may now be, I shall be such as God has foreknown that I shall
be,” implying that he has no control over the development of his character, and so no
control over what he does or does not do. According to Augustine, what this monk said
about God’s foreknowledge was true, “but he was not profited by this truth for good, but
so far made way in evil as to desert the society of the monastery, and become a dog
returned to his vomit; and, nevertheless, it is uncertain what he is yet to become.”110 Such
is just one example of how predestination and foreknowledge are often misunderstood,
resulting in a moral complacency that opens a person up to the alluring danger of sin.
How, then, should predestination be taught? For Augustine, there is really only
one suitable way:
For either predestination must be preached, in the way and degree in which
the Holy Scripture plainly declares it, so that in the predestined the gifts and
calling of God may be without repentance [i.e., without dependence on the
merits/demerits of those who are predestined]; or it must be avowed
that God’s grace is given according to our merits—which is the opinion of
the Pelagians. To whomsoever, therefore, God gives His gifts, beyond a doubt He
has foreknown that He will bestow them on them, and in His foreknowledge He
has prepared them for them. Therefore, those whom He predestined, them He also
called with that calling which I am not reluctant often to make mention of, of
which it is said, The gifts and calling of God are without repentance
(Rom 11:29).111
Augustine is making the point that the gratuity of God’s grace does not admit of degrees.
It is either gratuitous or not. It is either as Holy Scripture teaches it to be or not. There is
no way to escape between the horns of this dilemma by finding a third alternative, even
though that is precisely what the monks to whom Augustine is writing were trying to do,
in their holding that the beginning of faith and perseverance in that faith to the end were
two parts of human agency that were independent of God’s causality. But Augustine will
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hold his ground along with St. Paul and St. Cyprian in saying that all of the good we
think and will and do are gifts of God.112 Indeed, they are gifts in the sense of being
freely ‘given’ to us by God, not depending on our merits, but requiring the consent of our
wills to be received. The fact that they are gifts, Augustine tells us, does not make them
any less ours when we willingly receive them, for “ours is anything had by us, ours too is
anything given to us; I mean, if it isn’t ours, it hasn’t been given. How after all can you
give anything, if it isn’t to be his or hers, to whom you give it?”113 It follows that all of
the goods and perfections that come down to us from the Father of Lights (James 1:17)
can properly be said to be God’s, in that He is the one giving these gifts, and ours, in that
we are ones accepting and thereby receiving them.
For the remainder of the work, Augustine then gives advice as to how the abovementioned teaching of predestination ought to be preached to the members of the Church,
so that it does not lead to moral defeatism or theological contradiction. In Chapter 58, we
receive the most important of these pieces of advice. While rather lengthy, it is worth
quoting in full:
Now, therefore, the definite determination of God’s will concerning
predestination is of such a kind that some from unbelief receive the will to obey,
and are converted to the faith or persevere in the faith, while others who abide in
the delight of damnable sins, even if they have been predestined, have not yet
arisen, because the aid of compassionate grace has not yet lifted them up. For if
any are not yet called whom by His grace He has predestined to be elected, they
will receive that grace114 whereby they may will to be elected, and may be so; and
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if any obey, but have not been predestined to His kingdom and glory, they are for
a season, and will not abide in the same obedience to the end.
Although, then, these things are true, yet they must not be so said to the
multitude of hearers as that the address may be applied to themselves also, and
those words of those people may be said to them which you have set down in your
letter, and which I have above introduced: The definite determination
of God’s will concerning predestination is of such a kind that some of you
from unbelief shall receive the will to obey, and come to the faith. What need is
there for saying, ‘Some of you?’ For if we speak to God’s Church, if we speak
to believers, why do we say that some of them had come to the faith, and seem to
do a wrong to the rest, when we may more fittingly say the definite determination
of the will of God concerning predestination is of such a kind that
from unbelief you shall receive the will to obey, and come to the faith, and shall
receive perseverance, and abide to the end?
When we preach predestination, in other words, Augustine thinks it is better to preach it
in the third person rather than the second person. For to preach it in the second person “is
not to be said to be desirable, but abominable, and it is excessively harsh and hateful to
fly as it were into the face of an audience with abuse, when he who speaks to them
says, ‘And if there are any of you who obey, and are predestined to be rejected, the power
of obedience shall be withdrawn from you, that you may cease to obey.’”115 Augustine
admits that there may be no fundamental difference in the third person and second person
expressions of this doctrine, but there is a difference in the psychological effect that these
expressions have on the audience: the one made in second person is unhelpful to their
salvation, sounding more like a personal attack, or a supererogatory request that they
cannot work towards achieving; whereas the one made in the third person is helpful to
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their salvation, in that it provides a kind of salutary exhortation to fight the good fight, to
keep the faith, and finish the race.116 According to Augustine, the way predestination is
preached to the community of the faithful matters because human effort matters. For
anyone to say that he would switch his preaching of predestination from the second
person to the third person in order to achieve some end other than aiding in the salvation
of the faithful, such as to maintain order and peace in his flock, makes Augustine out to
be no more than a charlatan. Given how seriously Augustine took his pastoral duty of
preaching, I dare say he would view such an accusation contemptible.117
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Chapter 3
Augustine as Preacher of Grace

The stress that Augustine puts on the primacy of God’s grace in his anti-Pelagian
and semi-Pelagian writings has led to him being called the “doctor of grace” (doctor
gratiae). But even in these sometimes highly polemical works, we have seen reason to
doubt the claim of his theological opponents and scholarly critics that his teaching with
respect to sin and grace somehow destroy the free choice of the will. We see this to an
even greater extent in his pastoral writings and scriptural commentaries, which I will
show allow for the same kind of synergy between God and man that the Eastern
Orthodox tradition’s conception of deification requires.
While the concept of deification by grace is not as emphasized in Augustine as in
the Greek-speaking-East, it still finds a place of great importance in his writings.118 As an
object of scholarly research, however, it is still true to say that it has received less than
adequate attention, considering just how much Augustine will rely on it to explain key
aspects of Christian life, from the reason why God created man to how we are able to
interact with God (whether in this life or the next) and everything in between.119 As a
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theological concept, deification finds its origin in the famous words of St. Peter: grace
makes us partakers of the divine nature (“consortes divinae naturae/theias xoinonoi
phuseos”) (2 Peter 1:4). Because of God’s deifying grace, real human-divine communion
can take place, as we become in a sense connatural with God through His activity
towards us that makes us “like Him.” Similarly to the Greek Fathers, Augustine views
deification to be the New Testament doctrine of uiothesia, or sonship by adoption, made
possible by the Son’s Incarnation. The Word’s union with human nature in the person of
Christ as the way to our salvation is a major theme in Augustine’s theological and
pastoral writings from about the mid-390s throughout the rest of his teaching and
preaching career. An earlier example of this can be found in Sermo 261.2-3 (ca. 396 or
397):
Just as he ascended, you see, and still didn’t depart from us, so we too are now
there with him ... if he has attached us to himself as his members in such a way
that even with us joined on he is his very same self (ut etiam nobis coniunctis
idem ipse sit), ... we too are going to ascend, not by our own virtue, but by our and
his oneness (sed nostra et illius unitate).
A later example of this can be found at en. Ps. 121.5:
Onto what should you grasp? Grasp that which Christ became for you, because
that is Christ himself, and Christ himself is rightly understood by this name I am
who I am [Ex. 3.14], inasmuch as he is in the form of God. In that nature wherein
he deemed it no robbery to be equal to God, there he is the selfsame [idipsum].
But that you might participate in the selfsame, he first of all became a participant
in what you are [ut autem efficiaris tu particeps in idipsum, factus est ipse prior
particeps tui].120

Augustine’s conception of deification, I do not include it in the following list: V. Capánaga, ‘La Deificatión
en la soteriología augustiniana,’ in Augustinus Magister: Congrès International Augustinien, Paris 21-24
septembre 1954 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), ii. 754-54; P. Wilson-Kastner, Grace and
Participation in the Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,’ Augustinian Studies, 7 (1976),
135-57; J. Oroz Reta, ‘De l’illumination à la deification de l’âme selon Saint Augustin,’ SP 27 (1993), 36482.
120
CSEL 95/3.91.

56
Our participation in God is thus only made possible by Christ becoming man, and it is
through him that we become deified. The Christological focus of Augustine’s doctrine of
deification is perhaps best seen in his Commentaries on the Psalms 49.2, where he writes:
In the same psalm observe to whom it is said, “I have said, ‘you are gods and sons
of the Most High, all of you, but you will die as men, and you will fall like one of
the princes.’” It is therefore clear that he calls gods those men who are deified by
his grace (ex gratia sua deificatos) even though they are not born of his substance.
For he justifies who is just through himself and not from another; and he deifies
who is God through himself and not by participation in another. Now he who
justifies is he who deifies because by justifying he makes them sons of God. For
he gave them power to become sons of God (Jn 1:12). If we have become sons of
God, then we have also become gods; but this is by reason of the grace of the one
who adopts us not by reason of his nature begetting us.121
This adoptive grace makes us brothers of Christ: “For he who says ‘Our Father’ to God
says ‘Brother’ to Christ.”122 And Christ himself tells us, Whoever does the will of my
Father is my brother and sister and mother (Mk 3:35). The adopted Christian in fact
becomes part of Christ and forms with him ‘the whole man,’ “for if he is the head, we are
the members: he and we are a whole man.”123 In this regard, Augustine will often refer to
the Church by the expression “Christus totus”—the whole Christ.124 For Augustine,
individual Christians are only who they are in relation to Christ and their fellow Christian
brothers and sisters, in the service of charity. It is a relation in which the fulfillment of
any member helps bring to fulfillment the whole body. When one Christian, for instance,
shows hospitality to another who is a stranger, or feeds another who is hungry, or clothes

121

Enarr. In Psalmos.49.2; CCL 38.575-576. Similar texts to this one can be found at: Miscellany of
83 Questions, LXVII; Sermo 166.4 (PL 38.909); Epistle.140.4.10 (PL 33.542); Sermon 119.4-5 (probably
after 409); Sermon 126.9.
122
Enarr. in Psalmos.48.1.8.
123
In Joan. Tract.21.8.
124
See for example, On the Trinity, 4.2.12; Sermon 217.4; Sermon 137.1, 400-405; and Sermon
341.11.

57
another who is naked, “members are serving members; and the head rejoices, and reckons
as given to himself whatever has been lavished on a member of his.”125
As the Archbishop of Ottawa, Monsignor Joseph Plourde, once said:
[T]he human being, in St. Augustine’s formulation, is ‘an extension of the
Trinitarian family’; that, when God thinks of man as His image, man is, in the
first place, Jesus Christ. Consequently, that man is governed by the same
dynamics as the Trinity itself, that is, by freedom, unity, and love.... [T]his image
of God which is actualized in a divine surrounding, requires of us a mastery of
nature; and thus a technical and economic effort. We should move beyond the
struggle for life and beyond self-centeredness, to a vision of sharing, and the
essential fulfillment of all humanity.126
The fact that some members of the body have things to give to other members, or that
some have things others do not, does not imply any kind of disunity in the body. 127 The
body is a place where the members ought to supply what certain other members are
lacking, a place where the material and spiritual needs of others are met.128 This is one of
Augustine’s fundamental theological/philosophical ideas: “that the good of all persons is
both unified and interdependent (I cannot specify what is good for me without including
what is good for you in the same calculation).”129
Augustine gives an example: Suppose in your body your left hand has a ring on it,
but your right hand does not. Does that mean your right hand is lacking something your
left hand possesses? It would seem so, if you are only considering your two hands; but if
you consider your entire body, of which your two hands are parts, you will see that “the
one which doesn’t have a ring, does in fact have it in the one which does.”130 Similarly,
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different parts of your body serve different and distinct functions from each other: your
eyes allow you to see where you are headed, whereas your feet move you to where your
eyes look ahead; and while it is true that your feet are unable to see, and your eyes are
unable to walk, it is not true that they lack each other’s functions, when they are
considered within the context of the unity of the body as a whole. Augustine writes:
“your foot answers you, ‘I too have the light; not in myself, though, but in the eye; the
eye, after all, doesn’t see only for itself, and not for me.’ Your eyes too say, ‘We too can
walk, not in ourselves but in the feet; the feet, after all, don’t only carry themselves, and
not carry us.’”131 Every function of every part of the body, in other words, is shared in the
unity of the whole body for the benefit of the whole body. This is how we must
understand the unity of the body of Christ, i.e., the unity of its members and Head in the
visible Church. For we, too, are freedom, unity, and love, not in ourselves but in the
whole Christ, and particularly in our Head, who has sacramentally brought us into this
unity through his life, death, and resurrection. The unity of the whole Christ, then, cannot
be understood in individualistic terms, because it is by its very nature a societas grounded
in the love of the members both for each other and for their Head, and preeminently in
the love that the Head has for its body. Freedom, unity, and love are not private
possessions of an individual, but rather are the common goods of all Christians, as they
relate to each other and to God through Christ.
A fitting and not to mention helpful image of this unity is also provided by the
prophet Isaiah’s discussion of the bride and the bridegroom. In the book of Isaiah, the
bride speaks to the bridegroom as if they were one person. Augustine comments that it is
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certain that “it’s one and the same person speaking,”132 and that we can see this in what is
said: As for a bridegroom he has bound a turban on my head, and as for a bride he has
decked me out with ornaments (Is 61:10). Isaiah calls “one and the same person
bridegroom with reference to the head, bride with reference to the body.”133 Another
biblical example Augustine often relies on to explain the close-knit unity between the
members of the body of Christ is Paul’s conversion experience recounted in Acts 9. Here,
the then named Saul is asked the simple question, Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting
me? (Acts 9: 1-4). Paul could neither see nor touch Christ, but he still said to him, why
are you persecuting me? Augustine thinks it is of great significance that Christ did not
say, “Why are you persecuting my family, my servants, my saints—add another title of
honor—my brothers and sisters.”134 He said you are persecuting me, my members, who
were being insulted, stoned, and killed on earth, causing the head to cry out from heaven.
The unity among Christ and Christians is indeed so strong that Augustine claims
that psalms of praise may be made in honor not only to the Head of the Church but also
to its body, to us as its adopted sons and daughters.135 Even more emphatic is the image
of this unity Augustine gives us in his Commentary on the Epistle of John 10.3, where he
talks of Christ and Christians as being unus Christus amans seipsum, or “one Christ
loving himself.”136 For Augustine, one becomes a member of Christ’s body only by the
way of love (via amoris), and through that love “there will be one Christ loving himself.
For when the members love one another, the body loves itself.”137
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We must also understand this unity to apply to all members of the body of Christ,
no matter where they are, no matter past, present, or future:
The apostle says with the utmost clarity: You are the body of Christ and his
members (1 Cor 12:27). All of us together are the members and the body of
Christ—not only we who are present in this place, but all throughout the world;
not only we who are alive at the present time, but—as I might put it—all who
have lived or will live from Abel the just man to the end of the world, as long as
human beings beget and are begotten. Every just man who passes through this life
is included138; all who exist now, that is, not just in this place, but in this life
everywhere; all who will be born in the future. All these form the one body of
Christ.... This Church, which is now on pilgrimage, is united to the heavenly
Church where we have the angels as fellow citizens.... And there is but a single
Church, the city of the great king.139
Apart from the body of Christ (corpus Christi), or what means the same thing, the unity
of the Church (unitas Ecclesiae), Christians cannot be one with any person, even
themselves; nor can they find any true and lasting fulfillment as the spiritual beings they
are meant to become. As a result, Christ “wants his disciples to be one in him, because
they cannot be one in themselves, split as they are from each other by clashing wills and
desires, and the uncleanness of their sins; so they are cleansed by the mediator that they
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may be one in him, not only by virtue of the same nature whereby all of them from the
ranks of mortal men are made equal to the angels, but even more by virtue of one and the
same wholly harmonious will reaching out in concert to the same ultimate happiness,
fused somehow into one spirit in the furnace of charity.”140 Augustine tells us that
Christ’s desire for our unity in him should be seen as an invitation to live the life of the
angels, to participate in the Holy Spirit’s love, and to partake in the never ending dinner.
It is an invitation which is given to us so that we may become Christ’s brothers and
sisters, so that we may inherit the eternal felicity meant for us from the moment we were
created in the divine Wisdom. And it is an invitation to live Christ’s life of perfect
freedom, lived in perfect obedience to his Father in heaven.141 Accepting this invitation
means that we actually become Christ, “because we too are himself, insofar as he is the
son of man because of us, and we are sons of God because of him.”142
But here we must be careful about in what sense we become Christ, for surely we
do not attain the divine nature of Christ, nor do we become Christ in the sense of taking
over his unique role as mediator between God and man, i.e., as the Head of the Church.
In Sermon 341 (419), Augustine clarifies how we should understand our identification
with, yet distinction from, the two-natured Christ. He begins this sermon with an analysis
of choice scriptural passages to show that Christ is to be understood in three ways: the
first way is “as God and according to the divine nature which is coequal and coeternal
with the Father before he assumed flesh.” The second way is as he is after the taking on
of our human nature, i.e., as the God-man—the mediator between God and man,
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“according to that pre-eminence which is peculiar to him and in which he is not to be
equated with other human beings.” The third and final way is “in some manner or other
as the whole Christ in the fullness of the Church, that is as head and body, according to
the completeness of a certain perfect man (Eph 4:13), the man in whom we are each of us
members.”143 Only in this third and final way can we properly say we are Christ.
We will not receive the same divine inheritance as Christ the mediator, however,
if we shun the unity enjoyed by the whole Christ, preferring our own individual good.
Indeed, if we do not join together in this societas but set ourselves apart, we will be
natural human beings and remain as such, for this is what we have of ourselves, by
ourselves; we will remain psychikoi (natural men), who are slaves to the carnal lusts that
are natural to our bodily existence, not becoming the pneumatikoi (spiritual men)144 we
were meant to become, because we will not possess the Spirit, or perhaps better, because
we will not be possessed by the Spirit. Augustine believes that it is this unity, effected by
the Incarnation, cemented by the love of the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts (Rom
5:5), that is enjoyed by the true Church. And it is this unity that Saint John was speaking
of when he said, that they may be one as we are one (Jn 17:22). The Father and Son are
one not only by virtue of the same substance they share, but also from their will being
one and the same. So too, all true Christians are one not only by possessing the same
human nature, but also “by being bound in the fellowship of the same love.”145 Being
bound by others’ love in this way is not a form of internal compulsion, an obstruction to
one’s freedom, but rather is how we are reconciled to each other and to God.146 The
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Church thus cannot be conceived of as a mere natural unity between members of the
human species. After all, not even the Trinity can be described as just a community of
three persons which are of the same divine kind. The Church, like the Trinitarian
communion, is a dilectionis societas. That is, a society of individuals of the same kind
that is effected by love. According to Augustine, any other kind of societas, whether
formed for the utilitarian benefit of its members or some other reason, is not a true
society.
Augustine was so certain of the reality of man’s deification by grace, occurring in
and through the unified body of Christ, that he even used it to argue for the true divinity
of the Son:
If the word (sermo) of God was so made to men that they should be called gods,
how can the Word (verbum) of God himself, who is with God, not be God? If men
are made gods by the Word of God (per sermonem Dei), if by participating
(participando) they are made gods, is not He in whom they participate not God?
If lights which are kindled are gods, is the light which enlightens not God? If they
are made gods being warmed in a certain fashion by the saving fire, is He by
whom they are warmed not God? You come to the light and are illuminated and
numbered among the sons of God. If you draw back from the light you are
darkened and reckoned to be in darkness. But that light does not come to itself,
because it does not draw back from itself. If therefore the word (sermo) of God
makes you, how is the Word (verbum) of God not God?147
Augustine makes clear, however, that our adoption as sons will only be fully realized in
the next life, when the spiritualization of our bodies is complete:
Our full adoption as sons will take place in the redemption of our body. We now
have the firstfruits of the spirit, by which we are indeed made sons of God; but in
other respects we are Sons of God as saved and made new by hope. In the event,
however, since we are not yet finally saved, we are therefore not yet fully made
new nor yet sons of God, but children of this world.148
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This is not to say that we cannot have any knowledge of our future spiritualized state at
the present time. Christ’s resurrected form, for those who have the eyes to see and the
ears to hear, provides us quite exactly with what we will be, God willing, at the
resurrection of our bodies. The spiritualized form in which “we are to rise again, he has
shown us himself in his own resurrection. It’s because that specific form, however, will
have no tendency to decay that the apostle says, But this I must say, brothers, that flesh
and blood shall not gain possession by inheritance of the kingdom of God; nor shall what
is perishable gain possession by inheritance of imperishability (1 Cor 15:50).149
Augustine does not view it to be an abdication of our freedom to conform
ourselves as far as we can to Christ’s spiritualized form here and now, this side of
heaven; he in fact recommends us to imitate the example set by Christ in the form of his
humanity, and the example set by the Son—the divine Image—whose being and will are
inseparably one with the Father’s:
For we too are the image of God, though not the equal one like him; we are made
by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father like that image; we are
image because we are illuminated with light; that one is so because it is the light
that illuminates, and therefore it provides a model for us without having a model
itself. For it does not imitate another going before it to the Father, since it is never
by the least hair’s breadth separated from him, since it is the same thing as he is
from whom it gets its being. But we by pressing on imitate him who abides
motionless; we follow him who stands still, and by walking in him we move
toward him, because for us he became a road or way in time by his humility,
while being for us an eternal abode by his divinity.”150
Even though we are not an equal image of God the Father, like the Son, and even though
we are radically separated in our being from him, unlike the Son, by imitating the
humility of Christ, who only came to do his Father’s will, we can achieve a deeper
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communion in that reality of God which is for us: God’s eternal will and knowledge. Our
deification as Christians is effected by our imitation of Christ’s obedience to that reality
on which our salvation and freedom completely turns, by aligning our wills with Christ’s.
That Christ as humble man is our way to Christ as God is an idea that frequently recurs in
the Sermons. For instance, Augustine says, “The place for you to stay in, that’s God; the
way for you to get there, that’s man. It’s one and the same Christ, both the way to go and
the place to go.”151 Augustine will also frequently refer to the humanity of Christ as being
a “broad road” or “highway” which leads us back home to our Creator,152 but a road or
highway which demands from us the same kind of willing obedience displayed by Christ.
The model of human free will for which I am arguing in Augustine is not one
characterized by the dominance of the divine will over the subordinate human will, but
one characterized by their inseparable, co-operative, and free relation to each other. The
Greek East picks up on this, too, with Basil offering the same example of the Son’s
obedience to the Father to show why this is the case: “When then he says, ‘I have not
spoken of myself,’ and again, ‘As the Father said unto me, so I speak,’ and ‘The word
which you hear is not mine, but [the Father’s] which sent me,’ and in another place, ‘As
the Father gave me commandment, even so I do,’ it is not because he lacks deliberate
purpose or power of initiation, nor yet because he has to wait for the preconcerted keynote, that he employs language of this kind. His object is to make it plain that His own
will is connected in indissoluble union with the Father ... so that ‘all things that the Father
hath’ belong to the Son, not gradually accruing to Him little by little, but with Him all
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together and at once.”153 And the same goes for the Spirit: “you might learn that in every
operation the Spirit is closely conjoined with, and inseparable from, the Father and the
Son. God works the differences of operations, and the Lord the diversities of
administrations, but all the while the Holy Spirit is present too of His own will,
dispensing distribution of the gifts according to each recipients worth.”154 Basil’s younger
brother, Gregory of Nyssa, will even be more extreme in his language, claiming that
subjection to God is our only chance for real freedom. He writes: “the subjection of men
to God is salvation for those who are so made subject, according to the voice of the
prophet, who says that his soul is subject to God, since of Him cometh salvation by
subjection (Ps lxii.1), so that subjection is the means of averting perdition.”155
Augustine assures us that such obedience or subjection to God does nothing to
vitiate the nature of our wills as free:
When we obey God and are said to do his will by that obedience, we do not do it
unwillingly, but willingly. Hence, if we do it willingly, in what sense do we not
do our own will, unless in the language of Scripture that will is called ours, which
is understood to be our own as opposed to the will of God. Adam had such a will,
and as a result, we died in him. Christ did not have such a will so that we might
have life in him.... In terms of the Son’s divinity, the Father and the Son have one
and the same will, nor can it be different in any way where the nature of the
Trinity as a whole is immutable. But so that the mediator of God and man, the
man Jesus Christ, would not do his own will, which is opposed to God, he was not
only man, but God and man. And through this marvelous and singular grace
human nature could exist in him without any sin.”156
Similar themes are brought out in his Commentary on Psalm 93 (ca. 414), where
Augustine discusses the two wills that Christ revealed in the garden of Gethsemane and
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on the cross within the larger context of salvation history, and what this should mean for
the salvation of our own individual wills. He rhetorically asks:
How did our Lord marry two wills so that they became one in the humanity he
bore? In his body, the Church, there would be some people who, after wanting to
do their own will, would later follow the will of God. The Lord prefigured these
people in himself. He wanted to show that though they are weak, they still belong
to him, and so he represented them in advance in his own person. He sweated
blood from his whole body, as a sign that the blood of martyrs would gush from
his body, the Church.... He revealed the human will that was in him, but if he had
continued to insist on that will, he would have seemed to display perversity of
heart. If you recognize that he has had compassion on you, and is setting you free
in himself, imitate the next prayer he made: Yet not what I will, but what you will
be done, Father (Mt 26:39).157
We are able to do the Father’s will here and now by following the commandments
present in scripture, with the help of God’s grace, of course. In one of his most important
anti-Pelagian sermons, Sermon 348A (415), Augustine comments on the apostle’s words,
We pray to God that you may do nothing evil (2 Cor 13:7):
He could have said, “We warn you not to do anything evil, we teach you not to do
anything evil, we order you, we command you.” And to be sure, if he had said
that, he would have said something perfectly in order, because our wills also do
contribute something; it’s not the case, after all, that our wills do nothing. But
they are not sufficient by themselves. However, he preferred to say, We pray, in
order to emphasize the role of grace, so that those correspondents of his might
understand that when they did not do anything evil, they were not shunning evil
solely by their own will, but were fulfilling with help from God what had been
commanded.”158
Augustine concludes that when a command is given by God, it points to the will’s
freedom of choice; and when a prayer is made about accomplishing what has been
commanded, it points to the will’s need for grace to be effectual. The need for both free
will and prayer can also be found in scripture:
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Is there any need, my brothers and sisters, to run through many instances?
Whatever we are commanded to do, we have to pray that we may be able to fulfill
it; but not in such a way that we let ourselves go, and like sick people lie flat on
our backs and say, “May God rain down food on our faces,” and we ourselves
wish to do absolutely nothing about it; and when food has been rained into our
mouths we say, “may God also swallow it for us.” We too have got to do
something. We’ve got to be keen, we’ve got to try hard, and to give thanks insofar
as we have been successful, to pray insofar as we have not.”159
In emphasizing God’s grace as the primary cause of our free will oriented towards the
good, Augustine does not cancel human freedom and responsibility. While any good that
we do is wholly from God as primary cause, it is also wholly from us as secondary cause,
as actuated or moved by God’s grace, in accord with the praiseworthy specification of
our will. It is not as if part of a good action belongs to us and part of it belongs to God.
According to Augustine, from the deepest recesses of our hearts to the hairs on our head,
no minutiae of our spiritual and corporeal being escapes God’s providential causality.160
So too with the good actions we perform: from their possibility, to their source and
specification in the will, and even during and up to their completion, no part of them is
separated from God’s causality. Augustine gives an example of this in On the Trinity,
where he uses the language of first or primary causality to explain God’s role in effecting
someone’s charitable action. He begins by saying that, “Without any doubt the first or
ultimate cause [of someone’s work of mercy] must be looked for in that changeless
wisdom which the soul of the wise man serves in charity.... So it is in the will of God that
the primary and ultimate cause”161 of the man’s work of mercy can be found. Augustine
continues his example by asking us to suppose that in going about his charitable action
the wise man hires servants to help complete his good work, even though the servants
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might be motivated to do so not because they have the same spirit of generosity as the
man, but because they want to get paid to feed their worldly lusts or to avoid bothersome
inconveniences as a result of a lack of money. Suppose further that the wise man enlists
the help of draft animals to complete his good work. Since they are non-rational, clearly
they do not give a moment’s thought to what they are doing; they only help the man
because of their natural desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Finally, suppose the wise
man uses many different kinds of inanimate objects required for his charitable endeavor,
such as money, clothes, food, drink, oil, books, etc. etc. According to Augustine, the
application of all of these animate and inanimate bodies to the man’s work leads to their
being “moved about, damaged, repaired, destroyed, reconstructed, subjected to all sorts
of changes in time and space”; and all such changes have as their first cause “the invisible
and unchanging will of God.”162
If Augustine were asked to specify exactly the role of the secondary causality
provided by the various animate/inanimate objects in the above example and the
secondary causality provided by the man performing the work of mercy, he would reply
that such a question cannot be answered univocally, because the being of created reality
is not univocal, capable of being divided most generally into the visible and the invisible,
heaven and earth. This is why Augustine in Book III gives various examples of how
secondary causation operates with the primary causality of God. He believes that there is
a difference between stones and living stones (1 Pt 2:5), or non-rational and rational
creation, respectively.163 It follows that there must also be a difference between how the
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divine will operates with causes that come from the soul and operates on causes that
come from purely material or bodily realities.164 Coming back to the example given
above, Augustine will attempt to make this point clearer by asking us to suppose that the
man who performs a work of mercy “wearies his body by toil, and thereby contracts an
illness.”165 Suppose further that this man goes and asks one physician what caused his
illness, and the physician replies that it was a dryness of the body; the man then goes and
sees another physician, who tells him that his illness is due to excessive moisture in the
body. One of these physicians, from a bodily perspective, gives the true cause of the
man’s physical ailment, but both are talking about the “proximate cause” of the man’s
illness. There is yet a higher cause of his illness, however, which is the “freely-assumed
toil” the man chose to undertake in the carrying out of his work of mercy; and this
pertains to the soul.166 But even with this psychological explanation, Augustine maintains
that we have not given an adequate causal explanation of why the man performed his
work of mercy. For that we must turn to the unchangeable Wisdom itself. According to
Augustine, by serving the divine Wisdom and obeying its command, “the soul of the wise
man took upon himself this voluntary toil (voluntarium laborem). Thus, the first cause
(causa prima) of that illness, in the truest sense of the term, would be found to be nothing
else than the will of God (Dei voluntas).”167
But when it comes to our evil actions, God cannot be said to be causally
responsible for them, directly or indirectly, for it is we who are the first cause of them,
taking the first initiative towards doing them in rejecting the divine will. In Sermon 229E
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(after 411), Augustine urges those listening to him to not let sins remain their friends; but
if certain sins do manage to tempt their hearts, they should only let those sins tempt them
“against [their] wills,” for then it will be the sins in them that want to do what is evil and
not them.168 He gives an example: Suppose you are sick with a bodily disease, and the
doctor comes to see you in order to help make you better. Would not this mean that the
doctor is a friend to you, but an enemy of your disease? Yes. After all, if the doctor did
not want you to get better, he would be an enemy to you and a friend to your disease. So
the doctor hates the disease in you, and “it’s against it that he entered your house, against
it that he went upstairs to your bedroom, against it that he approached your bed, against it
that he felt your pulse, against it that he gave you instructions, against it that he mixed
and applied medicines; all this against the fever, all this for you.”169 If, however, you love
the disease your body carries, you will be alone in hating yourself, being against yourself.
Does anyone love being sick? No. Even so, Augustine notes that while no one is fond of,
for instance, having a fever, people are often fond of what the “fever is asking for,” such
as cool drinks. Yet the doctor—the enemy of your fever—prescribes that you should not
consume cool drinks, as it will make you sicker and your time of recovery longer. So
when the doctor leaves your house, the fever may ask for a cool drink, but you must
recognize this fondness of yours for a cool beverage “is the fever.”170 It is not you but the
fever in you that dries up your mouth, making a cool drink appear desirable. If, however,
you remember the doctor’s advice, and if you ally yourself with him against your fever,
then there will be two of you fighting against the same enemy, and you will almost
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certainly achieve victory over your foe. On the other hand, if you ally yourself with the
fever, succumbing to what it asks for, “the doctor loses—but the loss is the sick person’s,
not the doctor’s.”171
Augustine clearly wants to conceive of sinful and righteous action along the same
lines, holding that we alone “lose” in any sinful actions we perform, whereas both we and
God “win” in any righteous actions we perform. According to Augustine, Christ, our
medicus, can never really lose irrespective of what we choose to do, since Christ works
all things, including moral evil, for the good; and like an experienced doctor, he knows
more thoroughly what is going on in a morally sick man than that man himself, and just
how to cure him. As doctors are experts at producing health in the body, so, too, Christ is
an expert at producing health in the soul.172 The Christus-medicus theme in Augustine
has a clear basis in Scripture, which constantly speaks of human sinfulness and weakness
and their need to be healed by Christ.173 It also proves, I think, that Augustine did not
defend a predominately legalistic interpretation of our salvation, an interpretation which
has been almost universally supported by Western theologians since the eleventh
century.174
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Even in his doctrinal works, Augustine never ceases to primarily emphasize the
suitability of the incarnation for the healing of fallen humanity. The following is a
representative text:
Our enlightenment is to participate in the Word, that is, in that life which is the
light of men (Jn 1:4). Yet we were absolutely incapable of such participation and
quite unfit for it, so unclean were we through sin, so we had to be cleansed.
Furthermore, the only thing to cleanse the wicked and the proud is the blood of
the just man and the humility of God; to contemplate God, which by nature we are
not, we would have to be cleansed by him who became what by nature we are and
what by sin we are not. By nature we are not God; by nature we are men; by sin
we are not just. So God became a just man to intercede with God for sinful man.
The sinner did not match the just, but man did match man. So he applied to us the
similarity of his humanity to take away the dissimilarity of our iniquity, and
becoming a partaker of our mortality he made us partakers of his divinity. It was
surely right that the death of the sinner issuing from the stern necessity of
condemnation should be undone by the death of the just man issuing from the
voluntary freedom of mercy, his single matching our double.175
Immediately following this text Augustine will then use the harmonious pitch ratio of 1 to
2 of the musical octave to further explain the fitting application of Christ’s single to our
double: the incarnate Word bestows on our humanity, in consonance (conuenientia) with
its fallen nature, “what the Greeks call harmonia”176—a gift which in its oneness heals
the double-death of our souls to ungodliness and our bodies to perishability which our
humanity suffered in the fall of Adam and Eve. Accordingly, we can say that Christ’s one
death saved us from our double-death, and that his one resurrection granted us two
resurrections, restoring the harmony of our spiritual and material nature. This sacrificial
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gift on the part of Christ is given by God to unredeemed humanity because he is merciful,
so merciful that he deigned to take on the likeness of sinful flesh, in which our “mortal
body and damnable soul are united with the single purpose of divine love so that they are
made capable of seeing God and being resurrected.”177
The kind of harmonious healing Augustine speaks of here, and that is more fully
explained in his doctor-patient analogies, is a very useful way of conceiving of divine and
human synergy—or what Augustine has deemed to be the harmonious working of
primary and secondary causality—in moral life:178 The doctor acts and the patient is
acted on, but the patient, too, acts in his choice to either freely consent to or dissent from
the prescriptions of his doctor. If he follows them, by conforming himself to the doctor’s
regimen for him, he gets better; if he does not, he becomes worse; the choice is up to the
sick patient, who is helped along by the doctor in the former, but not in the latter.
Augustine considers a possible objection to the synergistic relationship he is envisioning
between the doctor and his patient, or as he puts it below, that between God as our helper
(audiutor) and we as helped:
Someone will say to me, ‘So we are led, acted on, we don’t act.’ I answer: Rather,
you both act and are acted on; and it is precisely then that you act well, when you
are acted on by one who is good.179 The Spirit of God, you see, who is leading
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you or acting on you, is your helper in your own action. He gave you this very
word “helper,” because you too have to do something. You must realize what you
are asking for, realize what you are admitting, when you say, Be my helper, do not
forsake me (Ps 27: 9). You are, of course, calling on God as your helper. None are
helped if they do not do anything themselves.... If you were not working, he
would not be working together with you.180
Augustine’s response to this hypothetical objection points to the fact that God’s grace cooperates with a man’s own good action, and thus cannot determine it in any fatalistic
sense. In other words, for a man to will or think or do the good, he cannot be a passive
pawn in God’s helping hands but must be an active participant in the working out of his
own salvation. It follows that God will not grant his predestinating grace to persons for
their salvation who do not help themselves by rendering the secondary causality they
possess in humble obedience to the primary causality of the unchanging Wisdom.
Augustine warns us, however, that we must not now fall into the Pelagian heresy
by overemphasizing the secondary causality we provide, by saying that God’s help is not
necessary for us to act well, but rather is something that makes acting well considerably
easier. He likens this to someone on a boat saying, “We can of course get there by
rowing, though with considerable trouble; oh, if only we had some wind, we would get

human nature itself, the latter being created plumb and sound by God, and remaining as such even after the
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is a nature and substance, is an evil.” (I.9). Moreover, he will insist that when he said, “By sin Adam lost
the image of God according to which he was made” (DGnL.6.27.28), this should not be interpreted “as
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there so much more easily!”181 God’s help in the form of His grace is not given to us so
that we may “fulfill more easily by grace what [we] are commanded to do by free
will,”182 which implies the will is sufficient by itself to uphold the commandments, if it is
used properly, as the Pelagians hold.
Contrary to the Pelagians, Augustine claims that God’s grace is a necessary
condition for our acting well, and in fact the “primary” condition, without which we can
do nothing good. Though it is primary, it does not follow that it determinatively takes
over human agency in the sense of fatalistically forcing us to act out our “free” choices
according to a pre-approved divine plan from which we cannot deviate: “After all, God is
not building his temple out of you as out of stones which can’t move themselves; they are
picked up, placed in position by the mason. That’s not what living stones are like: And
you like living stones are being built together into the temple of God (1Pt 2:5). You are
being led, but you too must run; you are being led, but you must follow.”183 So how do
you run, how do you follow? How do you build up the temple of God within yourself?
Augustine answers: you must be like “beams that cannot rot [and] make of yourselves a
house for God. Let yourselves be squared off together, be chipped and chiseled, by toil,
by need, in going without sleep, in being kept constantly busy; be prepared for every
good work; so that you may deserve to find rest in eternal life, as in the well-constructed
company of the angels.”184
Augustine will say elsewhere that everything good about our actions comes from
God, but not “however as though we were asleep, as though we did not have to make an
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effort, as though we did not have to be willing.”185 If we are not awake, if we do not
make an effort, if we are not willing, then there simply will not be the justice of God in
us. And while it may be true that the will is prepared by the Lord, strengthened by the
Lord, and made effectual by the Lord, it does not follow that the will ceases to be our
own. For Augustine, God does not justify us without our consent; we must let God justify
us. He writes: “The will, indeed, is only yours, the justice is only God’s.”186 However,
since God’s justice can exist without your will, but your will can only be just with the
help of God’s justice, God maintains his primacy.
It follows that a person can do nothing good or can only do “nothingness,” i.e.,
introduce into what exists the privation of a due good, which Augustine views as “evil,”
without the help of God’s guiding hand (Jn 15:5); indeed any created initiative that is not
caused by God can only be an initiative for what is harmful or a deprivation in being, or
what Maritain will appropriately call a “nihilation,”187 for it is a “defective movement,
and every defect is from nothing.”188 Augustine will actually compare our feebleness of
mind and body, which is our natural lot in life because of original sin, to the feebleness of
a newborn baby. A new born baby cannot talk by itself, walk by itself, or do anything by
itself; of itself it just lies there. It is so weak that it needs “someone else’s help for
everything.”189 The position of Pelagius and his followers, that the will can have an
initiative for the good on its own, and that the grace of God can be merited, must
therefore be rejected; and a fortiori for the idea of the semi-Pelagians that we are

185

Sermon 169.13, 416.
Ibid.
187
God and the Permission of Evil, 33.
188
On Free Choice of the Will 2.20.54.204. See also de.civ.Dei 12.7, where he speaks of the human
will separated from God as a “deficient cause.”
189
Sermon 127.1, between 410 and 420.
186

78
responsible for the beginning of our faith and its perseverance to the end: “Anybody, you
see, who wishes to say that he has paid something back to God, is a liar. Absolutely
everything has to be hoped for from him. From ourselves, apart from him, nothing—
except perhaps sin and lies, because whoever utters a lie, speaks from what is his own....
But when it comes to the truth, if he wants to be truthful, it won’t be from what is his
own.”190 Important to note is that the latter is a point on which Augustine and all major
Greek theologians agree.191
To more fully explore the idea of our complete indebtedness to God with respect
to the conative and cognitive goods we possess, the concept of the interior word (verbum
interior) that Augustine explains at De Trinitate 9.6.9-12.18 proves useful. Here
Augustine considers the idea that we know in two ways: 1) we know things in ourselves
that we can then communicate to others through various signs, such as language; or 2) we
know things in the Truth itself, which is present to us in such a way that it is not the
private possession of an individual, but a possible object of knowledge for all
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simultaneously. While we know these things, they can be spoken about and thought of in
the same way by others who know them in the Truth as we do,192 the Truth mentioned
here being the divine Word. In either form of knowing, we formulate what Augustine will
refer to as “words of the heart.”193 According to Augustine, these words of the heart
require not only love to be conceived, but also the knowledge of higher or lower objects
that direct that love to those objects.194 Because “love ... joins together our word and the
mind it is begotten from,”195 what we choose to know and how we choose to know it
matter a great deal: we become what we know insofar as our minds are formed by the
objects on which we direct our attentive effort.
These words precede any and every human working, good or bad, occurrent or
habitual—indeed “there are none that are not first spoken in the heart, and hence it is
written that the beginning of every work is a word (Eccl 37:16).”196 Augustine will divide
up these words into two basic categories: words that occur as a result of love for God, and
words that occur as a result of an inappropriate love for creatures.197 The second category
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of words is then distinguished into the verbum as conceptum and the verbum as natum.
As conceived, we desire the word’s completion; as born, our desire for the word’s
completion is actually completed. The only way we can conceive true words, Augustine
tells us, comes from our knowing and judging in the Truth, in the Word of God; by doing
so we generate or utter this true word in our mind.198 Unlike words that occur as a result
of an inappropriate love for creatures, these true words are simultaneously conceived and
born, and this because the true love (vera dilectio, not cupiditas) by which they are
conceived instantly possesses what it loves and loves what it possesses. He gives an
example: a person who loves justice has a will that remains in the knowledge that is
conceived, so that what he wills is simultaneously present to his knowledge and vice
versa.199 In our fallen state, however, our love is tinged by concupiscence and our minds
misled by intellectual error, thus making it impossible to rely on our own conative and
cognitive powers to be the primary cause of the good we desire and by which we are
directed in our search for happiness. For any and every word we speak internally, if we
do so by ourselves, content with our own damaged faculties and powers, is insufficient to
attain to its proper objects that would lead to our being formed into the image of God.
As we have seen, Augustine thinks we have a perfect model of how this formal
causality should work in the conformity of will that is shared between the Father and the
Son, which St. John speaks of: the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the
Father doing (Jn 5:19); and Everything that’s mine is yours, and that’s yours is mine (Jn
17:10). According to Augustine, what the Gospel writer means is that the Son perfectly
conforms himself to the Father, doing only the same things as the Father does. The Son
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perfectly patterns himself after the Father out of the perfect love he has for his generator.
Augustine is aware that some may object to this statement on the grounds that it attributes
an “inability” to the Son, as it seems the Son cannot do anything according to His own
will, but he thinks that such inability is actually “true ability,” nor is it weakness but “the
strength whereby the truth is unable to be false.”200 Again this is a point on which the
Greek East could not agree on more, with Basil, for instance, writing: “Accordingly, a
man becomes ‘one’ with another, when in will, as our Lord says, they are ‘perfected into
one’ (Jn 17:23), this union of wills being added to the connexion of nature. So also the
Father and Son are one, the community of nature and the community of will running, in
them, into one.”201
It is Augustine’s belief that because Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share one and
the same nature, they share one and the same will.202 But that does not mean that either
the Son or the Holy Spirit is unfree to do their own will. Certainly there are many
instances in scripture which point to the Son claiming that he has been sent to do the will
of the Father. Augustine thinks these show that “the Father willed, the Son put it into
effect.”203 But there are also examples from scripture that show that this does not prevent
the Son from willing, with the Father putting it into effect. We have Christ saying, for
instance, Father, I will. That where I am, these too may be with me (Jn 17: 24); and the
Son’s power of will is clearly proclaimed at Jn 5: 21: Just as the Father raises the dead
and gives them life, so too the Son gives life to whom he will. The Son does not give life
to those whom the Father orders him to give life, but to those whom he will. In the same
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way, we are truly free when we act according to true words that cannot be false on
account of their being formally and finally caused by God’s will and knowledge for us,
all of which are “spoken” by Him to restore the image of God in us. The works we
perform from those true words are both God’s and ours. Yet we should not glory in our
contribution to the works we perform; we should follow the example of Christ, in the
form of his humanity, who would always give the glory to God the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit. In addition, we should all strive to understand that just as the Son can only speak
through the Father, and has everything that he speaks from the Father, so, too, for those
who are righteous: all the goods they possess, all the good that they will and think and do
is from God. Indeed, the very good they seek as their ultimate end is God, according to
which they organize their pursuit of all other goods.
Following the example of Christ in this regard demands a literal self-sacrifice on
our part.204 Augustine often pleaded with his flock to believe and understand as far as
they could the idea that they are most fully themselves when they, as the apostle says,
clothe [themselves] with the Lord Jesus Christ, and [when they] do not think about how to
gratify the desires of the flesh (Rom 13: 14).205 This is a lesson he personally learned all
too well, and which he forcefully recounts in Book VIII.12 of his Confessions, where he
tells the reader how his self-conversion (and the conversion of his good friend Alypius)
came about through the Lord Jesus Christ, helped along by his reading of the following
quotation from Paul’s Letter to the Romans:
Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in
contention and envy, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ and make not provision
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for the flesh in its concupiscences (Rom 13:13). I had no wish to read further, and
no need. For in that instant, with the very ending of the sentence, it was as though
a light of utter confidence shown in my heart, and all the darkness of uncertainty
vanished away. Then, leaving my finger in the place or marking it by some other
sign, I closed the book and in complete calm told the whole thing to Alypius, and
he similarly told me what had been going on in himself, of which I knew nothing.
He asked to see what I had read. I showed him, and he looked further than I had
read. I had not known what followed. And this is what followed: Now him that is
weak in faith, take unto you. He applied this to himself and told me so. And he
was confirmed by this message, and with no troubled wavering gave himself to
God’s good will and purpose—a purpose indeed most suited to his character, for
in these matters he had been immeasurably better than I. Then we went in to my
mother and told her, to her great joy.
Augustine urges us to give our wills, our minds, and indeed everything that we are
metaphysically and morally back to God, who made us for Himself. For apart from God,
we are nothing: “Of one thing only I am sure—that, apart from you, nothing I have or am
can be good, and ‘anything I gain is a mere deprivation’ if it be not my God.”206
Somewhat paradoxically Augustine holds that the only way we can truly and freely will
is not to do our own will. If we prefer to follow our own will and resist the will of God,
then we are “harmful”207 to ourselves; and this because as persons we are depriving
ourselves of a good which is due to the human will and to human nature itself. It is thus
necessary, Augustine tells us, to put God’s will before our own, and to put love of God
before love of ourselves.
Our love of God must reach the point that, “for love of him we even forget, as far
as this is possible, ourselves.”208 There are many other Sermons in particular where
Augustine recommends a letting go of ourselves, or a kind of self-sacrifice, so that we
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might cleave to God more fully, and so that we might understand that God is our life.
Some examples of this are as follows:
Don’t stay in yourself, rise above even yourself; place yourself in the one who
made you and your true self.209
The soul is not its own life, but it’s God who is the life of the soul.210
Remove yourself, remove, I repeat, yourself from yourself; you just get in your
own way. If it’s you that are building yourself, it’s a ruin you are building. Unless
the Lord has built the house, they have labored in vain, who build it (Ps 127:
1).211
Ignore your own spirit, receive the Spirit of God. Don’t let your spirit be afraid
that when the Spirit of God takes up residence in you, your spirit will be squeezed
into a corner of your body. When the Spirit of God takes up residence in your
body, it won’t shut your spirit out.212
Augustine makes clear that the self-sacrifice he is recommending does not entail a
destructive form of self-hatred. Nevertheless, there is still a right way to love oneself and
a wrong way to love oneself. The latter occurs when you leave God out of your life to
love your time-bound self, which actually causes you to move away from your true self;
whereas the former occurs when you love yourself in God. Augustine explains step-bystep how this proper self-love can come about in us: “Come back to yourself; but again,
turn upward when you’ve come back to yourself, don’t stay in yourself. First come back
to yourself from the things outside you, and then give yourself back to the one who made
you, and when you were lost sought you, and as a runaway found you, and when you had
turned away turned you back to himself. So then, come back to yourself, and go on to the
one who made you.”213 According to Augustine, this loving ascent from things in the
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world to yourself, then from yourself to God, has a scriptural basis in the story of the
prodigal son. And he exhorts those listening to his sermon, perhaps to their surprise and
ours, to be the younger son, who wasted his inheritance by living a life of dissipation, and
subsequently found himself living in the most desperate of straits. Augustine rhetorically
asks his audience, ‘What does the Gospel say about the younger son?’ And returning to
himself. He let go of himself in his debauched behavior, but he did eventually return to
himself, and he did not remain in himself; he found the need to arise and go to his father.
So after finding himself, he denies himself, which is indicated by what he plans to say to
his father: And I will say to him, I have sinned against heaven and before you. I am now
not worthy to be called your son (Lk 15: 17-19). Augustine believes that it is in this
respect that we should copy the younger son’s behavior. Just as he was in full possession
of himself once again at the end of the story, by his new desire to be obedient to his
father’s will, so, too, let us possess ourselves again in virtue of obeying God’s will for us.
Augustine’s overall advice therefore is “Don’t do your own will, but that of the one who
is dwelling in you.”214
In The City of God, Augustine describes the kind of obedience to God’s will that
he is recommending to us as a form of worship. However, he admits that there is a slight
difficulty in encapsulating the meaning of this worship in a single word in the Latin
language: ... “to express this worship in a single word as there does not occur to me any
Latin term sufficiently exact, I shall avail myself, whenever necessary, of a Greek word.
Latreia, whenever it occurs in Scripture, is rendered by the word service.”215 Augustine
tells us that Latreia is better than any other perceived Latin equivalents (worship,
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religion, piety, etc.), because of its exclusive focus on service to God. A bit later on at
City of God 10.3, he will discuss the service entailed by Latreia in more detail, and note
that it requires a total surrendering of ourselves to God. Such surrendering is
accomplished by loving God with all of our heart, with all of our soul and with all of our
strength, which allow us to cleave to Him in unity. Augustine views this loving service to
God as a community effort taken up within the ecclesial body of Christ, since “to this
good we ought to be led by those who love us, and to lead those we love.”216 When we
love God with every moral and metaphysical fiber of our being, as it were, and when we
love our neighbor in God and for God’s sake, we may call both true sacrifices, or works
in which whatever is done is done so that we might be united to God.217 It is this
surrendering of self that makes up the righteousness of man, “that he submit himself to
God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even when they rebel, to his reason, which either
defeats or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God grace to do his duty, and
the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all the blessings he
receives.”218 Elsewhere, Augustine will say more strongly that being a slave to
righteousness is what the true liberty of man consists in, but at the same time it is a “holy
bondage, for he is obedient to the will of God.”219 Once again he looks to a statement
from St. Paul to bear all of this out and, specifically, the following from Paul’s Letter to
the Ephesians: For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works,
which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them (Eph 2: 10). Augustine
takes this to mean that we shall be made truly free when and only when “God fashions us,
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that is, forms and creates us anew, not as men—for He has done that already—but as
good men, which his grace is now doing, that we may be a new creation in Christ
Jesus.”220 This is something that we cannot do by the power of our intellects and wills
alone, no matter how holy they are, no matter how strong they are, but only with the
grace of God. One may call this servitude, subjection, slavery, or even, as I have
suggested earlier, a form of sacrifice of self.221 The good news that Christ proclaims in
the Gospel of Matthew, however, is that this yoke is easy and this burden is light: Come
to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon
you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for
your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light (Mt 11:28-30).
The distinction that Augustine is drawing here between selfless service to God
and selfish service to oneself is the fundamental distinction in what many view to be his
magnum opus in doctrinal theology, The City of God. It is the fundamental distinction of
this work in my opinion, because it is the basis on which Augustine will make the
subsequent division between the heavenly and earthly cities—the histories of which, from
beginning, to middle, to end, he makes it the purpose of this work to track in excruciating
historical detail and with insightful theological exegesis. But one need not take my word
for it. According to Augustine, it is clear that “two cities have been formed by two loves:
the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of
God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the
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Lord.”222 This distinction is made time and time again by Augustine throughout the work,
and is used as an explanative device to inform the reader as to why certain divisions in
the human race have taken place throughout history. He will argue, for example, that
such love of oneself, or of what is created, was the cause of Adam’s forfeiting paradise
for humanity, Cain’s crime against his brother, and really all divisiveness in the human
race, which is meant to be one in Christ.223
Of course, Augustine knows that carnally-minded people, i.e., those who belong
to the earthly city, those who, to use the common expression, “raise Cain,” will see such a
total obedience to God’s will as a restriction of their supposed “freedom” to choose as
they want, or perhaps better, as their flesh wants: “when it’s said that all other things will
be withdrawn, and there will only be God to delight us, it’s as if the soul feels restricted,
because it has been used to delighting in many things; and the carnal soul says to itself,
addicted to the flesh, tied up with fleshly desires, having wings stuck together with the
birdlime of evil desires to stop it flying to God, it says to itself, ‘What will there be in it
for me, where I shall not eat, I shall not drink, where I shall not sleep with my wife?
What sort of joy will I have of that?’ This joy of yours comes from sickness, not from
good health.”224 Here, as in Sermon 229E, Augustine likens the human soul and its
fleshly desires to a sick person wanting things they imagine will give them respite from
their illness but will, in all actual fact, make them worse. Such is a truth that the sick
person realizes only if and when his good health returns, which in turn eliminates those
deleterious desires. When it comes to our moral health, we have a similar choice: either
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we obey the prescriptions of our doctor, Christ, or those of the flesh, our enemy.
Augustine makes clear that we should not suppose that because we choose the former
“free will must be withdrawn. It will, on the contrary, be all the more truly free, because
set free from delight in sinning.”225 Nevertheless, the choice between which of the two
we decide to take heed of has been, is, and always will be a choice that we make, and we
and we alone have to live with the corresponding consequences.
Augustine thinks evidence of this can be found in scripture. Take Mt 23: 27,226 for
instance, where Christ laments the fact that the Jews exercised their carnal “freedom,”
rejecting as they did the condescension of his grace: Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill
the prophets and those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children
together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing.
Augustine writes of this scriptural passage that Christ “really was looking after them, as
he himself was happy to put it, in the way a hen looks after her chicks; in the way, I
mean, that a hen enfeebles herself too, because of the feebleness of her chicks.”227 It was
because of their weakness, and the weakness of the whole of fallen humanity, that he was
willing to enfeeble himself by becoming incarnate of the Virgin Mary, and that he was
willing to suffer and die for our sins. In Sermons 105.11 and 265.11 (412), Augustine will
explain in more detail how the hen “enfeebles herself” for its chicks, by lowering its
voice to the chirps of the chicks, drooping, and ruffling its feathers. But his conclusion is
simple enough: Christ had to permit the Jews nihilating initiatives, because he had to
respect their free choice to sin, which resulted in the death of the prophets and those sent
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to them to effect such a communion. Augustine thinks the Jews provide a perfect
example of the fact that, while God wills all men to be saved, all men are not in fact
saved, and this “because men themselves are not willing.”228
Even for those of us who do accept Christ’s help, who choose to live at the
humble level at which he chose to live, achieving victory over the flesh is no easy task for
our wills to accomplish, and especially for those that are weighed down by past bad
habits. Not to mention that in this life the flesh continually lusts against the Spirit and the
Spirit against the flesh in such a way that those experienced in this warfare cannot
completely escape the enticements and pull their flesh exercises upon them.229 Following
Paul, Augustine believes that it is this warfare that does not allow us to carry out the good
we want to do: For it is not what I want to that I do; but what I hate that is what I do; but
if what I hate is what I do, I agree with the law, that it is good. To want to do good is
available to me, but to carry out the good I do not find in my power. But I see another
law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me prisoner to the
law of sin, which is in my members (Rom 7:15-16.18.23). From the time of Plato and
Aristotle onwards, this is what the Greeks would refer to as akrasia, or weakness of will,
understood as a condition in which compulsive patterns of behavior (i.e., bad habits)
prevent us from acting in accordance with what we know to be good.230 For Augustine,
the good that is always within my power is not to consent to bad desires, but I cannot
carry the good through by myself. There is a significant difference between these two: the
former we might say is a power to refuse evil; the latter, by contrast, is a power to
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cooperate with God to accomplish the good. This illustrates the importance of the
secondary causality of man—in wanting to do the good—and of the necessary primary
causality of God—in His making that desire effectual in the realm of human action.
Hence this is the reason why Augustine can say that no human being, however morally
strong of will and intellectually adept in mind, can accomplish the good by him/herself;
and that all human beings, by themselves, can only accomplish what is evil.231
Augustine explains: “I do good when I do not consent to the evil lust; but I do not
carry through with the good, so as not to covet or have any lust at all. So again, how does
my enemy too do evil and not carry through with the evil? It does evil, because it stirs up
an evil desire; it does not carry the evil through, because it does not drag me into
committing the evil (Ago bonum, cum malae concupiscentiae non consentio; sed
non perficio bonum, ut omnino non concupiscam. Rursus ergo et hostis mea quomodo
agit malum, et non perficit malum? Agit malum, quia movet desiderium malum:
non perficit malum, quia me non trahit ad malum).”232 Augustine is clear that we should
not take what the apostle says, It is not what I want to that I do, but what I hate, that is
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what I carry out, as implying that I want to be chaste, but am actually an adulterer; that I
want to be kind, but am actually cruel; that I want to be religious, but am actually
irreligious. While it is true that no matter what we do, no matter how saintly of a life we
lead, we cannot resist having lusts of the flesh, it is, nevertheless, always within our
power to resist actually being adulterous, cruel, and irreligious. In other words, we do not
have to act on the evil lusts of the flesh, even if we cannot help but have them in this
life.233 This is something we can do, and Augustine views this dissent from evil desire as
a significant contribution to one’s salvation, writing:
It isn’t the case, after all, that you don’t carry out anything. Lust rebels, and you
don’t consent; you take a fancy to another man’s wife, but you don’t give your
approval, you turn your mind away, you enter the inner sanctum of your mind.
You see lust kicking up a rumpus outside, you issue a decree against it, to cleanse
your conscience. “I don’t want to,” you say, “I won’t do it.” Granted it would be
delightful, I won’t do it, I have something else to delight in. For I delight in the
law of God according to the inner self.234
Augustine will describe this elsewhere as keeping the flesh in check,235 which is
something that we do, but cannot successfully carry through without the grace of God.
Other anti-Pelagian Sermons of Augustine deal with the notion of the will’s consent, or
its specification, while under the influence of God’s grace. Take Sermon 165 (417), in
which Augustine begins with the common anti-Pelagian sentiment that we should not
place our hope in man but in God; and with the following quotation from Paul: I ask you
not to be weakened by my tribulations on your behalf, which is your glory (Eph 3:13).
Augustine interprets this to mean that the apostle is asking them not to lose strength,
which he wouldn’t do, unless he wanted to rouse their wills. I mean, suppose they
answered, ‘Why do you ask us for what we don’t have in our power?’ Wouldn’t it
seem they had given him a fair answer? And yet unless the apostle knew that
233

Sermon 154.2, 419.
Sermon 154.12. See also City of God 19.4.
235
See for example, Sermon 155.2, 419.
234

93
there was in them such a thing as the consent of their own will, when they too
were to do something themselves, he wouldn’t have said I ask you. And if he said
‘I order you,’ the word would come from his mouth quite pointlessly, unless he
knew they could apply their wills to his order.236
Of course, without God’s help the human will is weak, and so the apostle added, For this
reason I bend my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all fatherhood
in heaven and on earth is named, that he would give you (Eph 3: 14-16). Paul’s statement
here can be seen as another version of the famous Augustinian dictum from the
Confessions, “Command what you will, and give what you command.” And again, we
might find ourselves asking the question Pelagius asked: How does it make any sense for,
in this case, Paul, to ask God to give what he is at the same time demanding from his
audience? Augustine answers for Paul: “because for God to be willing to give, you for
your part have to accommodate your will to receive. How can you really wish to receive
the grace of divine goodness, if you don’t open the lap of your will to receive?”237
To sum up, there is no textual evidence from Augustine’s corpus that necessarily
implicates his mature theology of sin and grace into a form of predestinationism that
would vitiate the nature of our wills as free. Quite the contrary: what we have seen from
Augustine, in his doctrinal works, sermons, and scriptural commentaries, is a great
concern to maintain a harmonious working relationship between God’s grace and our free
will as oriented towards the good. We have seen this particularly in his threefold
emphasis on: 1) the grounding of the doctrine of deification in the body of Christ, of
which we are acting members along with its Head; 2) the need for Christians to willingly
engage in the economic act of self-sacrifice, or obedience to the primary causality of the
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divine will; and 3) the distinction without division between not consenting to the lust of
the flesh and being able to carry through the good, according to which both man and God
help to determine the outcome of salvation history. Even these three interrelated
elements, however, do not give us the full philosophical-theological picture of
Augustine’s positive doctrine of predestination. That requires the further examination of
his theory of the divine ideas, to which we now turn.

95
Chapter 4
The Divine Ideas: A Predestination of Potentialities

Augustine’s theory of the divine ideas, more than anything else, serves to reveal
the enduring influence Platonism had on his thought. Indeed, it is almost impossible to
prevent oneself from making comparisons to key concepts of Plato, such as the Demiurge
(demiourgos), participation (methexis), and so on, while learning of this theory. Even the
way Augustine describes it himself, especially in his various commentaries on the Book
of Genesis, lends a prima facie legitimacy to these comparisons.
In his Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, for instance, Augustine will
ask: “Or were all things in fact completed by God as in a craftsman’s thought-out design,
not in a stretch of time, but in that very power which made to abide in a timeless state
even those things that we perceive as not abiding, but passing away in time?”238 The
answer to this question, he thinks, is that God eternally and intentionally “speaks” His
creative designs in His Word, in whom “all things are primordially and unchangingly
together, not only things that are in the whole of this creation, but things that have been
and will be; but there is not a question of “have been” and “will be,” there they simply
are.”239 Augustine, however, makes the important qualification that we are talking here
about the eternity of the Creator when we make reference to the divine ideas, not the
eternity of the divine essence. Indeed, to understand things such as the succession of the
ages and the resurrection of the dead Augustine believes we must consult “the eternity of
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the Creator, in whom we live, move, and have our being.”240 It is only in the eternity of
the Creator that some rare souls (i.e., those souls which are not weighed down by a carnal
love of temporal things) may understand “the rolled up scrolls of the centuries, which
there already are and always are, but here only will be and so are not yet; or that they
could see there the change for the better not only of the minds but also of the bodies of
men, each to its own proper perfection.”241
One of the more explicit ways Augustine makes this distinction can also be found
in Book V of his The Literal Meaning of Genesis. In chapter 15, where he discusses in
what sense creatures can be said to have life in God, Augustine will cite two texts from
the Book of Job (28: 12-13 and 28: 22-25), both of which he believes proves that all
things “before they were made were in the knowledge of God their Creator.”242 Here,
these things exist in an ideal manner; they are life in God; they are eternal (aeterna) and
unchangeable (incommutabilia). In addition, if God knew these things before making
them, then it must follow that “before they were made they were with Him and known to
Him as they live, and indeed are life, eternally and unchangeably.”243 Augustine will
caution, however, that as the eternal and unchangeable ideas of things they cannot be said
to be with God as the Word was with God (Jn 1:1), in that they exist in God as Creator,
not God as Generator or Spirator.244 In other words, we can say that the divine ideas are
not separated from the life-giving reality of God, for they are in God as Creator, but they
are distinct (not divided) from God’s essential life as expressed in the activities of
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Generation and Spiration.245 Augustine’s distinction without division between the eternity
of the divine ideas and the eternity of the divine nature directly corresponds to the
Eastern distinction between the eternity of the divine will and the eternity of the divine
essence.246
These creative designs, these rolled up scrolls of the centuries, that are with God
as Creator, not as Generator or Spirator, are the divine ideas (rationes). According to
Augustine, these are then placed in creation by God as the rationes seminales, which are
the inbuilt rational structures that order the coming into being and passing away of things
in time according to their natures. These rationes seminales are thus what account for
things following predictable patterns of development, e.g., tadpoles develop into frogs,
acorns into oak trees, and so on.247 The ontological need for these rationes seminales is
obvious for Augustine: “because if there were no such seminal force in the elements
themselves, there would not be so many forms of life spontaneously generated from earth
where nothing was sown; nor would there be so many animals on land and in water
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which have come into existence without any mating of male and female, though they
themselves, born asexually, grow up and produce offspring by copulation.” In other
words, if there were not such seminal forces in the elements themselves, things would
simply poof into existence from nothing; which is absurd. It follows that God, who is the
creator of all of these seminal forces is ipso facto the creator of all things, for anything
that we can observe as being brought to life “receives the beginning of its course from
hidden seeds, and derives its due growth and final distinction of shape and parts from
what you could call the original programming (ab originalibus tanquam regulis) of those
seeds.”248 Here we must make an effort to distinguish between the developmental
patterns of rational and non-rational things. We can say that rational creatures are not
bound to their pre-established rational structures in the same way as, say, a horse or rock,
because of their essential possession of reason and free will. Humans, for instance, are
unique in that their rational nature allows them to freely choose to turn towards or away
from God.249 Nevertheless, there is a pre-established number, weight, and measure that
each human person should attempt to conform themselves to, i.e., the image of the Son
(Rom 8:29).250 Yet because of their natural capacity for reason and free choice they are
not deterministically compelled to do so. While a rock cannot help but find its center of
gravity close to the earth, and a hungry horse cannot help but go for the portion of food
that looks most attractive to it, a human being can deliberately choose whether it will be

248

trin.3.2.13.
See for example, trin.7.4.12.
250
One of Augustine’s favorite quotations comes from the Book of Wisdom, namely, You have
arranged all things by measure and number and weight (Wis 11:20). Augustine holds number (numero) to
signify the specific form of a thing; weight (pondere) to signify its dynamic power, i.e., its natural tendency
or “love”; and measure (mensura) to signify its relation to things other than itself, or its proper resting place
in relation to everything else. These three factors make any created reality into a harmonious whole. For a
more in depth study of how these three terms are used by Augustine, see W. Roche’s enduringly helpful
article, “Measure, Number, and Weight in St. Augustine” New Scholasticism, 15 (1941), pp. 350-76.
249

99
in the image of God or not. The choice is an important one, with equally important
consequences: “The self opens to God or to nothing, so that apart from God the self has
no real or true form through which to understand God.”251
Our brief examination of the divine ideas above seems to suggest that they are at
least similar to the Forms or Ideas of Plato, namely those realities which are present in
the Demiurge’s mind, from which are created all things that are spatially and temporally
conditioned. Yet such comparisons, as I hope to show in what follows, can only be
pushed so far. And scholars who push this comparison too far wind up misinterpreting
Augustine to the point where it looks as if he cannot sufficiently, philosophically, explain
how the eternal causality of God interacts with the temporal causality of man. In what
follows, I will argue that scholars have grossly misinterpreted Augustine’s view of the
divine ideas on at least two counts, both of which are due to their over-zealousness to
make Augustine out to be the “Christian Plato.”
First, in the often referenced Question 46 (On Ideas), Augustine can be found
placing the pre-temporal divine ideas in the mind of God. His following definition of
“ideas” bears this out: they are “the principal forms or the fixed and unchangeable
reasons of things that have themselves not been formed and consequently are eternal,
always constituted in the same way and contained in the divine intelligence.”252
Elsewhere, he states that the divine ideas “existed in God’s knowledge, they did not exist
in their own nature.”253 Most scholars take the phrases, “contained in the divine
intelligence,” “existed in God’s knowledge,” to mean, with not even a single sentence of
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textual evidence to support their claim, that Augustine equates God’s mind with God’s
essence. This in turn makes the divine ideas, which are in God’s mind, to reside in the
eternity of God’s essence.254
If anything, however, I think Augustine’s placing of the divine ideas in God’s
mind implies He created with knowledge. As Augustine says, “In this art [i.e., the divine
ideas] God knows all things that he has made through it, and so when times come and go,
nothing comes and goes for God’s knowledge. For all these created things around us are
not known by God because they have been made; it is rather, surely, that even changeable
things have been made because they are unchangeably known by him.”255 And if there
were any doubt about my interpretation, Augustine will make the same exact point in
Question 46 (On Ideas):
But what religious person imbued with true religion, although not yet able to see
these things, would nonetheless dare to deny—indeed, would not acknowledge—
that everything that exists—that is, whatever is contained just as in its own genus
by its own nature—was produced by God as its maker; and that, with him as their
maker, all living things are alive; and that the universal soundness of things and
the very order by which those things that undergo change proclaim that their
trajectories through time are subject to a firm control are contained within and
governed by the laws of the most high God? Once this has been established and
conceded, who would dare to say that God created all things without good reason?
If this cannot be rightly said and believed, it remains that all things were created
in accordance with reason (ratione), but humankind in accordance with a different
reason (ratione) than the horse, for it is absurd to think this [i.e., that they were
created in accordance with the same reason]. Individual things, then, have been
created in accordance with their own reasons. But where should these reasons be
thought to exist if not in the very mind of the creator? (Singula igitur propriis sunt
creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente
Creatoris?)256
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In his first tractate on the Gospel of John, Augustine will speak further of these different
“reasons” according to which different things come into existence: “There is, however, in
Wisdom itself, in a spiritual way, a certain reason by which the earth was made: this is
life.”257 Immediately after this statement Augustine will make an analogy concerning a
craftsman’s creative knowledge and the creative Wisdom in which God made all things.
He explains that a craftsman can only make a chest if he first has the chest in his “ars,”
i.e., in his practical or creative knowledge. Once he makes a particular chest, there is still
the chest in his “ars.” This paradigmatic chest, on which the particular chest is modeled,
remains unchanging, serving as the blueprint for all other particular chests that will be
built, and as the standard by which the excellence of all future chests is judged.
Augustine concludes that as the earth was made by a certain reason, and that was called
“life” for it, we are justified in saying that the chest in the “ars” of a craftsman is “life”
for all particular chests that are modeled after it.258 The point Augustine is driving at in
this analogy should be clear: all created things are life in the creative function of the
Word, in whom they live and move and have their being. This life just is the divine ideas.
But as Augustine makes clear, the above analogy has Platonic undertones that can only
be pushed so far. In his second tractate on the Gospel of John, Augustine continues to
discuss the craftsman analogy and notes its limitations:
Do not imagine that [God] was in the world in such a way as the earth is in the
world, the sky is in the world ... But how was he? As the master builder who
governs what he has made. For he did not make it in the way a craftsman makes a
chest. The chest which he makes is external to him; and when it is constructed, it
has been situated in another place.... Suffusing the world, God creates; being
everywhere, God creates [deus autem mundo infusus fabricat, ubique positus
fabricat]; he does not direct the structure which he constructs as someone on the
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outside. By the presence of his majesty he makes what he makes; by his own
presence he governs what he has made [praesentia sua gubernat quod fecit].259
Augustine knows that as finite beings we have a hard time imagining how God creates.
When we create something (whether that be a chest, another human being, etc.), that
creation is always external to us, separated in its being from us. God’s act of creation is
not like this. God creates through his omni-presence, suffusing all things from the inside,
from the very depths of their material and moral being; and as we have already
established, this omni-presence of God does not include his essential existence for
Augustine. What it does include is God’s will and knowledge, or what Augustine refers
to as the divine ideas.
The Eastern Orthodox tradition maintains the same general view of the divine
ideas. Palamas, for instance, argues that there must be a reality in between the divine
ousia and creatures, i.e., the divine logoi, for creatures to participate in for their existence.
If there were not this middle reality, then creatures would have to participate in the divine
ousia for their existence, an idea which Palamas thinks leads to pantheism.260 For
Palamas, as for the Cappadocians, Dionysius, and Maximus, the divine logoi are
predeterminations (proorismous), foreknowings (prognoseis) and wills (thelemata) meant
for the creation and perfection of what exists.261
The proper translation of the Greek thelemata is especially important in the
philosophical-theological task of our understanding the divine logoi. Thelemata in this
context should be translated as “divine wills,” not as “acts” of the divine will or
“products” of the divine will. This is so because the latter two translations would,
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according to the Eastern Orthodox tradition, result in us understanding the divine logoi as
creatures, and not as expressions of the uncreated God as He is accessible to us. In his
150 Capita, Palamas makes it clear that any attempt to employ such translations would be
to land oneself in heresy, for “it is not the energy of God that is a creature—certainly
not!—but rather the effect and product of the energy.”262 Palamas is arguing that the
divine energeiai and the effects of those energies are not the same from an ontological
standpoint. If they were, Barlaam and Akindynos would have been right to say as they
did that the energies of God are mere creatures, thereby dragging down God’s energies to
the level of what is created. Palamas thinks that such an identification would result in the
collapsing of the divine volitions (thelemata) and divine participations (metoxai) into
what is created.263 But this would be absurd, “[f]or if the energy is in the category of
creatures or if these are uncreated (What madness!) in that they exist before they have
been created or before creatures (What impiety!), God would not have an energy.”264
Palamas maintains, however, that God must have an energy and that this energy must be
uncreated. This is a theological touchstone, as it were, that he shares with many other of
the Greek Fathers and writers who preceded him in the Eastern Orthodox tradition.265
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According to the Eastern doctrine of divine ideas, God created all things, spiritual
and corporeal, out of nothing. The act of creation itself was one of God’s will, not his
essence, for God created freely according to his eternal and unchanging counsel. The
word “counsel” in this connection implies not only a free or willful act, but a thoughtful
one—the counsel of the three persons. It is the persons who create in and through their
energies, not in and through the essence they commonly share. St. John Damascene helps
to summarize the doctrine well, writing: “God creates by His thought which immediately
becomes a work”266 .... “God contemplated all things before their existence, formulating
them in his mind; and each being received its existence at a particular moment, according
to His eternal thought and will (kata ten theletiken autou axronon ennoian), which is a
predestination, an image, and a model.”267 Commenting on this text, Vladimir Lossky
notes that the term “theletiken-ennoian” (volitional-thought) is a “perfect expression of
the Eastern doctrine of the divine ideas,”268 because it tells us quite exactly what these
ideas are—and what they are not—in God’s counsel for all created beings. What they are
not are the eternal reasons of created beings found in and determined by the essence of
God, which they would be referred to through a form of exemplary causality as in
Aquinas.269 Rather, Lossky thinks the Greek Fathers were correct in viewing the divine
ideas as dynamic, thoughtful, and intentional in their existence, and for placing them in
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that which naturally comes with the necessary (non-volitional) essence of God, namely
the divine energies. He writes: “the ideas are to be identified with the will or wills which
determine the different modes according to which created beings participate in the
creative energies.”270 There are therefore as many divine ideas (logoi) or wills
(thelemata) as there are individual created beings which relate to those beings in various
ways, depending on the higher or lower capacities they possess to participate in the
reality of God. It follows that the logoi spoken of by the Eastern Orthodox tradition are
fundamentally different from, say, the Forms/Ideas of Plato, because they are not
“species,” i.e., they are not what we would call secondary substances.271
In his Ambiguum 7, Maximus the Confessor speaks very well for the Eastern
Orthodox tradition in making such a point of difference clear. For Maximus, every
human being—and indeed every created thing—has his/her/its own corresponding divine
idea (logos) in the Word of God (Logos) in terms of which they have been made.272 Then,
ideally, all created beings enact movement (kinesis) of one kind or another in an attempt
to conform themselves to their corresponding logoi, “whether by intellect, by reason, by
sense-perception, by vital motion, or by some habitual fitness...”273 until they reach their
ultimate perfection in God. That is, until they completely conform themselves to the logoi
that God has of them, thereby no longer needing any motion, having achieved a stability
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or rest. When it comes to human beings in particular, Maximus thinks that this goal of
conformation to the divine ideas is implanted in us by nature (i.e., we cannot help but
seek it to some extent given our nature), and that at the end of this conformation process
we become “God, being made God by God [and so] to the inherent goodness of the
image is added the likeness (cf. Gen 1:26).”274 Or as he will say elsewhere: “our entire
self will wholly pass over to God as an image to its archetype.”275 Our self as image will
therefore possess every perfection of our archetypal logos, i.e., every ontological or moral
good that is appropriate to us as an individual.
The second point on which scholars have misinterpreted Augustine’s theory of the
divine ideas concerns how God’s creative eternity, or perhaps better, the immutability of
the divine ideas is understood. Most scholars believe that the undoubted influence that
Neoplatonism had on Augustine’s theory of the divine ideas276 led him to conceive the
rationes of God as static, purely actual and intelligible realities in the manner of the
Platonic Forms. Jacques Maritain, James Wetzel, Fr. Edmund Hill, Eleonore Stump, and
Norman Kretzmann provide particularly good representations of this same basic position,
though sometimes for different reasons, as will be made clear below.
Speaking for both Aquinas and Augustine, Maritain claims that, for them, God
knows all created “essences in His uncreated essence which is His sole specifying
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object.”277 Maritain concedes that this means that they would have to hold that “God has
the entire course of time physically present [i.e., in its actual being] to His eternal
Instant.”278 And elsewhere he will specifically say that they view the entire course of time
as physically present in the divine ideas—those realities “to which all things and all
events and the whole succession of time are present at one stroke in their actuality and
their existentiality, and in which there is absolutely nothing variable and absolutely
nothing indeterminate.” 279 Immediately we can detect a problem: Does not Maritain’s
interpretation of Augustine deny the inherent temporality of creation, which changes (and
hopefully advances towards its perfection) over time? St. Basil provides a good summary
statement of this worry in his nine homilies on creation known as the Hexaemeron, in
which he writes that “the proper and natural adornment of the earth is its completion:
corn waving in the valleys—meadows green with grass and rich with many coloured
flowers—fertile glades and hill-tops shaded by forests.”280 But in the divine ideas none of
this was actually produced. Rather, through these ideas, the earth was impregnated with
the power necessary to bring forth, at the appointed time, these various perfections. For
Basil, if we were to say that in the divine ideas all of this was actually produced, then the
changeability that makes up an essential aspect of temporal creation would be illusory.
Next we come to James Wetzel, who, in the last chapter of his extremely wellreceived and often cited book, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, defends the
uncontroversial claim that humans exist under a temporal mode of being, while God
exists under an eternal one. Wetzel then goes on to say that, from God’s eternal
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perspective, He anticipates “all the saint’s failures of will. From God’s point of view,
conversion does have closure. Human beings, having limited access through grace to
God’s way of viewing things, nevertheless have no way of anticipating their own
lives.”281 We can know ourselves up to an extent in our time-bound condition, but never
to the extent of anticipating our own lives completely, with all of our failures and
triumphs of the will present to our memory. Yet God does have a perfect knowledge of
the lives of the saints, according to Wetzel, and this because of His predestinating will
already and eternally having bestowed on them the graces necessary for their salvation:
“To put it baldly, I am claiming that in terms of how grace operates, the saints live out
their lives as the effect in time of an eternal cause. The effect is necessary in the way that
events, once they have occurred, are fixed. On this analogy, our lives are set out in
advance, predestined in God’s eternity.”282 Wetzel thinks it follows that, “Saints are
empowered in will in so far as they can recollect the ordered self that God has created
them to be,”283 and are enervated in will insofar as they cannot. The problem with
Wetzel’s interpretation of Augustine occurs in his claim that the effect is necessary in the
sense of already happened, occurred, or actual. Augustine does not believe that there is an
“ordered self” in the sense of a perfect, completed paradigm of a saint’s life that that saint
can hopefully, partially recollect, and that exists in the mind of God in such a way that He
cannot be temporally responsive to what that saint wills in time, with or without the help
of His grace. Saints and sinners alike are temporally bound, as Wetzel himself will point
out in various places throughout his book, and so it makes little logical sense for him to

281

Wetzel, 215.
Wetzel, 216.
283
Wetzel, 218.
282

109
say that my life narrative, my conversion story, my ultimate eschatological fate, has
already been decided before it has been decided. Wetzel bases our hope of redemption on
a fiction, an archetypal self that supposedly exists already “fixed” in the mind of the
Creator. Plato’s influence on Wetzel’s interpretation of Augustine’s views on
predestinating grace looms large, but more important, I think, is what conclusion this
Platonic interpretation of Augustine leads us to accept, namely: a dualistic view of the
person as two separated personae, one temporal and incomplete, the other eternal and
complete. Such a dualistic way of thinking may have been familiar to Mani and his
disciples, but not to the mature Augustine.284
Fr. Edmund Hill, O.P., one of the best twentieth century translators and
commentators on Augustine’s Sermons, On the Trinity, and On Christian Teaching,
thinks the divine ideas are just Plato’s ideas or forms, except for the fact that they are
placed in the divine mind—in the Word; they are the rational plans of creatures, fully
actualized, before the work of temporal creation takes place. For Hill, when in the
beginning heaven and earth were created, they were planted as “hidden seeds” in the
world as the seminales rationes, where the fully actualized ideas in the Word would then
develop and shine forth, God willing, in their corresponding time-bound creatures. Hill
likens this developmental process to the execution of a computer program.285 The

As is often pointed out, when Augustine was younger, he remained a “hearer” among the
theological sect of the Manicheans for around nine years, whose characteristic belief was in the dualism
between good and evil. Such a dualism, they believed, was present at the microcosmic scale in the human
person (the human soul being good, the body being evil) and replicated at the macrocosmic scale in the
existence of a kingdom of light and a kingdom of darkness that make up the reality of the universe.
285
P. 411, ftn 2; Sermons 94A-147A on the New Testament. Hill offers the same interpretation of the
divine ideas in his commentary on Book IV of Augustine’s On the Trinity, where in ftn 68 he writes the
following: “These aeternae rationes are the platonic ideas or forms, located by Plotinus in the first
emanation Mind or Nous, and by Augustine in the Logos or Word of God.... The aeternae rationes are not
to be identified with the seminales rationes, which he was talking about in Book III, 13, note 20, and which
284

110
problem with Hill’s analogy is that it ignores the distinction Augustine makes between
what is “actual” (actualis) and what is “complete” (completus). Hill takes the divine ideas
to be fully actualized, like a computer program, when, in fact, Augustine considers the
divine ideas to only completely contain all possible potentialities for the good a thing
may have according to its nature, and depending on the free choices it makes or does not
make, if the creature under consideration is something ontologically more than a rock or
a horse. The divine plan for a specific rational creature of its kind cannot be modeled
after a computer program, even one of quantum level complexity, because its plan as
related to God and the totality of creation cannot be explained by the calculation of
already actualized inputs that then lead to determined outputs. For Augustine, human and
angelic behavior is unique in that it is mindful and willful, intelligent and free, capable of
following divine instruction on what it ought to do, but not constrained to execute that
instruction in running the natural course of their existence. I submit that rational creatures
are, so to speak, “co-programmers” with God, to modify Hill’s analogy in a way in which
Augustine would approve, sharing their potential for doing what is good with the allgood God.
Finally, we have both Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann interpreting
Augustine as holding God’s foreknowledge to be immutable based on the fact that God’s
nature is immutable. According to them, if a temporal event were “earlier or later than or
past or future” 286 in relation to God’s knowledge, then He would be present in the
successiveness of time, which they think would lead to an undermining of His simplicity.
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With this said, they do think that a relation can obtain between an eternal being like God
and temporal beings like ourselves, and they describe such a relation in terms of ETsimultaneity (eternal-temporal simultaneity). ET-simultaneity is essentially a relation of
co-existence, which means that what is eternal and what is temporal can occur
simultaneously. However, Stump and Kretzmann further add very importantly that what
is eternal and what is temporal cannot both be related “within the same mode of
existence,”287 as they are both irreducibly real modes of existence. To reduce what is
temporal to what is eternal would render time illusory, and to reduce what is eternal to
what is temporal would render eternity illusory.288 Following Boethius and the medievals,
however, Stump and Kretzmann claim it is absurd to deny the reality of either mobile
time or eternity; and that there is no third alternative mode of existence.289
Since we must affirm the reality of two modes of existence, it is necessary to
define ET-simultaneity in terms of two observers with two non-symmetrical
epistemological perspectives: God’s eternal frame of reference and our temporal frame of
reference. Stump and Kretzmann define ET-simultaneity as follows (note that x and y
stand for entities and events):
For every x and for every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous iff
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal or vice versa;
and
(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and y are both
present – i.e., either x is eternally present and y is observed as temporally present,
or vice versa;
and
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(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference
frames, x and y are both present – i.e., either x is observed as eternally present and
y is temporally present, or vice versa.290
As their description of the relation proves, Stump and Kretzmann believe that they can
actually speak of the “unique eternal reference frame” as always being simultaneous with
the “infinitely many temporal reference frames.” This is somewhat unusual insofar as
they admit that explaining relational simultaneity in non-Newtonian scientific systems is
problematic.291 Nevertheless, they insist that it is conceptually unproblematic to claim
that all temporal entities and events are in a relation of co-existence in God’s eternal
“now,” that they are ET-simultaneous.
Stump and Kretzmann then proceed to apply their definition of ET-simultaneity to
the now dated example of President Nixon’s death, which was a future contingent at the
time that they wrote their article. Specifically, they look at how an eternal entity with its
unique frame of reference can relate to this particular future contingent. According to
them, while it may be true that Nixon’s death will only be realized at the time of his
actual death (which we now know to be April 22, 1994), we must also say that Nixon’s
death “is present to an eternal entity”292 in the manner prescribed by their definition of
ET-simultaneity. Next, however, they immediately make a point of denying a vision of
Nixon’s death to an eternal entity: “It cannot be that an eternal entity has a vision of
Nixon’s death before it occurs.”293 Stump and Kretzmann concede that a vision of a
future contingent event like Nixon’s death is impossible for God, because then an eternal
event would be prior to a temporal event, and such an earlier-later relation cannot be
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possible in eternity. With this said, it is also their claim that the sacrificing of God’s
vision of Nixon’s future death does not take away “the actual occasion of Nixon’s dying
[being] present to an eternal entity.”294 As a matter of fact, all temporal actions and
events associated with Nixon from the time of his birth to the time of his death are ETsimultaneous within God’s eternal frame of reference. Stump and Kretzmann conclude
that “there is a sense in which it is now [prior to Nixon’s actual death] true to say that
Nixon at the hour of his death is present to an eternal entity,”295 yet they never explain
what sense of “true” they are using.296 How can an eternal being, while not having a
vision of Nixon’s death, still have true knowledge of the hour when Nixon will die?
Moreover, what is the difference between an eternal entity having a vision of the future
and having the future present to it? It appears that Sump and Kretzmann use temporal
operators to explain both notions, yet they only choose to reject the former. Not only that,
but Augustine actually speaks out vigorously against any such position as complete
nonsense in City of God 13.11, where he writes that, it is “absurd to say that a man is in
death before he reaches death (for to what is his course running as he passes through life,
if already he is in death?), and ... it outrage[s] common usage to speak of a man being at
once alive and dead, as much as it does so to speak of him as at once asleep and awake.”
Another difficulty plagues the misinterpretation that Stump and Kretzmann
attribute to Augustine, and it concerns the inconsistent way in which they understand
God’s omniscience itself. The following text calls attention to the inconsistency: “If we
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are considering an eternal entity that is omniscient, it is true to say that that entity is at
once aware of Nixon resigning the Presidency and of Nixon on his deathbed (although of
course an omniscient entity understands that those events occur sequentially and knows
the sequence and the dating of them); it is true to say also that for such an entity both
those events are present at once.”297 Given the fact that Stump and Kretzmann are on
record earlier as having said that an eternal entity is atemporal and separate from the
succession of time, it is inconsistent for them to now say that, from an eternal entity’s one
and the same epistemological perspective, temporal events can be simultaneous and yet
also prior/posterior with respect to that eternal entity.
Stump and Kretzmann attempt to meet this charge of inconsistency by claiming
that there is only “one objective reality that contains two modes of real existence in
which two different sorts of duration are measured by two irreducibly different sorts of
measure: time and eternity.”298 But if Stump and Kretzmann say that time and eternity are
“two irreducibly different sorts of measure,” one wonders how they could have justifiably
postulated ET-simultaneity as an explanatory entity to begin with. After all, no relation
can obtain among two relata that are totally unlike each other.299 That is why when
Stump and Kretzmann claim that an eternal entity infallibly knows the contingent truths
of Nixon’s resignation from the presidency and death as ET-simultaneous, we must
question what sense of the word “know” they are using. Only by having two senses of
“know” can they possibly avoid the absurdity that Nixon’s resignation and his death are
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ET-simultaneous, and so occur at the same time. Even then, however, it is unclear how an
event could be known as both occurring now in eternity and in the future.
Eleonore Stump still defends ET-simultaneity to this day, believing her two-tiered
(eternal-temporal) ontology can sufficiently explain the interaction between God and
man. In the God of the Bible and God of the Philosophers (2016), given as the annual
Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, she argues that the God of classical theism, i.e.,
the immutable, eternal, and absolutely simple God, is the God of the Bible, who is seen to
interact with humankind in highly personal and collaborative ways as witnessed, for
instance, in the story of Jonah. While her focus is on Aquinas’s version of classical
theism, she makes clear that what she says equally applies to Augustine as well.300
The main objection Stump attempts to answer is: How can an immutable, eternal,
and absolutely simple God interact with a person such as Jonah without destroying the
coherence of maintaining these three divine attributes in the process? In the story of
Jonah, God rescues Jonah after he says a prayer, but would not this entail that God was
somehow passively determined by Jonah’s plea, thereby causing Him to be mutable,
temporal, and complex?301 Stump answers with a resounding, No, offering an analogy
involving Erwin Abbott’s short story, Flatland, to make her point. In brief, the main plot
of Flatland revolves around a self-aware two-dimensional square living in a twodimensional world. One day this square encounters and begins to converse with a
similarly self-aware sphere, who inhabits a three-dimensional world. Of course, the
sphere cannot adequately explain its three-dimensional existence to the square, who is
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puzzled by this new mode of being it can never occupy in its two-dimensional state.
Stump concludes that: “In the story, the two spatial modes of existence, that of Flatland
and that of the sphere, are both real; and neither is reducible to the other or to any third
thing.”302 So too with respect to God’s immutable, eternal, and absolutely simple
existence and how it can personally relate to our inherently mutable, temporal, and
complex existence. According to Stump, Aquinas, Augustine, or any classical theist for
that matter, believes that “reality includes both time and eternity as two distinct modes of
duration, neither of which is reducible to the other or to any third thing. Nonetheless, on
their view, it is possible for inhabitants of the differing modes of duration to interact.”303
And once again, in addition to the previously mentioned analogy, Stump attempts to rely
on ET-simultaneity to explain such interaction. The problem is she admits that “the
presentness or simultaneity associated with an eternal God cannot be temporal
presentness or temporal simultaneity.”304 Here, then, is where she totally denies any kind
of “real” relation or interaction possible between God and man. God can only be present
or simultaneous with time-bound man if and only if He is present or simultaneous with
time-bound man. No amount of analogies or philosophical conceptualization can hide this
truth. Stump then hedges and says ET-simultaneity is a special kind of simultaneity, in
which “all of time is encompassed within the eternal present ... just as the whole Flatland
world can be here for someone in three-dimensional space,”305 but can never bridge the
original gap she created between God as eternal and man as temporal, because of the
crippling Platonic assumption that they are two separate and irreducible forms of
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existence. Her ontology as a whole lacks the middle reality of the divine ideas, which are
eternal by a different kind of eternity than that of the divine essence, namely that of the
divine will and knowledge, and which are especially emphasized in the Eastern tradition
and Augustinian theology.306 Such incorporeal and eternal reasons may be above the
human mind, as they are unchangeable, but they are really present to us in changeable
creation. For “unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be
able to employ them as our measures by which to judge corporeal things.”307 Because of
their truncated two-tiered ontology, Stump and Kretzmann have to rely on the eternity of
the divine essence to explain every attribute (immutability, eternity, and simplicity in
particular) pertaining to God as God and how He relates to creation. This in turn forces
them to say that every temporal entity and event in creation “is present at once to the
whole life of eternal God,”308 or what means the same thing, physically present at once to
the eternity of the divine essence. Whether they admit it or not, Stump and Kretzmann
have denied the reality of the temporal order in the defense of the immutability, eternity,
and simplicity of the divine essence.
Augustine preferred, no doubt to keep the purely actual essence of God distinct
from His will and knowledge, to say that the divine essence is existentially distinct (not
divided) from the divine idea of a creature, with the latter being further distinguishable
from the creature itself. For “the formula or idea on which a creature is fashioned is there
in the Word of God before it is realized in the fashioning of the creature” and remains
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there after it comes to be.309 This idea is life for the creature, i.e., what constitutes its
creaturely perfection; and this idea is complete because the creature has “nothing in [its]
natural manner of running [its] course in time which was not made causally in that
primordial creation.”310 For this primordial creation contains the nature proper to each
thing according to its kind, and so “whenever a creature in its natural development in due
course discloses and puts forth perfection, this added something was previously hidden
within that creature, if not in a visible and tangible corporeal way, at least by a natural
power.”311 Augustine believes that the goal of this perfection process for creatures is to
rest in God, not as He is for Himself (essentially), but as He exists for creation in terms of
His will and knowledge expressed in the divine ideas (relatively).312 We might say that
the latter realities in God—those that are distinct from the divine essence—contain “fully,
exhaustively, existentially, all there is of being, of the positive, of good, of the
ontologically good and of the morally good, in creatures, because it itself causes or makes
all of this.”313 Nothing more of being is ever added to the divine ideas after their
establishment. Augustine’s reasoning for this is that God “would not be the perfect
worker He is, unless His knowledge were so perfect as to receive no addition from His
finished works.”314
It follows that through the divine ideas God has a perfect existential and moral
knowledge of the whole of creation from moment to moment, insofar as it exists as the
kind of thing it now is and as it ultimately ought to be according to the divine ideas by
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which it was originally made. As we saw previously, a divine idea constitutes God’s
rational plan for a particular creature that will help it keep its natural order and realize its
full, God-given, potential. It is a plan that anticipates every good actuality that that
creature can attain as related to God and the totality of creation. When it comes to any
creature, there is no getting to that good before God, no anticipating it, no making it,
since it has already been done by Him, who has done, is doing, and will do all good
things in heaven and earth.
It is important to emphasize, however, that Augustine never says that what was
made causally in that primordial creation is actual, or already existing. It was made
“Invisibly, potentially, in their causes, as things that will be in the future are made, yet
not made in actuality now (Quomodo fiunt futura non facta).315 This is something that
scholars such as Maritain, Wetzel, Hill, Stump, and Kretzmann assume, perhaps because
of their apparent penchant for reading Aquinas backwards into Augustine, or for reading
Plato forwards into Augustine. But if one examines Augustine’s corpus carefully, and
especially his Commentaries on Genesis, where we find the bulk of his references to the
divine ideas, Augustine only ever defends the position that the divine ideas contain fully,
exhaustively, the potential goods for the corresponding creatures which are the bearers of
these ideas. In his Literal Commentary on Genesis, for instance, Augustine claims that
the “formulae contained each potentiality” for all creatures, “so that anything would be
actualized from them that pleased the one who would make them.”316 Augustine will give
numerous examples of this passim DGnL, including that of a tree and its various
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perfections: “Let us, then, consider the beauty of any tree in its trunk, branches, leaves,
and fruit. This tree surely did not spring forth suddenly in this size and form, but rather
went through a process of growth with which we are familiar.” Specifically, Augustine
tells us, it is in the seed that “all those parts existed primordially, not in the dimensions of
bodily mass but as a force and causal power.”317 Saying that it is the potentiality of
creatures that can be actualized according to the divine ideas ensures that the ordo
temporum is not rendered illusory, being merely reduced to what is eternally actual and
immutable. Augustine will make similar comments to this effect in his other two
commentaries on Genesis, namely, his Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book.318
Augustine was a firm believer in the potential aspects of created reality, writing
elsewhere that all things in creation “have been seminally and primordially created in the
very fabric, as it were, or texture of the elements; but they require the right occasion
actually to emerge into being. For the world itself, like mothers heavy with young, is
heavy with the causes of things coming to birth.”319 But these things are not yet actual,
possessing no definite number, weight, and measure, i.e., possessing no formed nature
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(number), no ultimate end to strive towards (weight), and no relations to anything else
(measure).
We can say, for example, that no possible perfection of a human being is lacking
in the corresponding idea for him in the Word, for God possesses perfect knowledge of
human nature in itself and as it is lived in the concrete members of the species. The idea
for a particular person contains each “good” potentiality for him, so that he would be
actualized from his corresponding idea if he so chose to conform himself to it. Augustine
noticeably picks up on this example in what can only be said to be a side issue of the final
book of The City of God, i.e., whether or not infants who have died are going to be
resurrected in the body which they would have had if they were given the chance to
mature normally. Here, Augustine reinforces the point that the divine idea of any thing
contains all potential perfections for that thing. He writes of the dead infant in particular
that it was:
... wanting the perfect stature of its body; for even the perfect infant lacks the
perfection of bodily size, being capable of further growth. This perfect stature is,
in a sense, so possessed by all that they are conceived and born with it—that is,
they have it potentially, though not yet in actual bulk; just as all the members of
the body are potentially in the seed, though, even after the child is born, some of
them, the teeth, for example, may be wanting. In this seminal principle of every
substance, there seems to be, as it were, the beginning of everything which does
not yet exist, or rather does not appear, but which in the process of time will come
into being, or rather into sight. In this, therefore, the child who is to be tall or
short is already tall or short.”320
One can see that the fundamental assumption of Augustine’s argument is that some thing
cannot come from nothing and no thing ever could: If there was not some sense in which
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the infant already possessed the perfection of its bodily size and form of its members
(potentially), then there would be no rational way to maintain that it could ever, through
the process of time and its own deficient being, achieve these perfections (actually).
These perfections would be some ‘things’ that literally originated in ‘nothing,’ but it is
absurd to say that something can come from nothing.321 Hence the need for there to be all
of these perfections seminally in the principle of the human substance, i.e., in its
corresponding divine idea.
This in turn raises an important question: If in fact all of the perfections of human
nature and its conative and cognitive powers are contained in the divine ideas, then would
not this mean that we as human beings are necessarily limited in the number of goods we
can accomplish? Speaking of the human will in particular, Augustine writes: “Wherefore
our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should
have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits;
and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge
is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it.”322
According to Augustine, these “most certain limits” imposed on the human will, because
of God’s perfect knowledge of the human will, are necessary, but not necessary in any
sense that would be controlling of our freedom:
For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though
we be unwilling effects what it can effect—as, for instance, the necessity of
death—it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly are
not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing,
we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself—for if
we will, it is; if we will not, it is not—for we should not will if we were unwilling.
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But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary
that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I
know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the
freedom of our will.323
Death is not in our power; growing old is not in our power; being born is not in our
power; and so too for a host of other things natural to human life too many to enumerate.
These happen to us whether we will them or not. It is Augustine’s claim that our wills are
not necessary in this sense of “not in our power.” However, they are still necessary in the
sense that if one wills such and such an action, then of necessity one wills such and such
an action, whether for good or ill. As a result of our possessing a definite nature, distinct
from other natures in the mind of God, we are limited in the number of potential goods,
and therefore evils—which are merely privations of goods—that we can willingly acquire
or avoid as human beings. This necessary consequence of our partaking in one and same
human nature, which has a corresponding complete divine idea to go along with it, is not
necessary in any vicious, freedom-destroying sense. It is only necessary in how things
actually are for us, because of the reality we inhabit as human beings.
The Greek Fathers also present a unified philosophical front when it comes to
saying that God has a perfect knowledge of human nature through the divine ideas, with
this perfect knowledge only including the potential perfection, or actuality, of man.
Nyssa, for instance, writes in his On the Making of Man XXIX.1 that, “in the power of
God’s foreknowledge, all the fullness of human nature had pre-existence (and to this the
prophetic writing bears witness, which says that God knoweth all things before they be).”
But he makes clear that the “fullness” he speaking of is potential:
just as we say that in wheat, or in any other grain, the whole form of the plant is
potentially included—the leaves, the stalk, the joints, the grain, the beard—and do
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not say in our account of its nature that any of these things has pre-existence, or
comes into being before the others, but that the power abiding in the seed is
manifested in a certain natural order, not by any means that another nature is
infused into it—in the same way we suppose the human germ to possess the
potentiality of its nature, sown with it at the first start of its existence, and that it is
unfolded and manifested by a natural sequence as it proceeds to its perfect
state...324
He will repeat the same point elsewhere: “the form of the future man is there potentially,
but is concealed because it is not possible that it should be made visible before the
necessary sequence of events allows it.”325 Nyssa is arguing that temporal things must
follow a temporal sequence of development appropriate to their respective natures. It
follows that a grain of wheat cannot instantly produce its fruit, or pre-exist in its mature
state where it would bear its fruit. Similarly, the “seed” of a human being cannot instantly
become an adult, or pre-exist as such; and so on for everything else created and that
exists in time.326 If it could be otherwise, then things in time could exist as actual before
they are actual, which would be the very height of philosophical absurdity. The Greek
Fathers thus understood the metaphysical and logical necessity of keeping creatures
distinct from their corresponding ideas in the Word. It does not follow, however, that we
as rational creatures cannot participate in our corresponding ideas. We can, and we
should, for the more we do so, the more progress we make towards gaining the
knowledge that God has of us in Him, i.e., the knowledge of how we ought to be in
relation to God and the totality of creation, which constitutes our ultimate perfection.
Nazianzen has a similar message to Nyssa when it comes to knowing ourselves in God.
He will say, when we have ascended to our archetypal selves in the divine ideas, which
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we now desire but have not yet attained, then we shall know even as we are known (1 Cor
13:12). We shall know ourselves, in other words, as God knows us as we should be in
Him; and to know ourselves as God knows us is something He actively wants for the
whole human race. 327 Those who do not ascend to their archetypal selves, or those who
fail to attain the likeness of God but still yet retain the image, will not be formed in such a
way as to attain their ultimate perfection as creatures that are capable of God.328
Like the Greek Fathers, Augustine will often speak of our conformation to our
corresponding divine ideas as constituting our ultimate perfection. One instance of this
that particularly comes to mind can be found in Book XI of The City of God, where he
will first say of the righteous angels that they know creation:
... not in itself, but by this better way, in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by
which it was created; and, consequently, they know themselves better in God than
in themselves, though they have also this latter knowledge. For they were created,
and are different from their creator. In Him, therefore, they have, as it were, a
noonday knowledge; in themselves, a twilight knowledge.... For there is a great
difference between knowing a thing in the design in conformity to which it was
made, and knowing it in itself—e.g., the straightness of lines and correctness of
327
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figures is known in one way when mentally conceived, in another when described
on paper; and justice is known in one way in the unchangeable truth, in another in
the spirit of a just man.329
Augustine believes that, as the spiritual beings we were meant to become, we have some
access to this angelic, “noonday knowledge” of ourselves; but as we are also material
beings, and as we often let this latter “aspect” of our being dominate the former, we tend
to largely possess a “twilight knowledge” of ourselves. As St. Paul famously says, and as
Augustine loved to quote in this connection, Therefore we are always confident and know
that as long as we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord. For we live by
faith, not by sight (2 Cor 5: 6-7). And to quote again from St. Paul: For now we see only
a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall
know fully, even as I am fully known (1 Cor 13:12). With this said, Augustine was
confident that our supreme good lies in this “noonday knowledge” of ourselves, wherein
we see how we ought to be as creatures of God; and that such a good, “is not far from
every one of us: for in it we live, and move, and have our being” (Acts 17: 27-28).330
Equally important, too, is that Augustine views our participation in the divine
ideas as “pleasing” to God, which calls attention to the fact that God desires all persons to
conform themselves to him, as he is accessible to them: “God wants to make you like
him.”331 Yet such good news is immediately counterbalanced by what it implies, namely
that we are not currently as like God as we should be. While we all are the image of God
insofar as we possess a rational mind,332 this does not necessarily mean that we are all
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“like” God or exist ‘according to the likeness of God’ after which he originally created us
(Gn 1:26).333
When Augustine speaks of man being made according to the likeness of God, I
would argue that this refers to our development, in co-operation with Him, to conform
ourselves to His will and knowledge. It has a perfective sense—to make us what God
knows we ought to be according to His divine rationes for us. It is a form of creation
distinct from the creation of all things together, after which He rested on the seventh day;
we might call it continual creation, or the kind of creation of which Christ spoke of when
he said, My Father is working still (Jn 5:17).334 Augustine will stress that this creation
demands action on our part. Near the end of DGnM, Augustine will state what it means
for man to be made in the image and likeness of God, phrasing it in terms of the genders
of male and female, respectively: “Thus let man be made to the image and likeness of
God, male and female, that is, intellect and action.”335 While some may object to
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Augustine’s identification of the male with intellect (image of God) and female with
action (likeness of God), one must first remember that this is an allegorical reading of
Genesis 1:26 on his part. In his subsequent literal interpretation found in DGnL, he will
clearly state that “she certainly had a mind, and a rational mind, and therefore she also
was made to the image of God.”336 Second, we must remember that male and female,
taken in this allegorical spirit, are meant to complement each other in a kind of
inseparable spiritual union. From this union of image and likeness, male and female,
intellect and action, Augustine thinks spiritual fruit will be brought forth in the effect of
holding “the flesh in subjection, as well as other things [that concern] human
perfection.”337 According to Augustine, it is God that bids us to perfect the image in us
according to His likeness through the performance of good works, and that He will “give
us rest after all of these works.”338
At DGnI.16, Augustine will further explain his literal approach to explaining the
doctrine of the likeness. Here, he will speak of it in terms of the concept of participation.
Augustine will ask why the Scriptures say, “Let us make man to our image and likeness.”
Are not all images like that of which they are images? He answers his own question in
the affirmative, but notes that not every thing that is like something else can be said to be
its image. For some thing to be called the image of something else it must have its origin
from this other thing. In addition, we must make another distinction between what is
‘like’ and ‘likeness’ itself. For example, there is a difference between a chaste person and
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chastity; a strong person and strength; a wise person and wisdom. The former persons
being such and such depends on their relation to, or participation in, these latter realities.
And these latter realities, Augustine thinks, are found “in God,” where there is chastity
which is not chaste by participation; strength which is not strong by participation; and
wisdom which is not wise by participation. Augustine concludes that whatever things
God made that are like Him in these and other respects are like by participation in these
likenesses themselves.339 He explains these distinctions in relation to Gen 1:26: “the
addition, ‘to the likeness,’ after it had said, ‘to the image,’ was meant to show that what
was called the image is not like God in the manner of one participating in some likeness,
but that this image is itself the likeness, in which all things participate which are said to
be like. Thus there is in God chastity itself, by participation in which souls are chaste, and
wisdom, by participation in which souls are wise, and beauty, by participation in which
all beautiful things are beautiful.”340 It follows that if the Scriptures mentioned only
‘likeness,’ they would not have sufficiently indicated our origin from Him; and if they
had mentioned only ‘image,’ they would have sufficiently indicated our origin from Him,
“but not that it was so like to Him that it was not merely like, but likeness itself.”341 It is
the likeness itself of God that forms us and brings us into the unity with God which we
were meant for before the foundation of the world.342
According to Augustine, God wants to “love us for actually being what he now
loves us that we might be,” in the complete divine idea he has for each one of us, “and
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are not such as he hates because we are (non quales odit quia sumus),”343 in our presently
incomplete and sinful time-bound condition. Augustine often preached this same lesson,
that God does not love us as we are, but rather hates us insofar as we are sinful, thereby
failing to achieve the likeness to Him we can and ought to achieve. This is analogous, he
thinks, to how sick people hate themselves as they are, insofar as they are ill, and how
doctors hate their sick patients, insofar as they hate their patients’ illnesses. As the doctor
of our souls, God has compassion for us, because while He hates us as we are, because
we are afflicted with many “fevers” of the soul, such as avarice, lust, hatred,
covetousness, lechery, and so forth, He wants to make us what we are not yet. He wants
to make us better. He wants to make us like Him. Augustine thinks we see this
particularly in the example of Christ, who only loved sinners because of the good he
wished to make in them and for them, not because of the sin he found in them.344 It is up
to us to let him make us into the kinds of persons we are not yet, into spiritual men and
women. We can and must help the wellness process along, according to Augustine, by
making an effort with God, by listening gladly to what he orders, and by gladly doing
what he orders. And if not gladly, we must force ourselves to “co-operate” with God, so
that God, as doctor, and we, as patients, may persecute our illnesses together.345
Nevertheless, this healing of human nature will never make us what God is, no
matter how healthy we become. God only promised to make us what He is, “after a
fashion, that is to say, an imitator of God like an image, but not the kind of image that the
Son is.”346 To give us some understanding of how we can be a kind of image of God but
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not the kind of image that the Son is, Augustine will draw on an example he often uses in
his Sermons: that of the difference between the emperor, his son, and the coins that bear
his image. Augustine thinks the emperor’s image is carried differently by a gold
sovereign than how it is carried by the emperor’s son; these two different images of the
emperor are not of equal ontological weight. So too, we are God’s coins, but better ones,
insofar as we are His coins endowed with life and intelligence, and so capable of
knowing whose image we carry and to whose image we were originally minted.
Because we were created imago Dei, Augustine will say that it is the nature of the
human person, and the human mind in particular, that it order itself according to the
eternal pattern of righteousness present in God for it, which exemplifies how it ought to
be as related to God and the rest of creation.347 Following Augustine’s previous coin
analogy, we might say this is how we as God’s coins are restruck in a way which actually
surpasses our “first issuance,” so to speak. When we let God restrike us in the furnace of
charity, we quite literally touch the Master Minter himself, for the re-minting effected by
divine ideas, as expressions of God’s will and knowledge, are himself as He is accessible
to us.348
The above minting process renews the image of God in us that was damaged by
the fall and our own personal sins. Of course, this does not happen instantaneously: “The
renewal of which we speak is not effected in the single moment of return, like the
renewal which takes place in baptism in a single moment through the remission of all
sins—none whatsoever remaining unremitted.”349 Rather, Augustine likens our rise to
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contemplating God, or our greater and greater conformation to God’s divine will and
knowledge, to recovering after a bout of fevers or after some harm has been done to the
body; our fevers may cease or a dart may be pulled from our body quite quickly, but that
is different from the convalescing that takes place after which one’s full health returns,
which must take “effect by gradual process.”350 So too with our defaced and distorted
image: It is one thing to remove the cause of its weakening, by the forgiveness of sins,
yet it is quite another thing to go about strengthening it, which takes place by a gradual
process of grace working on (passive) and with (active) our human nature and its various
conative and cognitive powers. Augustine views this divinely-directed recovery process
as a distinct form of grace from the grace of creation, to which he often refers to as recreation.351
To support the view that God continues to be involved with his incomplete
creation after its first establishment in the divine ideas, Augustine frequently cites Jn
5:17: My Father is working until now, and I myself am working. It is his claim that after
the initial act of creation God holds together, and providentially provides for, everything
that he has made; and that this is a form of creation that will take place in time until the
final Apotheosis of creation, the “Sabbath of Sabbaths,”352 when everything that has
remained with God will enjoy eternal rest in God. However, everything else that has not
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will be left to its own self-imposed temporal demise, returning from the nothingness from
whence it came, and in which it foolishly placed its hope for happiness.353
Augustine is careful to keep the two forms of creation he has spoken of as distinct
(creation and re-creation), and the corresponding realities that go along with them
(immutable and time-bound): “the unchangeable formulae [or ideas] for all creatures in
the Word of God are one thing... [and] yet another these which carrying on from those he
is working until now.”354 Augustine will return to this distinction multiple times in The
Literal Meaning of Genesis. He gives an example of it in action: “I say that in that first
establishment of things, in which God created all things simultaneously together, man
was not to be found as he is now, not only as an adult but not even as an infant, not only
as an infant, but not even as a fetus in his mother’s womb, not only this, but not even as
the visible seed of a human being.”355 In short, he was to be found as ‘complete’356 in his
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corresponding divine idea. But man as he is found now, whether as an adult, visible seed,
or at whatever stage of development in between, is partly complete, partly incomplete, in
his own existence.
Perhaps now we can better understand why Augustine will make statements to the
effect of: “it is what [God] wills that will of necessity be in the future, and it is those
things that he has foreknown which will really be in the future;”357 and “He knows
unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He shall do.”358 Taken out of
context, the previous statements sound like an affirmation of predestination (maybe even
double-predestination) to the ears of most scholars.359 But by placing them within the
context of Augustine’s theory of the divine ideas, I believe they only support a reasonable
divine providence. First, the only things that will of necessity be in the future are those
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things that God wills, because the divine ideas are complete, not lacking any “good”
potentialities for their respective creatures existing in time. Potentialities for evil provide
no exception, for they are quite literally nothing on Augustine’s account; they are mere
nihilations or privations that are parasitic upon the existence of the good but not
constitutive of the good.
Second, the only things that will really be in the future are those things that God
has unchangeably foreknown in the divine ideas, because it is based on them that God
knows the future through their primordially complete causality, effected through the Son
and in the Holy Spirit, which actualizes creatures at the appropriate times, in accord with
the divine will and knowledge for those creatures, as well as their free choices, when
considering the rational creation. Evil actions on the part of rational creatures once again
provide no exception to the above account, because evil does not exist as a positive
reality for Augustine. It has no proper mode of being in itself. With this said, in knowing
all the potential goods of creatures through the divine ideas, God knows all the possible
evils that could befall them as well, for such evils are nothing else than privations of the
potential goods present in the divine ideas. In other words, God knows all possible evils
through the goods of which they are privations. He knows how far they fall short of the
ideal of what they can be in Him.
The king Hezekiah and his miraculous recovery from an illness he was suffering
provides an occasion to witness Augustine’s theory of divine ideas in action. As the story
goes, Hezekiah was going to die because of natural, secondary causes, but God extended
his life by fifteen years after hearing his prayers. Augustine claims this is something that
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God had foreknown he would do before the foundation of the world.360 Since this was
something God foreknew that he was going to do, it was something that was really going
to be in the future. But how is this not an instance of divine pre-determination, if God’s
extending of Hezekiah’s life was decided before he even existed? The answer is found in
the divine idea for Hezekiah, which causally interacted with the time-bound man himself.
We might say that, built into the very idea of Hezekiah, there is every kind of perfection
that was, is, and would be offered to the man himself (even life of body and soul),
provided that he patterns himself after God’s eternally complete idea of him in the
appropriate way, at the right time, and in the right circumstances. In Hezekiah’s case,
God’s eternal will for Hezekiah and Hezekiah’s own temporal will matched up, leading
to his miraculous recovery recounted in 2 Kings 20:1; 2 Chronicles 32:24; and Isaiah
38:1. This is an instance of predestination, but one of potentialities, namely the “good”
potentialities Hezekiah actualized by his free choice, helped along by God’s good will for
him. The worry remains, however, that this personal activity of God, hearing the prayers
of a dying man, somehow threatens both divine transcendence and immutability. To
which I answer it jeopardizes neither: God’s essence remains transcendent, and God’s
will did not have to change to personally respond to Hezekiah, for God decided before
the foundation of the world to give (maybe not always in the way people expect, to be
sure) when people “ask” of Him with a sincere faith (Matthew 7:7). Augustine writes: “It
gives us firm hope that no one who asks, seeks and knocks leaves the Lord’s presence
empty-handed.”361 Hezekiah asked, and so he received.
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God’s will according to the divine ideas is thus genuinely eternal on my view,
because nothing new happens to God either essentially or accidentally on account of a
new decision of His will. All of His decisions as to how to perfect his creation have
already been prejudged on the basis of the everlasting divine ideas. Augustine writes of
God’s will: “His will is singly, simultaneously, sempiternally all that he wills, not willing
now and then, on this or that. He does not will now what he nilled before, or nill now
what he willed before, since that would show a changeable will, and anything changeable
is not eternal, and ‘our God is eternal.’”362 Unlike human beings, God does not act under
the aspect of time, sometimes choosing this, sometimes choosing that, “but by the eternal
and unchanging, stable formulae of his Word, co-eternal with himself, and by a kind of
brooding [fovebat], if I may so put it, of his equally co-eternal Spirit.”363
In one of his early works, On the Immortality of the Soul, Augustine uses an
analogy involving the will of an artist to make the point that something immutable can
move something mutable without undergoing any change in itself: “there can be a certain
thing which is not changed when it moves a changeable thing. For when the intention of
the mover to bring the body which it moves to the end it desires is not changed, while the
body which is acted upon is changed by this motion from moment to moment, and when
that intention of accomplishment, which obviously remains unchanged, moves both the
members of the artificer and the wood or stone which are subject to the artificer, who
may doubt that what we have said follows as a logical consequence.”364 Nevertheless,
God’s will is really present in the ordo temporum, because His decisions are actuated at
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the fitting time, in relation to the appropriate rational and non-rational creatures for their
perfection. While God’s will or creative Wisdom may abide unchangeably (Wis 7.27),
this does not mean it is not temporally active in the perfection of creation. Augustine
writes in his commentary on Psalm 138: “Wisdom stands firm, if we can properly say
that she stands; the expression connotes immutability, not immobility [dicitur autem
propter incommutabilitatem, non propter immobilitatem]. Nowhere is she other than she
is here or there, never is she different from what she is now or was formerly. This is what
God’s utterance is.”365 And elsewhere, he tells us that, “[w]hile this wisdom is
unchanging in itself, it does not hold itself aloof from anything that is, even in a changing
mode of existence, because there is nothing that was not created by it.”366
A concrete example of this kind of immutable movement can be witnessed in the
coming of Christ. For Augustine, in the Word of God, “there was timelessly contained
the time in which that Wisdom was to appear in the flesh.”367 And while it was decided in
the pre-eternal counsel of Father, Son and Holy Spirit that the Son would manifest
himself in the flesh of our humanity, only at the “right time” could such an idea be made
actual in the person of Christ.368 According to Augustine, it would be absurd to negate the
very real and very temporal aspect of Christ’s existence:
He contains in himself the deep treasures of wisdom and knowledge and fills
minds with faith in order to bring them to the eternal contemplation of the
immutable truth. Imagine if the almighty did not create the man, wherever he was
formed, from the womb of his mother, but thrust him suddenly before our eyes!
Imagine if he went through no ages from infancy to youth, if he took no food and
did not sleep! Would he not confirm the opinion of that error, and would it not be
believed that he did not in any way assume a true man, and would it not destroy
what he did out of mercy if he did everything as a miracle? But now a mediator
365
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has appeared between God and human beings so that, uniting both natures in the
unity of his person, he may raise up the ordinary to the extraordinary and temper
the extraordinary to the ordinary.369
Not only that, but for there to be Christ there first had to be Mary. And for there to be
Mary there first had to be Adam, Noah, Abraham, and then David, from whose royal line
she descended. Augustine claims that from Adam to Christ’s birth there spanned five
ages, with his birth marking the beginning of the sixth.370 Christ was not actually
incarnate in the divine ideas, or “physically present” in God’s eternal instant, as Maritain,
Wetzel, Hill, Stump, and Kretzmann must hold according to their sometimes Platonicsounding ontological interpretations of Augustine, before he was sent. Rather, when the
fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, made of woman (Gal 4:4). Like all
temporally existing things, Christ the man required the right moment to “actually emerge
into being.”371

369

Ep.137.3.9; CSEL 44.108, the works of St. Augustine: a translation for the 21 century.
Ibid, 4.2.7.
371
Ibid, 3.2.16. See also 4.2.11, where he notes that all the sacred and mysterious things shown to us
about Christ before he was sent “were likenesses of him,” but not actually him who was to come at the right
time. And later at 4.5.30, Augustine claims that, while the angels could represent Christ before his
incarnation in order to prefigure his future coming, “they could not take him over and just be him.”
370

140
Chapter 5
Augustinian and Eastern Arguments for Divine Simplicity

As we have seen throughout the last chapter, most scholars interpret Augustine as
holding to a simple ontological equivalence between the eternity of the divine will and
knowledge (as expressed in the rationes) and God’s eternal essence. But once such an
interpretation is viewed as a satisfactory stopping point within the context of our
understanding of Augustine’s view of divine and human interaction, no amount of
philosophical hedging can then bring the eternal God into a meaningful, engaged, and
personal relationship with temporal humanity. On this interpretation, God always remains
separated from the drama of salvation history, or even worse, renders the latter illusory,
as a kind of puppet theatre, in which all temporal events and entities are made physically
present to His eternal now, as pre-determined and already accomplished facts that cannot
change or develop according to a will other than God’s alone. The zeal with which we
have seen philosophers and theologians alike defend this interpretation of God’s wholly
transcendent and utterly dominating eternity ultimately stems from their desire to uphold
what has been seen as the overriding theological focus of the Western theological
tradition since the time of Augustine, namely the absolute simplicity of God; and we have
seen them defend this interpretation even at the expense of the plurality of God, whether
that be with respect to himself as three-persons (ad intra), or with respect to the economic
dispensation of his many gifts for what is created (ad extra).
This chapter will examine a few of the most important texts from Augustine’s
corpus that could be used to support their interpretation. All of these texts will be seen as
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falling into either one of two distinct but related arguments for God’s simplicity, what I
will call the possession and participation arguments, both of which appear to not allow
for a real distinction between the eternity of the divine essence and the eternity of the
divine ideas. I will prove, however, that these arguments only support the idea that no
real distinctions can be made in the divine essence itself, not precluding any such
distinctions when it comes to the divine persons’ relations to their shared essence, or to
each other as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or to creation as they work to perfect it
according to the rationes. Augustine’s position in this regard will therefore be shown to
closely mirror the Eastern Orthodox tradition on divine simplicity, which also does not
allow for real distinctions pertaining to the divine ousia or physis as it is in itself (auth
kath’ authn), but does in these other three respects.372 In this chapter, I will specifically
compare Augustine’s view on God’s simplicity with that of St. Gregory of Nyssa, whose
view on the absolute simplicity and incognoscibility of the divine physis373 will be used
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to represent that of the Eastern Orthodox tradition. I will prove that, at least with respect
to their views on divine simplicity, “neither of them adopt a notion of absolute simplicity,
e.g., as espoused by Thomas Aquinas, in which the persons of the Trinity and the divine
energies are reduced to and simply identified with the divine essence (ousia) or nature
(physis).”374
The first Augustinian argument to be considered, the possession argument, can be
briefly summarized as follows: Since God is absolute being without any kind of
composition, qualification, or modification, for Him to be great, just, almighty, and so
forth for the rest of His attributes is the same as to be. The divine essence is therefore
“the same as itself” and “is what it has.”375 It must be what it has, for this is the only way
to ensure that God can never be deprived of the attributes He possesses, or suffer any
kind of change in those very same attributes. Augustine will make the possession
argument multiple times in On the Trinity,376 but the following is arguably one of its
more impactful formulations:
It is generally accepted to be the case with the human virtues which are to be
found in the human spirit that although they each mean something different from
the others, they can in no way be separated from each other, and so men who are
equal for example in courage are also equal in sagacity and justice and
moderation. For if you say that they are equal in courage, but one man excels in
sagacity, it follows that the other’s courage is less sagacious, and thus they are not
even equal in courage, since the former’s courage is more sagacious; and you will
find the same with the other virtues if you run through them all—it is not of
course a question of fortitude of body, but of fortitude or courage of spirit.
be used interchangeably, which is evidenced by what Nyssa says in places such as CE.3.2.34 and 81
(Krivocheine 82).
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How much more then will this not be the case in that unchanging and
eternal substance which is incomparably more simple than the human spirit? For
the human spirit it is not of course the same thing to be, and to be courageous or
sagacious or just or moderate; it can be a human spirit and have none of these
virtues. But for God it is the same thing to be as to be powerful or just or wise or
anything else that can be said about his simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity
to signify his substance [de illa simplici multiplicitate uel multiplici simplicitate
dixeris quo substantia eius significetur].377
Augustine thus uses the co-entailing unity present among the human virtues to argue that,
in an analogous but much higher way, there is an even stronger kind of unity present in
God’s substantia. He takes this to prove that the Father cannot possess any perfections in
greater measure than the Son (and by extension the Holy Spirit), who is God from God,
and therefore must be co-equal to the Father in all things.378 If any one of the three
persons could possess even one divine attribute in greater measure than the other two,
God would be made complex, or turned into a Trinity of unequal perfections. As a result,
any one of the three persons must be equal in all things to the three considered together
and vice versa. He continues:
Since, therefore, the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone is just
as great as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit together he is not to be called
threefold in any sense [triplex]. Bodies, on the contrary, increase by a union of
themselves.... In God himself, therefore, when the equal Son adheres to the equal
Father, or the equal Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, God does not thereby
become greater than each one separately, for there is nothing whereby that
perfection can increase. But he is perfect whether the Father, or the Son, or the
Holy Spirit; and God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is perfect, and,
therefore, he is a Trinity rather than tripartite [et ideo trinitas potius quam triplex].
Nor since he is a Trinity [trinitas] is he, therefore, tripartite [triplex];
otherwise the Father alone or the Son alone would be less than the Father and the
Son together. Although, to tell the truth, it is difficult to see how one can speak of
the Father alone or the Son alone, since the Father is with the Son and the Son
377
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with the Father always and inseparably, not that both are Father or both the Son,
but because they are always mutually in one another and neither is alone.379
If the Father and the Son and the Spirit were triplex, then they would be divided into
three parts. As it is, however, they are always and inseparably a trinitas, because they are
each perfect, whether we consider Father, Son, or Spirit. Augustine admits in this passage
that it is well-nigh impossible to abstract what can be said of the Father alone from what
can be said of the Son alone, since Father and Son are always together, possessing all
perfections to an equal and infinite degree together.
Augustine clearly thought that the essential unity of God was important to be
made known not just to his more theologically-philosophically adept readers, but also to
the community of the faithful in the Church. In Sermon 341.8 (419), he preaches: “In
God, though, everything that is said about him is one and the same; in God, you see,
power isn’t one thing and sagacity another, courage one thing and justice another, or
chastity another. Whichever of these you attribute to God, it isn’t to be understood as one
thing and another, and none of them, in any case, is attributed to him worthily.” And later
in that very same Sermon, “in God power is identical with justice (whatever you say in
him, you are saying the same thing, since in fact you are not saying anything that is
worthy of him) ... because all the things you say in that field are one and the same, and all
have the same value.”380 Augustine’s theological teaching and preaching when it comes
to the simplicity of God’s eternal essence therefore appear to line up, in that they both
convey the message that we cannot divide the divine essence by saying that it is the
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subject of many different perfections that it participates in to be good, just, wise, etc.
Rather, Augustine holds the divine essence to have one and the same ontological value.
Augustine’s possession argument for God’s simplicity thus discusses His
“essence,” or what is “in Him.” It is an attempt to talk about God as He is in Himself,
which from the Eastern Orthodox perspective may appear a foolish and impossible
endeavor,381 but what matters for the moment is that Augustine is not saying that this is
how God exists for creation. It is also important to keep in mind that Augustine is only
broaching this topic of the undivided unity of God’s essence to prove the co-equality of
Father, Son, and Spirit, to prove that the divine persons are a Trinity and not tri-partite.
Augustine at no point will claim that he knows exactly what the essential Life of God
consists in, and/or that he can adequately express this Life via thought or speech.382 After
all, he uses an argument from analogy with the human soul and the unity of its virtues in
his attempt to understand the substantial unity present in God. Augustine understood that
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The Eastern Orthodox tradition is well-known for its insistence on the incognoscibility of the
divine ousia/physis, whether by celestial or super-celestial minds. For an excellent discussion of this,
especially in St. Gregory of Nyssa, see esp. Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature...,” pp. 76-80.
Augustine will actually make similar statements about the unknowability of God. See DGnL.IV.6.13, for
example, where he writes: “But we are mortals and sinners, and our corruptible bodies are a load upon our
souls, and the earthly habituation presses down the mind that muses upon many things. But even though
our hearts were absolutely undefiled and our minds completely free from all burdens, even though we were
already equal to the holy angels, the Essence of God would surely not be known to us as it is in Himself.”
Both the Eastern Orthodox tradition and Augustine would appear therefore to disagree with the Thomistic
view that our beatitude in the next life consists in the satisfaction of our desire to know the divine essence,
which becomes an intelligible species for the blessed to see by the eye of their mind: “There resides in
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men.
But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural
desire would remain void. Hence, it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God”
(ST I, Q. 12, A. 1, ad 1).
382
Hence why I think any claim that Augustine’s views on the knowability of the divine essence
should be identified with that of someone such as Eunomius, who held that the divine names had a “divine
origin and the power to express the essence of things” (Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature..,”
84), should be avoided. Augustine only mentions that “in God” goodness, justice, wisdom, etc. have the
same ontological value to illustrate how much greater the unity is in God’s substance than in even the
highest image of it in the human mind and its various faculties and powers. It is not as if God’s substance is
broken up into various parts, however unified they may be.
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no analogy, including this one, is perfect or able to intellectually comprehend the Being
of God Himself.383
All of the significant Greek Fathers make this kind of distinction between God for
Himself (who is absolutely simple and unknowable) and God for creation (who is
willingly manifold yet without division and knowable), even though it might be said that
they are less willing than Augustine to speak of the former as they are of the latter.384
Archbishop Basil (Krivocheine) will in fact say of Nyssa in particular that, while he
affirms the incognoscibility of the divine nature, this does not prevent him from holding
to its simplicity. He does this to “defend the orthodox trinitarian doctrine of the
consubstantiality of the Son with the Father (in his polemics against Eunomius) and of
the divinity of the Holy Spirit (in his writings against Macedonius).”385 Like Augustine,
then, Nyssa argues for divine simplicity to safeguard the co-equality of Father, Son, and
Spirit.
We can see this in Book I of his Contra Eunomium, where Nyssa will claim that
the simplicity of the divine nature is evident to all, and that even the dullest of persons
understands that “simplicity in the case of the Holy Trinity admits of no degrees. In this
case there is no mixture or conflux of qualities to think of; we comprehend a potency
without parts and composition.”386 Wisdom, power, goodness, and whatever else may be
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suitably predicated of the Holy Trinity, are not external properties in which They
participate so that They may acquire them, but rather are properties rooted in Their very
nature. Put briefly, the Trinity must be what It has. Nyssa writes in this connection:
Nothing defective concerning wisdom or power or any other good thing is found
in Him for Whom the good is not just something acquired but is by nature
(phusei) that which He is (katho esti toiouton pephuke). Thus he who claims to
distinguish in the divine nature such lesser and greater essences, makes the Divine
... a composite of dissimilar things, and would lead us to believe that the subject is
one thing and the participated things another, which implies further that by
participation in them He comes to be in them something which He was not
before.387
Nyssa offers this “possession” argument for the divine nature’s simplicity in order to
combat Eunomius’ claim that God the Father is alone truly simple, and therefore
possesses, to a greater degree than the Son and Holy Spirit, the various Divine
perfections.
Nyssa’s version of the possession argument will also take center stage in his letter
to Ablabius, On ‘Not Three Gods.’ Near the beginning of this work, Nyssa makes a
distinction between the strict use of the term “nature” and its common use. Using human
nature as an example, he claims its strict use demands that we see it as indivisible and not
separated between various human beings.388 But in its common use, we do tend to see
human nature as separated from one individual to the next, and we do frequently say
things such as Peter, James, and John are “many men.” Bringing this examination of the
term nature to bear on the divine nature and the three persons, Gregory concludes that,
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Gregory will explain this in his Epistula 38.2 as follows: “If now of two or more who are [man] in
the same way, like Paul and Silas and Timothy an account of the ousia of men is sought, one will not give
one account of the ousia of Paul, another one of Silas and again another one of Timothy; but by whatever
terms the ousia of Paul is shown, these same will fit the others as well. And those are homoousioi to each
other, who are described by the same formula of being.” Translation taken from page 70 of Johannes
Zachhuber’s, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological
Significance, (Leiden: Brill, 2000).
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just because we speak of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as being three persons, it does not
follow that the divine nature is actually separated between them, thereby making three
Gods out of one. Immediately after giving this response, however, Gregory notes that it
will not be sufficient to quell the common use of the term divine nature. The only way to
move forward on this issue is to examine the power (dunamis) of the Godhead:
Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine Nature is not itself
signified, but some one of its surroundings (ti ton peri)389 is made known.... Since,
then, as we perceive the varied operations of the power above us, we fashion our
appellations from the several operations that are known to us.... He surveys all
things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts, and even entering by His
power of contemplation those things that are not visible, [hence] we suppose that
Godhead (theotes) is so called from beholding (thea).... Now.... let him consider
this operation, and judge whether it belongs to one of the persons whom we
believe in the Holy Trinity, or whether the power extends throughout the Three
Persons.390
According to Gregory, the way we can tell whether or not the power extends throughout
the three persons is by examining whether their energeiai are one. For if their activities
are one, which they are, then the power which is the source of them must be one. And if
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The word “peri” in this expression has the sense of “around” the divine nature, but one must often
be careful in its translation from the Greek, because its meaning is not only dependent on theological
context, but also the grammatical case of the words associated with it. Krivocheine rightly notes that we
must make a distinction in Nyssa’s writings “when he uses the words ‘divine nature’ in the accusative and
when he uses them in the genetive (peri ths theias phusews) (Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine
Nature...,” 88, ftn 82). Paying attention to the grammatical cases of the words ‘divine nature’ is important,
because only in the accusative can we translate “peri” by “around” the divine nature, and then and only
then “it can have a particular theological meaning.” Others in the Orthodox tradition render “peri” in the
accusative in this way. See for example, Maximus the Confessor, Chapters on Love I.100: “The qualities
that appertain to His nature/ [better: ‘around His Nature’ (tôn peri auton)], however, are accessible to the
intellect's longing: I mean the qualities of eternity, infinity, indeterminateness, goodness, wisdom, and the
power of creating, preserving and judging creature.” Translation modified by Fr. John D. Jones. Of course,
if these words were in the genetive, they would merely have the meaning “of the divine nature,” not
thereby connoting any kind of real metaphysical relationship between the energies and the nature
(Krivocheine, 88, ftn 82). Sometimes translators of Nyssa will render “peri” by “about” or “concerning.”
An example: “in order that we might have a certain understanding of what is thought piously about Him
(peri auton nooumenôn)” (CE.2.246). Often translations such as these skirt the danger of not doing enough
to connote a real relationship of the energies to the essence, or they imply one that is conceptual or logical,
i.e., one that depends on human thought, such as we find in Aquinas’ “real” distinction between the Persons
and the essence.
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the power is one, then the hypostatically manifested nature which is the source of that
power must also be one.
Nyssa argues that just as there is oneness in the Divine nature, so, too, there is in
the other names we apply to it: “But since the Divine, single, and unchanging nature, that
it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the
signification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is called in the singular by
all its other names, ‘God,’ ‘Good,’ ‘Holy,’ ‘Savior,’ ‘Just,’ ‘Judge,’ and every other
Divine name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to operation,
we shall not dispute the point.”391 Nyssa will not dispute the point whether these Divine
names refer to physis or energeia in God, because it is the oneness of God from Scripture
(Dt 6:4) which he ultimately desires to prove. This is a oneness that must be devoid of all
divisions in the physis of God, but does allow for real distinctions in the energeiai around
It, and in the hypostaseis that manifest It.392 Elsewhere Nyssa will describe this oneness
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To give an adequate summary of the Eastern Orthodox tradition on these distinctions without
divisions in God, let alone in Nyssa by himself, would prove to be impossible in this rather short chapter.
However, some brief comments on Nyssa’s theological approach to them can now be made. Nyssa believes
that the divine attributes, names, or energies—i.e., goodness, life, beauty, even God (theotes), etc.—do not
correspond to the divine physis, but rather the divine energeiai which are around it. The names we give
them cannot denote the nature as it is in itself, because then it would be “multiform and multi-composite,
manifesting its manifoldness according to the differences designated in the names” (CE.2.302-304). With
this said, the names do point to realities in God, and this is supported by Scripture, which, for example,
often speaks of the Only-Begotten as “Door,” “Shepherd,” etc. We predicate these names of God “by way
of intellection (tou kat’ epinoian tropou),” but they are not “purely a product of our intellection”
(Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature,” 85). Thus, when it comes to the physis-energeia
distinction in Nyssa, we may conclude that it is a real distinction (or one existing in God, not just in our
minds), and that it does not threaten divine simplicity, because it causes no divisions in the divine physis.
The same kind of reasoning is used by Nyssa to argue that the physis-hypostasis distinction in God causes
no real divisions in the His nature. A representative text: “By these expressions [i.e., ‘Light
Unapproachable’ for the Father and ‘True Light’ for the Son], Scripture does not at all harm this simplicity,
because their community and particularity are not of the essence, for if they were, their convergence would
demonstrate that the subject is composite. But the essence remains itself, whatever it may be according to
nature, being what it is” (CE.3.10). And, finally, we have the hypostasis-energeia distinction. According to
Nyssa, the energies are common to all three of the divine persons, having their source in the Father,
proceeding through the Son, and being perfected by the Spirit. They are energies of the Persons, and so not
divided from them, but they are distinct, because they cannot be merely identified with Father, Son, and
392
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as not requiring the identification of the subject (the Divine Being) with its various
“energetic” and “Personal” attributes:
As for the statement that [God] is a judge, we understand by the word
“judgement” a specific energy around Him, while by the word “is” we direct our
mind toward the subject. We are clearly instructed by this not to think that the
notion (logos) of the being (tou einai) is identical with the energy. Thus, when we
say that He is generated or ungenerated, we separate our thought in a two-fold
supposition, understanding by the “is” the subject and implying by “generated”
and “ungenerated” the attribute of the subject.393
Krivocheine believes this passage should be seen as Nyssa defending his older brother
Basil from Eunomian theological attack.394 As is well-known, the Eunomians were
critical of Basil, claiming that he identified energy and essence in the Son.395 Nyssa’s
response here is simple: God is one subject, but possesses different relational attributes,
which are distinct but not divided from His Being.

Spirit. Again, Nyssa thinks this is true according to Scripture: “Scripture teaches that faith in the name of
the Father who vivifies all proceeds ... so that the life-giving grace has its point of departure
(aphormhtheisan) in Him. As life, it gushes out, as from a source, through the Only-Begotten God, who is
the true life, and makes perfect those who are made worthy by the energy of the Spirit” (Maced., p.106.38). To summarize, we may say the energies are of the Persons and around the divine nature, distinct but not
divided from both.
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CE.2.359. Basil himself will respond to the Eunomians in his famous Letter 234. The Letter begins
with the Eunomians posing a dilemma in terms of a question: “Do you worship what you know, or what
you do not know?” Basil answers that to know (to eidenai) has many senses that correspond with the
various ways God can be said to be, not essentially but energetically, as great, powerful, wise, good, just,
etc. For Basil, we know God in terms of His energies as they economically come down to us; we cannot
intellectually comprehend His essence. After this rebuttal, the Eunomians try a different argumentative
approach, claiming that if God is simple, how can He exist in these multifarious ways? All these things we
know “about” (peri) Him must be identical to his essence. Basil thinks this is absurd, for can we really say
that there is the “same mutual force/power (dunamis) in his awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice
and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and
punishments, His majesty and His providence?” We cannot. The energies are distinct from the essence and
come down variously to us, performing their salvific functions in specific ways, depending on the
providential dispensation required. As Basil will say, “the energies are various (energeiai poikilai) and the
essence simple (ousia áplh). Through this knowledge of the energies, we can know that He exists (hoti
estin) but not what He is (ti estin). According to Basil, our knowledge of God in these various ways must
eventually give way to worship: “We know God from His power. We, therefore, believe in Him who is
known, and we worship Him who is believed in.” St. Basil the Great: Epistle CCXXXIV, translated by
Rev. Blomfield Jackson (modified by Fr. John D. Jones).
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The second of the two arguments Augustine gives for God’s simplicity, the
participation argument, is really a variant of the first one due to its being based on the
same fundamental understanding of God’s essential unity, but it is couched in language
that is sufficiently different to mention it here briefly as a distinct argument. We may
summarize it as follows: God cannot be said to participate in His various attributes
(mercy, justice, power, greatness etc. etc.), because then He would be inferior to those
perfections in which he participates. He would need them to be merciful, just, powerful,
great, and so forth. A representative example of this argument can be found at On the
Trinity 5.2.11. Here, Augustine illustrates how God’s essential relation with respect to the
attribute of greatness (or any perfection for that matter) differs from that of something
that partakes of greatness, such as a great house, a great valley, or a great heart. In each of
the latter, its being is one thing and its being great another. Because of this fact,
Augustine thinks true greatness is not had by any of these things. True greatness is that
by which all of these things are made great. This is a greatness that is reserved for God
alone, Who...
is not great with a greatness which he is not himself, as though God were to
participate in it to be great; otherwise this greatness would be greater than God.
But there is nothing greater than God. So he is great with a greatness by which he
is himself this same greatness. And that is why we do not say three greatnesses
any more than we say three beings; for God it is the same thing to be as to be
great. For the same reason we do not say three great ones but one great one,
because God is not great by participating in greatness, but he is great with his
great self because he is his own greatness. The same must be said about goodness
and eternity and omnipotence and about absolutely all the predications that can be
stated of God, because it is all said with reference to himself.396
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As in the possession argument, the participation argument for God’s simplicity makes
clear that we are talking about God “with reference to himself” and not about God with
reference to something else. In other words, we are talking about God’s essential
greatness, goodness, eternity, omnipotence, and so forth. None of what Augustine has
said would prevent him from making statements about God’s greatness, goodness,
eternity, and power in relation to creation.
Augustine’s possession and participation arguments have been heavily criticized
by most scholars for their being overly concerned with the unity of God’s essence at the
expense of not paying enough attention to the personal diversity of Father, Son, and
Spirit, and how they economically manifest their attributes in salvation history for the
benefit of creation. Accordingly, so the argument goes, Augustine makes God out to be
an absolutely simple monad with no real internal or external differentiation. What follows
are some representative examples of this scholarly position in the secondary literature.
In Being as Communion, John Zizioulas simultaneously lauds the Cappadocians
for bringing attention back to the notion of person as the ultimate ontological reality in
the Trinity while at the same time excoriates Augustine for supposedly making the unity
of the divine essence ontologically primary over and above the three persons. Using his
own words: “By usurping the ontological character of ousia, the word person/hypostasis
became capable of signifying God’s being in an ultimate sense. The subsequent
developments of Trinitarian theology, especially in the West with Augustine and the
scholastics, have led us to see the term ousia, not hypostasis, as the expression of the
ultimate character and the causal principle (arche) in God’s being.”397 And he will say
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elsewhere: “There can be no doubt that Augustine makes otherness secondary to unity in
God’s being. God is one and relates as three. There is an ontological priority of substance
over against personal relations in God in Augustine’s Trinitarian theology.”398 Zizioulas,
however, thinks the Cappadocians were right to prioritize the individual divine persons
over their shared substance and, specifically, to expound the idea that all things properly
originate from the person of the Father, not from the divine essence. This is a position
that has become well-known in Greek Orthodox circles as the monarchia of the Father,
according to which the first person of the Trinity is said to be the ultimate ontological
source of all reality, Divine and created.399 The Greek Fathers understood that this should
not now lead to a hierarchical ranking of the individual divine persons as being more or
less God than the others a la Arianism. That is why we have Nazianzen, for instance,
writing that the monarchy to be believed is that of Father, Son and Spirit, for it is a
monarchy “that is not limited to one person,”400 but rather extends throughout the three,
because of their unity of essence.
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The Monarchy of the Father is based on the idea that agency belongs to the person (hypostasis).
Actions are not actions of the nature (physis/ousia), but of the person that manifests it. There is a classic
text from John of Damascus’ De Fide Orthodoxa which illustrates this well. In this text, the Damascene
makes a fourfold distinction between energeia, ennergêtikon, ennergtêma, and ennerrgôn in God: “But
observe that energy (energeia), capacity for energy (ennergêtikon), the product of energy (ennergtêma),
and the agent of energy (ennerrgôn) are all different. Energy is the efficient and essential motion of nature
(physis or ousia). The capacity for energy is the nature from which the energy proceeds. The product of
energy is that which is effected or caused by the energy. And the agent of energy is the subsistence or
person (hypostasis) that uses the energy.” (De Fide Orthodoxa, III.15). The Monarchy of the Father thus
consists in His hypostasis providing the source of being and unity in the Trinity with respect to the Son and
Holy Spirit. The Father shares His divine nature with the Son and Spirit, thereby becoming Personally
related to Them and They to Him. Because of this we may also say that, while all three are co-equal and coeternal Persons, thereby sharing the same will/energy, in every common action of Theirs that extends from
Them to creation, such action “has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is
perfected in the Holy Spirit” (NPNF Ad Ablabius 526; see also 527 and 528). In the Eastern Orthodox
tradition, then, there is a pride of place given to the person of the Father, who is the source of the essential
Life of the Trinity and the economic life of created reality, but never in separation from the Son and Holy
Spirit.
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In contrast to the more Personal approach of the Greek Fathers is, as we have
seen, Augustine’s vehement defense of the unity of God’s essence. It has thus become an
easy critique to make that Augustine subsumes the Persons, along with their divine
attributes, into the undifferentiated unity of the divine essence. Following from this,
among other things, would be the undesirable consequence that Father, Son, and Spirit
are non-relational to each other, as there would not strictly speaking be any “otherness”
in the Godhead to be relational to, there being only the divine essence.
Richard Cross interprets the notion of person in Augustine’s Trinitarian grammar
in this way, viewing it, like the notion of substance, as non-relational.401 It is important to
note that he cites only the following passage from Augustine as proof of the soundness of
his interpretation:
Therefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not as he is Father,
but as he is, so too the person of the Father is not other than the Father himself.
For person is said non-relationally (ad se), not in relation to Son and Spirit, just as
he is called “God,” “great,” “good,” “just” and all other such things. And just as it
is the same thing for him to be as to be God, great, good, so it is the same thing
for him to be as to be person. Why therefore do we not call these three together
“one person,” as “one essence” and “one God,” but say “three persons” even
though we do not say “three gods” or “three essences,” unless it be because we
want some one word to serve for this meaning by which we understand the
Trinity, so that we would not be entirely silent when asked “what three,” when we
confessed there to be three.402
Cross apparently takes this “possession/participation argument” for the term person’s
non-relational status as self-evident in the above passage, for he gives almost no
philosophical justification for it afterwards, except for a rushed statement to the effect of:
person is not a relational term, because we do not use it as part of a two-place predicate,
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as we would in the case of the terms father, master, friend, and so forth.403 Not only is
this an exceedingly weak (and in my mind irrelevant) explanation as to why the term
person is non-relational for Augustine, who says nothing here, or anywhere in Book VII
of On the Trinity for that matter, of the requirements of terms to function as two-place
predicates, but it also completely ignores the nuanced metaphysical distinction Augustine
is making between the Father as viewed from the perspective of substance and the Father
as viewed from the perspective of his intra-trinitarian relations. Augustine is very clear in
saying that, when considered in himself, what the Father “is” is not the same as what he is
in relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Since the Father is a person, the same goes for
when we consider his personhood: from the perspective of substance, the person of the
Father just is the Father himself as God; but from the perspective of relation, the Father is
uniquely the begetter of the Son and the spirator of the Spirit, which are two other distinct
persons to which the Father is related. To be fair to Cross, Augustine does focus most of
his comments in the above passage on that which is non-relational in God, namely the
divine substance; but the language of relation is sufficiently present here (if read in
context), and elsewhere explicitly in Book VII, that Cross really has no philosophical
justification for his claim that person, when said of God’s Trinitarian being, is merely a
non-relational term. What is perhaps most odd to the reader is that after making this
argument, Cross will say that “Augustine certainly does not deny that the persons are
distinct by relations or that “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit” are relational words.”404 How,
though, can the Father, Son, and Spirit be relational words if they denote three distinct
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persons? If indeed person is a non-relational word according to Cross, then how can the
divine persons be truly relational?
Catherine Mowry LaCugna shares Cross’ criticism of Augustine as over-focusing
on God in himself, and so destroying any possibility of there being a truly relational God,
whether with respect to himself or to creation. For LaCugna, “Augustine inaugurated an
entirely new approach. His starting point was not the creedal and biblical sense of the
monarchy of the Father, but the divine essence shared equally by the three persons.”405
While she admits that Augustine discusses the economic missions of the three persons in
salvation history at the beginning of On the Trinity, in Books I-IV, she still claims that
Augustine prioritizes the unity of the Trinity over the divine economy, and that this
where his Trinitarian theology properly begins.406 To support her interpretation of
Augustine, LaCugna only uses the same primary text quoted by Cross from Book VII
mentioned above. She writes of this text: “Earlier in the treatise [i.e., in Book V]
Augustine had cited Father, Son, and Spirit as relative terms, but in this passage he denies
the relative character of a divine person and equates person with substance. The person of
the Father is the same as the being of the Father. The person of the Father is thus
absolute, without relation to Son and Spirit.”407 We can see that LaCugna falls into the
same interpretative morass of confusion as Cross when it comes to Augustine’s
metaphysical understanding of the trinitarian term ‘person,’ because she also fails to take
into account the distinction Augustine is trying to make in this passage between the
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person of the Father considered in himself and the person of the Father considered with
respect to Son and Holy Spirit.
It warrants mentioning that such was a distinction that was also made by the
Cappadocians. Nyssa particularly resembles Augustine in this connection, writing that
there is a difference with respect to what the Father is as regards the relation he has to the
Son and “as regards the definition of his nature.”408 He continues to argue that the same
distinction must be applied to the Son: “But what he is, in his own nature, who exists
apart from generation, and what he is, who is believed to have been generated, we do not
learn from the signification of ‘having been generated,’ and ‘not having been generated.’
For when we say ‘this person was generated’ (or ‘was not generated’), we are impressed
with a twofold thought, having our eyes turned to the subject by the demonstrative part of
the phrase, and learning that which is contemplated in the subject by the words ‘was
generated’ or ‘was not generated’—as it is one thing to think of that which is, and another
to think of what we contemplate in that which is.”409 Nyssa may speak in terms of
thinking of “that which is” and “in that which is,” but he is driving at the same distinction
as Augustine. He does so in order to prevent the supposition that God’s physis is the same
as God’s energeia. It follows that when we say that the Father is ungenerate and the Son
generate, we must always keep in mind their double reality in terms of being and action;
the former consisting in their reality as subjects (as “Deity” or “Divine”), the latter
consisting in the apprehension of that which uniquely belongs to them as subjects (as “not
having been generated” and “having been generated,” respectively).
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David Bradshaw (2004), however, is one of many writing from an eastern
orthodox perspective who thinks that, while the East has this distinction between God’s
being and activity, Augustine identifies the two in order to preserve divine simplicity, and
that this position can ultimately be traced back to Aristotle, who says in Metaphysics XII
that the substance of the Prime Mover just is actuality.410 Bradshaw is correct in finding
this position to an extent in Boethius and then St. Thomas. In De Hebdomadibus,
Boethius writes: “in Him [God] esse and agere are the same.... But for us esse and agere
are not the same, for we are not simple.” Aquinas for his part says of God’s being and
activity: “suum agere est suum esse.”411 But then, without citing any specific texts from
Augustine’s corpus throughout his entire ten-chapter book that would support his
interpretation, abruptly concludes that Augustine shares this same “Latin” understanding
of divine simplicity. According to Bradshaw, “the Augustinian conception of divine
simplicity entails that God is identical to His own will.... Nor will it do to say that God is
identical with His will only in the sense of His capacity to will, not his will as actually
realized. Divine simplicity rules out such distinctions.”412 I am more than willing to
concede that there is some evidence that Boethius and Aquinas may have identified
God’s being and will,413 but Augustine never argues for such an identification, which can
be seen from what I have already shown. Bradshaw (2008) does not abandon this view of
Augustine, writing: “Among the identities that Augustine infers from divine simplicity is
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that God is identical with his own will. By this he must mean God’s expressed and
determinate will, and not merely the will as a faculty as such, for to take the identity as
applying only to the will as a faculty would introduce a distinction in God that would
compromise his unity.”414 The only distinction Bradshaw thinks Augustine can possibly
make between God’s will as faculty and as expressed and determinate, if he desires to
keep God simple, would not be real but notional.415 What may seem ironic to readers of
Bradshaw’s work, however, is the fact that he is perfectly willing to allow the Greek East
to make the same fundamental distinction between God’s being and activity in terms of
their ousia-energeia distinction, detailing its history from the time of Aristotle to its
maturation in the Byzantine era with St. Gregory Palamas in pain-staking detail, but then
denies the same kind of move as philosophically and theologically untenable with respect
to Augustine.
There are also scholars like Colin Gunton who believe that the demand of divine
simplicity has exacted upon Augustine’s Trinitarian theology the lack of a real distinction
between the essence of God and how that essence is expressed in the distinct persons of
Father, Son, and Spirit. In The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, Gunton writes in this
connection:
It is difficult for [Augustine] to understand the meaning of the Greek hypostasis.
One reason is that he can make nothing of the distinction so central to
Cappadocian ontology between ousia and hypostasis: “I do not know what
distinction they wish to make” (trin.V.10). Certainly, it is unfair to say that he
gets nothing of the point at all, for he goes on to say that, in view of the difficulty
of translating the Greek terms into Latin, he prefers to say, with his Latin
414
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tradition, unam essentiam or substantiam and tres personas. Augustine at least
realizes that different concepts are required if we are to express the distinction
between the way in which God is one and the way in which he is three. It
becomes clear, however, that the adoption of the correct Latin equivalents does
not enable him to get the point, for, in a famous statement, he admits that he does
not really see why the term should be used. ‘Dictum est tamen tres personae non
ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur’ (trin.V.10, cf. trin.VII.7): “this formula was
decided upon, in order that we might be able to give some answer when we were
asked, what are the three”) ... Moreover, Augustine reveals that he is unaware of
what is going on when he makes it appear to be merely a matter of linguistic
usage (forte secundum linguae suae consuetudinem, trin.VII.11).416
Gunton explains that the reason why Augustine cannot grasp the point of the Greeks’
ousia-hypostasis distinction is because he grounds his Trinitarian thought in the
intellectual tradition of Neoplatonism and, specifically, in its conception of God as “the
Absolute One.” It is the latter conception of God that imbibes to Augustine’s conception
of the Trinity an abstract notion of personhood and intellectualism that removes the
Trinity from its proper liturgical, practical, and salvific context.417 Gunton’s “Trinity in
Modern Theology” makes the same kind of critique, adding the specific charge of
modalism against Augustine’s Trinitarian theology:
[Augustine] stressed the unitary being of God at the expense of the plurality, and
effectively generated a modalism in which the real being of God underlies rather
than consists in the three persons. As a result, Augustine’s theology cuts off “the
inner and eternal Trinity from the economic and revealed. It is as if much that is
of interest to writers about the Trinity in later Augustinian theology could be said
almost without reference to the divine economy of creation and salvation made
real in the Son and the Spirit.418

416

The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), pp. 39-40.
Ibid, 42-43. Gunton is not alone in this critique of Augustine’s philosophical connection to
Neoplatonism, and the problems that this connection has for his theology. See also Karl Rahner, The
Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns & Oates, 1970); Robert W. Jenson, the Triune Identity: God
According to the Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982); Vladimir A. Lossky, The Mystical Theology
of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clark, 1957); Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New
Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993);
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1991).
418
Trinity in Modern Theology, 940-941.
417

161
Gunton’s critique here, like all of the others we have seen above, is based on what I
believe has been a faulty interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of divine simplicity—an
interpretation in which God’s simplicity and relationality through various essential (ad
intra) and economic (ad extra) activities have been viewed as mutually exclusive
realities; or perhaps even worse, as one and the same reality with no real differentiation. I
will remedy this misinterpretation in the next chapter, where I will show Augustine’s
Trinitarian theology to be the via media between the theological extremes of Arianism
and Sabellianism; the former being extreme in its claim that there is an unequal plurality
in God, thereby destroying His unity; and the latter being extreme in its claim that there is
no plurality in God, thereby destroying the individuality of the three persons. In
successfully navigating his conception of God in between the shoals of these two
heretical options, Augustine will be seen to dock his theological ship, as it were, in the
safe harbor of the orthodox faith.
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Chapter 6
Augustine’s Conception of God: One in Essence, Three by Relation

While we have seen that the common scholarly line to take is that Augustine
holds to a modalistic conception of God, he actually defends neither the ontological
primacy of the unity of the divine essence nor that of the diversity of the three persons.
Rather, Augustine prefers what I would call a “both...and” approach to the Trinity,
affirming simultaneously the unity of the Trinity and the Trinity in that unity. He tells us
that such a preference was ingrained in him by scripture, which is full of passages that
proclaim not only the oneness within God, but also distinctness within God: the
“testimonies of the divine scriptures ... present our faith with the unity and equality of the
three.”419 For Augustine, if we were to say that God only has existence as some monadic
and undifferentiated thing, the realities of Father, Son, and Spirit would be lost. Yet on
the other hand, if we were to say that Father, Son, and Spirit only have existence as three
independent individuals, the reality of their unity would be lost. Taking scripture to be
authoritative on this issue, Augustine thinks that God’s three-in-oneness must be piously
believed, even if one cannot understand it.420 As mentioned in the very first chapter of
this dissertation, however, Augustine was not a theologian satisfied with believing for the
sake of itself; he desired to understand his faith, and this desire clearly extended to his
faith in the Trinity, which he believed the One God is. Just how he did, and of equal
importance, did not, understand the tri-unity of God in terms of the philosophical
categories of essence and relation, is the subject of this chapter.
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Since Books V-VII of On the Trinity (ca. 413-416) are most relevant to
Augustine’s own understanding of God as one according to essence and three according
to relation, they will receive the lion’s share of my treatment. However, to set the stage, I
think it important to briefly begin in Book I with Augustine’s initial statement of the
Catholic faith in the Trinity, because it encapsulates very well the overall Trinitarianism
that he will painstakingly defend throughout the rest of the work, one which, as we shall
see, has a threefold emphasis on: (1) the unity of the divine substance; (2) the plurality
and co-equality of the three divine persons (ad intra); and (3) the distinct functions of
Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation (ad extra). Using
Augustine’s own words:
(1) The purpose of all the Catholic commentators I have been able to read on the
divine books of both testaments, who have written before me on the Trinity which
God is [de trinitate quae Deus est], has been to teach that according to the
Scriptures Father and Son and Holy Spirit make known a divine unity in the
inseparable equality of one substance [unius substantiae inseparabili aequalitate
divinem insinuent unitatem]; and therefore there are not three gods but one God;
(2) although indeed the Father has begotten the Son, and therefore he who is the
Son is not the Father [et ideo filius non sit qui pater est]; and the Holy Spirit is
neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son,
himself co-equal to the Father and the Son, and belonging to the unity of the
Trinity [ad Trinitatis pertinens unitatem].
(3) It was not however this same three (their teaching continues) that was born of
the Virgin Mary, crucified and buried under Pontius Pilate, rose again on the third
day and ascended into heaven, but the Son alone. Nor was it this same three that
came down upon Jesus in the form of a dove at his baptism, or came down on the
day of Pentecost after the Lord’s ascension, with a roaring sound from heaven as
though a violent gust were rushing down, and in divided tongues as of fire, but the
Holy Spirit alone. Nor was it this same three that spoke from heaven, You are my
Son, either at his baptism by John [Mark 1:1], or on the mountain when the three
disciples were with him [Matt 17:5], nor when the resounding voice was heard, I
have both glorified it [my name] and will glorify it again [John 12:28], but it was
the Father’s voice alone addressing the Son; although just as Father and Son and
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Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably [inseparabiliter operum].
This is also my faith inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith.421
The above passage can be seen as a kind of executive summary of the whole On the
Trinity, minus the philosophical explanations of actually how God is one substance, how
God is three persons, and how God actively manifests himself in his distinct persons to
creation. In what follows, I will attempt to briefly go over Augustine’s understanding of
the “how” of each of these three points pertaining to the Catholic faith in the Trinity, so
that we may not only once and for all dispel the frequent misinterpretation of Augustine’s
conception of God as an undifferentiated monad, but also highlight the relational aspects
of God (both ad intra and ad extra) to better see how our human reality can harmoniously
co-exist with God as He is accessible to us.
To that end, we begin with the prologue of Book V, where Augustine’s
description of God initially possesses a clear apophatic tenor. Here Augustine notes that
not even men with the intellectual and spiritual aptitude of St. Paul are capable of
“grasping [God] as he is”; he can only be seen like a puzzling reflection in a mirror (1
Cor 13: 12). The best we can do, according to Augustine, is understand God negatively,
“if we can and as far as we can, to be good without quality, great without quantity,
creative without need or necessity, presiding without position, holding all things together
without possession, wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, without
any change in himself making changeable things, and undergoing nothing.”422 We have
to understand God, in other words, as being beyond Aristotle’s nine categories of
accidental being (quantitatis, qualitatis, locus, temporis, situs, habitus, facere, pati, and
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relatiuum).423 The first category of being, “essentia” or “substantia,” is soon after applied
to God by Augustine, but not in the rationalistic way done by the Aristotelian
philosophical tradition as a kind of limiting notion meant to imply that something is the
subject of accidental properties. We have already seen that this way of understanding
substance is rejected by Augustine in his possession and participation arguments for
God’s simplicity.
Nevertheless, Augustine felt free to use the word substantia to speak about God,
even while divorcing this word from its original philosophical context.424 An example of
this can be found in his Commentary on the Psalms: “We speak of man or animal, the
earth, the sky, the sun, the moon, stone, the sea, the air: all these things are substances,
simply in virtue of the fact that they exist. Their natures are called substances. God too is
a certain sort of substance [quaedam substantia], for anything that is not a substance is
not anything at all. A substance is something that is [Substantia ergo aliquid esse est].”425
Augustine’s most extended discussion of the notion of substance with respect to God,
however, comes in Books V and VII of On the Trinity, where one comes across the
expression “substantia uel essentia” or one of its grammatical variants when Augustine
discusses how one should speak about the Trinitarian God, thus indicating that he takes
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the words substantia and essentia to possess roughly equivalent meanings.426 The
difficulty, of course, is that the correlative terms in Greek for substantia and essentia, i.e.,
hypostasis and ousia, are not viewed by the Eastern Orthodox tradition to be equivalent
in their meaning. From the Cappadocians to John of Damascus and the later Byzantine
theological tradition that followed with St. Gregory Palamas, these words took on very
specific and distinct meanings from each other.427
In any event, Augustine will make clear in Book V that he prefers essentia:
“There is at least no doubt that God is substance (substantia), or perhaps a better word
would be being (essentia); at any rate what the Greeks call ousia. Just as we get the word
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“wisdom” from “wise,” and “knowledge” from “know,” so we have the word “being”
(esse) from “be” (essentia). And who can more be than he that said to his servant, I am
who I am, and, Tell the sons of Israel, He who is sent me to you (Ex. 3:14).”428
The first reason for his stated terminological preference comes from the Greeks
having another word (i.e., hypostasis) which, he thinks, they do not adequately
distinguish from the word ousia:
I give the name essence to what the Greeks call ousia, but which we more
generally designate as substance. They indeed also call it hypostasis, but I do not
know what different meaning they wish to give to ousia and hypostasis. Certain of
our writers, who discuss these questions in the Greek language are wont to say
mian ousian, treis hypostaseis which in Latin means one essence, and three
substances ... But because the usage of our language has already decided that the
same thing is to be understood when we say essence, as when we say substance,
we do not venture to use the formula one essence and three substances, but rather
one essence or substance and three persons. Such is the way in which it is
expressed by many Latin commentators, whose opinion carries great weight and
who have discussed this subject, since they were unable to find a more suitable
terminology for putting into words that which they understood without words.429
The Greeks say mia ousia, treis hypostaseis when speaking about the Trinitarian God, but
the typical Latin translation of hypostasis by substantia results in the ambiguous
expression: una essentia uel substantia, tres substantiae.430 Augustine’s point is that the
Greeks are using two words that seem to be etymologically the same (sub- and hypoboth mean “under” and -stance and -stasis both mean “stand”), thus making their
theological expression uninformative. This is why Augustine will prefer to use the Latin
persona and not substantia (Greek: hypostasis) when discussing the internal
differentiation of God’s being into Father, Son, and Spirit.431 But as noted in the above
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passage, Augustine thinks this is merely a better way in the Latin language to express
God’s unity and difference, His Oneness and Threeness. He is using a different term in a
different language from that of his Greek contemporaries, but he is attempting to use it to
refer to the same realities of Father, Son, and Spirit.
In Book VII, Augustine writes further about this difference between East and
West when it comes to their respective Trinitarian vocabularies. He notes that “our Greek
colleagues talk about one being, three substances, while we Latins talk of one being or
substance, three persons (tres personae)... [I]n our language, that is Latin, being and
substance do not usually mean anything different.”432 Because of the possible ambiguity
that can result from the Greeks’ preferred way of speaking, Augustine conventionally
adopts persona here as a more appropriate term than hypostasis when paired with
substantia or essentia. With this said, persona as a term also has drawbacks to its use.
Augustine will repeatedly say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct and
unconfused persons (Latin: personae/Greek: prosopa) from the divine essence. But as
Basil of Ancyra and Basil the Great point out, the word person (prosopon) in its original
etymological sense of “theatrical mask” was heretically used by the Sabellians in
describing the three divine persons as being “masks” of a numerically identical, monadic
God. Augustine, however, is clearly not so literal in his rendering of the term persona,
and he even notes that the only reason why we use the word person (persona)—or any
other word to talk about the divine essentia for that matter—is to be able to say
something about the divine mystery, “so that we are not simply reduced to silence.”433
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We have also seen this to be the case for the Cappadocians and, specifically, Gregory of
Nyssa with respect to the divine physis. In On Not Three Gods, Nyssa shows that we
really have no idea what the word physis means when referred to God. That is why Nyssa
gives up tyring to account for the unity of the Three via the divine physis, but rather
attempts to do so by examing the power (dunamis) of God.434 For Augustine, it is merely
a matter of convention what word we choose in this connection, whether the Latin
persona or the Greek prosopon/hypostasis. In response to the question “Three what?,” we
must say something, even if whatever we do say will always fall utterly short of
adequately describing the threefold being of the one God.
The second and related reason for Augustine’s preference of essentia over
substantia also appears in Book VII and has to do with the undesirable, simplicitydenying connotations brought on by the latter’s standard linguistic-philosophical use.
Augustine will famously say that the difference between substantia and essentia lies in
their derivation from different verbs—the former from subsistere and the latter from esse:
[subsistence] is rightly applied to things which provide subjects for those things
that are said to be in a subject, as the color or form of a body.... But if God
subsists, so that he may be properly called a substance, then there is something in
Him as it were in a subject, and he is no longer simple.... But it is wrong to assert
that God subsists and is the subject of his own goodness, and that goodness is not
a substance, or rather not an essence, that God himself is not his own goodness,
that it inheres in him as in its subject. It is, therefore, obvious that God is
improperly called a substance [abusive substantiam vocare]. The more usual
[nomine usitatiore] name is essence, which he is truly and properly called, so that
perhaps God alone should be called essence [ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur
essential, quod uere ac proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum deum dici oporteat
essentam]. For he alone truly is, because he is unchangeable. And, therefore, he
revealed his name to Moses when he said: I am who am: and He that is, has sent
me to you (Ex. 3:14).435
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Because of its inherent meaning of providing “subjects for those things that are said to be
in a subject,” which is antithetical to the understanding of God’s essential being as
absolutely simple, proven by the possession and participation arguments, the word
substance is the worse choice when compared with essence to use of God Himself. For
Augustine, anything that is fittingly said of God with respect to Himself (secundum
substantiam) must be identical to His unified being, otherwise God would be complex.
Like Augustine, I will follow his preferred convention of using essentia to discuss the
divine being, though in certain contexts (discussing the Nicene Creed, for example) and
in my commentary on certain Books of On the Trinity (especially Books V and VI), I will
use the more commonly adopted substantia as he does. Augustine lets us know why he
will switch back and forth between essentia and substantia to discuss the “being” of God
in Book V: It is because “many Latin authors, whose authority carries weight,” have used
substantia “when treating of these matters, being able to find no more suitable way of
expressing in words what they understood without words.”436
Augustine’s reluctance to speak of God in terms of the philosophical category of
substance can also be witnessed in Book IV of the Confessions, where he describes God
as “marvelously simple and unchangeable” (mirabiliter simplicem atque
incommutabilem).”437 He uses the marvelous simplicity of God to argue against those
who would try to claim that God is a subject of accidental predication, for this would
imply that God is composite, possessing his attributes as if they were external to His
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being. However, as we have seen Augustine argue time and time again, God does not
possess his power, greatness, beauty, etc. as if they were qualities of his divine substance,
as if they were tacked on to His being. Rather, for God, to be is to be powerful, great,
beautiful, etc.438
If Augustine does not understand God’s essential existence as a substance with
accidents, then how does he? The answer he gives to this question is: idipsum esse, being
itself, which is not restricted by the spatial and/or temporal considerations of human
categorical speech, thought, and existence.439 It follows that God’s uncreated and
unchanging being cannot be understood along the lines of created and changing being,
which can be explanatively captured by Aristotle’s ten categories of being. But then how
can we understand at all the idipsum esse that is God? Put bluntly, we cannot. Such is an
inadequate name we give for the nameless God himself-in-himself. Augustine tells us
that his naming of God as idipsum esse comes from his Latin version of Psalm 122:3,
which reads as follows: “Ierusalem quae aedificatur ut ciuitas, cuius participation eius in
idipsum,” ‘The Jerusalem that is being built as a city, it is a sharing in the selfsame, the
identical.’440 Like Augustine, I will use the dual expression “selfsame, the identical” to
translate the idipsum esse which God is. In his exposition of this Psalm, Augustine’s
questioning attitude reinforces the apophatic nature of this dual expression: “What is
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idipsum? What can I say other than idipsum? ... What is idipsum? That which always is in
the same way, which is not now one thing, now another. What therefore is idipsum,
unless that which is? What is that which is? That which is eternal. For that which is
always one thing and then another is not, because it does not abide.”441 Jean-Luc Marion
concludes that, for Augustine, the idipsum esse that God is, “remains radically and
definitively apophatic; it does not provide any essence, does not reach any definition, but
only expresses its own inability to speak of God.”442 The idipsum remains beyond the
horizon of created being and any form of rational and non-rational forms of
apprehension.
It remains beyond the horizon of created being because it is radically unlike
created being: the idipsum is simple, while creation is complex; the idipsum is eternal,
while creation is temporal; the idipsum is unchangeable, while creation is changeable;
etc. However, it is fair to say that, out of the many differences that could be listed here
between the idipsum that God is and created being, arguably all of them ultimately stem
from our understanding of the unity actually enjoyed by the divine essence—a unity
which everything that is created lacks just because of the fact that it was created. As we
have seen in Augustine’s possession and participation arguments for God’s simplicity,
while God cannot be said to possess or participate in perfections external to his being,
anything created, insofar as it is created, must do so, for its being is always different from
its being good, great, just, and so forth. While it is true that created things have a
providentially ordained unity in the divine ideas, which they can potentially reach in God,
such a unity cannot compare to or be co-equal with that of the Father, Son, and Spirit.
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According to Augustine, the Trinity’s unity of being leads to at least two
corollaries. First, all of God’s attributes should be expressed in the singular, not as three
separate affirmations: “whatever is said with reference to self about each of them is to be
taken as adding up in all three to a singular and not to a plural.”443 So, for example, while
the Father is great, the Son is great, and the Holy Spirit is great, they do not possess three
separate “greatnesses” but one greatness, which belongs to them all. The same holds,
mutatis mutandis, for the rest of the divine attributes. Second, like the Cappadocian
Fathers, Augustine believes that because the Father, Son, and Spirit share the same
essence, they have the same will, or energy, to use the Greek term.444 One of his later
statements concerning this comes from Sermon 398.3 (425): “Father and Son have one
will, because they have one nature. I mean it is quite impossible for the will of the Son to
differ in the least degree from the will of the Father. God and God, both one God;
almighty and almighty, both one almighty.” There are many other places in Augustine’s
corpus where one can find mention of this ‘same essence-same will principle’ as it
pertains to the Trinity.445
The unity of substance that Augustine argues for with respect to the three Persons
is not original to his theology, but finds its roots in the Councils of Nicaea (325 AD) and
Constantinople (381 AD), both of which had previously said that the Son was homoousios, of the same substance or nature, as the Father. Both of these councils also
endorsed a theology that was fundamentally and unequivocally anti-Arian. This is made
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evident from the Nicaean creed itself, which categorically rejects any kind of theology
that maintains Father and Son to possess different and unequal substances. We see this to
an even greater extent in St. Athanasius’ amended version of the creed of Caesarea that
would provide the theological inspiration for the Nicaean creed.446
Augustine will also rely on Scripture to argue for the unity of Father and Son and,
specifically, Jn 10:30 (I and the Father are one): “What does it mean, “we are one”? We
are of one and the same nature. What does it mean, “we are one”? We are of one and the
same substance.”447 The Arians, however, challenged the consubstantiality of the Son
with the Father according to their interpretation of John 17:3 (Now this is eternal life:
that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent) to prove
that the Father is the only true God; and their interpretation of 1 Tim 6:16, which states
that the Father is alone God and alone immortal. For Arius and his followers, to say that

Athanasius’ amended version of the creed of Caesarea is as follows. The translation is taken from
H. M. Gwatkin, The Arian Controversy. Longmans, Green, and Co.: London, 1914: “We believe in one
God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things, both visible and invisible; And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the
Son of God, begotten of the Father, as only-begotten—that is, from the essence (ousia) of the Father—God
from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, being of one essence
(homoousion) with the Father, by whom all things were made, both things in heaven and things on earth:
who for us men and for our salvation came down and was made flesh, was made man, suffered, and rose
again on the third day, ascended into heaven, cometh to judge quick and dead. And in the Holy Spirit. But
those who say that ‘there was once when he was not,’ and ‘before he was begotten he was not,’ and ‘he was
made of things that were not,’ or maintain that the Son of God is of a different essence (hypostasis or
ousia), or created or subject to moral change or alteration—these doth the Catholic and Apostolic Church
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the Son is consubstantial with the Father would thus be to say that He is co-equal and coeternal with the Father, which would lead to the existence of two ultimate principles in
reality—an absurdity according to their approach to scripture. They further thought that
the ontological prioritization of the Father over the Son could be seen in the terminology
used to describe them as persons, namely begotten and unbegotten. They assumed that
these terms referred to the divine substance, and so they were led to the conclusion that
the only-begotten Son necessarily differs in substance (qua ousia) from the unbegotten
Father. Arius writes of his own theological position in his Thalia (or “the banquet,” ca.
323):
The one without beginning established the Son as the beginning of all creatures....
He [the Son] possesses nothing proper (hidios) to God, in the real sense of
propriety, for he is not equal to God, nor yet is he of the same substance
(homoousios).... There exists a Trinity in unequal glories, for their subsistencies
(hypostases) are not mixed with each other.... The Father is other than the Son in
substance (kat’ ousian) because he is without beginning.... By God’s will the Son
is such as he is, by God’s will he is as great as he is, from [the time] when, since
the very moment when he took his subsistence from God; Mighty God as he is, he
sings the praises of the Higher one with only partial adequacy. To put it briefly,
God is inexpressible to the Son.... For it is impossible to search out the mysteries
of the Father, who exists in himself.... What scheme of thought, then, could admit
the idea that he who has his being from the Father (ton ek patros onta) should
know by comprehension the one who gave him birth.448
Having been heavily influenced by Nicaea and Constantinople,449 Augustine’s conception
of the divine unity was therefore careful to avoid the unequal plurality of natures or
essences present among the divine persons in Arian theology.
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Augustine was also unwilling to veer too far off in the opposite extreme
theological direction, commonly referred to as Sabellianism, or the position which treats
Father, Son, and Spirit as three names of one numerically identical reality or person. He
makes clear that the sameness of substance he is arguing for the three persons should not
be seen as destroying their individuality:
we must maintain a faith which is unshakeable, so that we call the Father God, the
Son God and the Holy Spirit God. Also, there are not three Gods, but that the
Trinity is one God, not with different natures, but of the same substance [neque
diuersas naturas, sed eiusdem substantiae]. Nor is the Father sometimes the Son
and another time the Holy Spirit, but the Father is always the Father, the Son
always the Son and the Holy Spirit always the Holy Spirit [sed pater semper pater
et filius semper filius et spiritus sanctus semper spiritus sanctus].450
Lewis Ayres believes this passage from On the Faith and the Creed, and especially the
language of eiusdem substantiae, is a clear reference to the Nicaean term homoousios,
and is a prime example of Augustine’s indebtedness to this Ecumenical Council.451 Not
only that, but the statement that the Father is always Father, the Son always Son, and the
Holy Spirit always Holy Spirit is a clear rejection of the Sabellian view that God is a kind
of three-faced Janus, switching “faces” whenever the economic need should arise, with
these faces not possessing any independent subsistence of their own. To use the technical
vocabulary of relations, Sabellianism views each relation in the Godhead as mutual
(mutua) and symmetrical (aequiparantiae). In his The Classical Theory of Relations,
Constantine Cavarnos defines this kind of relation very well as one “such that, when it
holds from the referent to the relatum, a relation of the same nature or denomination
holds from the relatum to the referent.”452 Hence there is not, properly speaking, two or
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more distinct terms related to each other in a mutual, symmetrical relation, but rather one
and the same nature or denomination is related back to itself. It follows that saying that
all of the relations in the Godhead are mutual and symmetrical, as the Sabellians do,
makes God out to be one in such a way that the same God is the Father, the same God is
the Son, and the same God is the Holy Spirit.453
For Augustine, however, the one God always subsists as Father, Son, and Spirit
simultaneously. Once again, this is a view of Augustine that is fully borne out by
Scripture, and so must be believed with the sincerest of faith, even if it cannot be fully
understood:
In very truth, because the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, and
the Holy Spirit who is also called the gift of God (Acts 8: 20; Jn 4: 10) is neither
the Father nor the Son, they are certainly three. That is why it is said in the plural
I and the Father are one (Jn 10: 30). He did not say “is one,” which the Sabellians
say, but “are one.”454
Any theological view that rejects God’s Threeness, such as Sabellianism, must therefore
be rejected as heretical.
So far, what we have seen is that Augustine does not opt for either a strictly
pluralistic or monistic view of God. And so we might well ask: What, exactly, is his view
of God? The short answer to this question is that Augustine opts for a relational view of
the Trinity which God is, in which the causal relations of Father and Son and Spirit
determine their differences from each other, while their shared essence maintains their
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unity with each other. Since we have already examined in sufficient detail Augustine’s
views on how God is one in essence, we shall now take a look at his overall doctrine of
relation and how it applies to God. At the outset of such a discussion, I believe it
important to mention that Augustine will only use the adverb “relative” and its cognate
words eighty-one times in his entire corpus, and seventy-eight of them come from Books
V-VII of On the Trinity.455 From this material consideration alone, these three Books will
be my primary theological and philosophical resource for explicating Augustine’s
understanding of any and all relations.
Augustine’s main opponents in these three Books are the Arians, against whom he
argues for the substantial unity of the Son and Holy Spirit with the Father, while
simultaneously arguing for their real distinction from each other. Early on in Book V,
Augustine will outline his basic approach to walking this fine line between substantial
unity and real distinction in God. Perhaps to the surprise of his theological opponents
Augustine agrees with the Arians that, because of God’s absolute simplicity and
immutability, nothing can be said of Him according to accident. Indeed, whether we are
discussing accidentia inseparabilia or accidentia separabilia, these cannot be predicated
of God.456 While we do frequently use accident words to describe God, such as good,
great, powerful, etc., these words do not point to realities superadded onto the divine
substance. Hearkening back once again to the possession and participation arguments, we
can say that when we claim that God is good, we really mean that God is his own
goodness; when we claim that God is great, we really mean God is His own greatness;
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and when we claim that God is powerful, we really mean that God is His own power.
That is, God does not possess or participate in these realities as if they were external to
His own being, but rather they are distinct from but undivided from the divine substance.
Where Augustine notes his disagreement with the Arians is in their conclusion
that everything said of God must refer to his substance. For Augustine, some of the things
said of God are “said with reference to something else (ad alterum),”457 or according to
relation. A case in point are the relationship words used to designate the first and second
persons of the Trinity, ‘Father’ and ‘Son.’ He writes of these two relationship words:
the terms [Father and Son] are not said according to substance [secundum
substantiam], because each of them is not said with reference to himself [ad se],
but both of these are used reciprocally, each with reference to the other [ad
alterutrum]. Nor are they used according to accident [secundum accidens],
because that which is called Father and that which is called Son is eternal and
unchangeable in them. Consequently, although it is different to be the Father and
to be the Son, still there is no undivided substance, because this is not said
according to substance, but according to relation [secundum relatiuum]. And this
relation is not an accident, because it is unchangeable.458
We might say therefore that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ signify realities that lie in
between that which is accidental and that which is substantial, or that they signify the
mutual relationships between the first and second persons of the Trinity.459 These are
relationships that are mutually exclusive (the Son can no more be his own Father as the
Father can be his own Son), and so not predicable of their shared divine substance; and
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these are relationships that are non-accidental, because they are eternal and
unchangeable.460
The ingenuity of what Augustine has done here rests in his re-purposing of the
philosophical category of relation, which when applied to God is no longer accidental, in
order to free up the requisite ontological space for the three persons to exist as distinct
individuals within the divine substance. While Augustine’s changing of the accidental
ontological status of relation with respect to God may be seen by some as signaling a
radical break from philosophical tradition and, specifically, the Aristotelian tradition, he
actually borrowed quite a lot from the latter to construct his own theory of relation.
Following Aristotle, Augustine conceived of a relation in the broadest sense as a
characteristic with the peculiarity that the being which possesses it possesses it of,
towards, or for another distinct being.461 Or as Augustine will say, “the terms of any
predication of relationship must have reference to each other.”462 The two beings/terms in
question are often given the technical names of referent and relatum, respectively, though
Augustine never refers to them as such. For example, in the relation Simmias is “taller
than” Socrates, Simmias is the referent and Socrates is the relatum. The relation “taller
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than” is a characteristic possessed by Simmias, but only in relation to Socrates, for
considered by himself Simmias is not “taller than” anyone (Socrates or whomever
else).463 The existence of this relation depends on its inherence in the referent, but the
essence of this relation is to hold from the referent to the relatum.464
Evidence of Augustine’s indebtedness to Aristotle in his general understanding of
how relations exist and what they essentially are can be traced back to Book IV of the
Confessions, where Augustine tells the reader that when he was around twenty, he read
and completely understood a Latin translation of the Ten Categories of Aristotle.
According to Fr. Paul Henry, there is no doubt that such reading material from The
Philosopher influenced Augustine’s own view of relations: Augustine borrows his
understanding of relations from “the Book of Categories but also from the Nichomachean
Ethics. From Aristotle he takes the analysis of reciprocal and mutual relations, such as
friend to friend, and father to son, and greatly improves upon it.”465 We can see the truth
of this for ourselves especially in Book VII of On the Trinity, in which Augustine will not
only describe relations and their terms in almost the exact way as Aristotle does in the
first four chapters of the Categories, but even use many of the same examples.466
Near the beginning of Book VII, Augustine will make the important distinction
between what is said with reference to self and what is said with reference to another. He
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writes: “when you say master, you point not to being but to relationship, which refers to
slave; but when you say man, or anything similar that has reference to self and not to
another, then you point to a being.”467 Augustine believed all such creaturely relations to
be dependent for their existence on the terms of those relations. For example, if there
were no men, there could be no master-slave relationship, because there would not be a
man to be a master and a man to be a slave. So too when we are discussing men, horses,
and sums of money: the latter are said with reference to self and signify beings; but the
terms “master,” “slave,” “draft-animal,” and “security” are said with reference to another
and signify specific relationships. These would have no relational existence, so to speak,
if it were not for their corresponding substance terms. All such relations are, to use the
technical vocabulary of relations once again, mutual (mutua) and asymmetrical
(disquiparantiae). This kind of relation can be defined as holding between two or more
beings if and only if “when it holds from the referent to the relatum, a relation of a
different nature or denomination holds from the relatum to the referent.”468 In other
words, it is a two-way relation amongst different natures or denominations.
Bringing this examination of relations to bear on God, Augustine infers that if the
Father was not something with reference to himself, then he could not be talked about in
relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit. Any relation for Augustine necessarily depends on
the existence and nature of its terms, or as he famously says, “every being which is
spoken of relatively is something apart from that relation [aliquid excepto relatiuo].”469
This Aristotelian insight, when applied to the intra-trinitarian relationships within God,
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shows that Augustine took seriously the distinct individuality of the three divine persons,
each of which is necessary for there to be the triune God, and each of which equally
manifest the unified divine essence. Moreover, since the three persons are “something
apart” from or not reducible to their their relations to each other, Augustine must be said
to have held that the intra-trinitarian relations are “real” relations, having an objective
basis in reality, separate from the considerations of any finite intellect. After all, if the
persons are real, objectively and ontologically, then the relations that obtain between
them must be such as well. In this regard, Augustine will very clearly say that the
Father’s being qua Father has reference not to himself, but rather to his only begotten
Son; and that the Son’s being qua Son has reference not to himself, but rather to his unbegotten Father:
The Father is Life, not by a ‘being born’; the Son is Life by a ‘being born’ ... the
Father, in that he is, is from no one; but in that he is the Father, he is on account
of the Son [Pater quod est, a nullo est; quod autem Pater est, propter Filium est].
But the Son, both in that he is the Son, is on account of the Father, and in that he
is, is from the Father [Filius vero et quod Filius est, propter Patrem est; et quod
est, a Patre est] ... Therefore, the Father remains life, the Son also remains life;
the Father, life in himself, not from the Son, the Son, life in himself, but from the
Father.470
Not only does this have to do with what is said, but with what ‘is.’ The Father ‘is’ only
Father if he has a Son; and the Son ‘is’ only Son if he has a Father. In other words,
Augustine believes that in order for there to be either one of these two divine persons
both of them must really, ontologically exist. What this shows is that the diversity of
person present in the Trinity actually enhances Its unity, or indeed is the very cause of
that unity. He clarifies this point with the example of the inseparable nature of the
relation between human fathers and their sons, while noting its obvious limitations:
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For example, a man and another man, if the one should be a father, the other a
son. That he is a man is in respect to himself; that he is a father is in respect to the
son.... For the name father has been said in respect to something [pater enim
nomen est dictum ad aliquid], and son in respect to something: but these are two
men. But in truth, God the Father is Father in respect to something [At vero Pater
Deus ad aliquid est Pater], that is to the Son; and God the Son is Son in respect to
something, that is, to the Father. But as those are two men, not so are these two
Gods.471
When considering the Holy Spirit, we can say that Father, Son, and Spirit are not three
Gods precisely because they are Father, Son, and Spirit, i.e., because they are what they
are as persons in relation to each other; because they exist ad aliquid. But unlike human
fathers and sons, they are perfect persons, whose relationships to each other are eternal
and unchanging. For Augustine, this makes their relationships to each other actually
perfecting of their essential unity and not accidental properties of an association of two or
more separate beings. Augustine therefore preserves the unity of the Trinity by arguing
for its Personal diversity, and preserves its Personal diversity by arguing for Its unity,
each of which necessarily, ontologically implies the other.
As Rowan Williams says, “What should be particularly noted is that Augustine,
so far from separating the divine substance from the life of the divine persons, defines
that substance in such a way that God cannot be other than relational, trinitarian.”472
Augustine certainly never views the divine substance as a kind of separate principle of
unity within God, or as a separate causal source of the three Persons.473 According to
Augustine, the Trinity is nothing more and nothing less than the one God and vice versa:
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... nor do we, therefore, call the Trinity three persons or substances, one essence
and one God, as though three somethings subsist from one matter which
[tamquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant], whatever it is, is unfolded in
these three. For there is nothing else of this essence besides the Trinity [non enim
aliquid aliud eius essentiae est praeter istam trinitatem] ... [In material things]
one man is not as much as three men together; and two men are something more
than one man ... but in God it is not so; for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit
together is not a greater essence than the Father alone.474
One of the difficulties in our understanding of the Trinity, then, comes from the fact that
within God (ad intra) “one is as much as three are together, and two are not more than
one, and in themselves they are infinite. So they are each in each and all in each, and each
in all and all in all, and all are one.”475 The kind of part-whole logic that humans are
inclined to engage in to understand other people and the material world around them
simply will not work when it comes to the Trinity, which cannot be understood in such a
piecemeal way. Elsewhere Augustine similarly writes:
... the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are the Trinity, but they are only one
God; not that the divinity, which they have in common, is a sort of fourth person,
but that the Godhead is ineffably and inseparably a Trinity... You know that in the
Catholic faith it is true and from belief that the Father and the Son and the Holy
Spirit are one God, while remaining a Trinity ... the Trinity is of one substance
and [the] essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself [ut ipsa essentia non aliud
sit quam ipsa trinitas].476
I submit that the last two primary texts from Augustine show his commitment to the
belief that the essence of the Trinity is not an extra fourth reality in God. We have seen
him express this belief in various statements: “there is nothing else of this essence besides
the Trinity,” “not that the divinity which they have in common is a sort of fourth person,”
and “the essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself.” I take these statements to mean
that the divine essence does not have an independent existence by itself and for itself.
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Rather, It exists in the realities of Father, Son, and Spirit. In the Greek East, we see the
same belief expressed with the technical, theological term “enhypostatic” as it is applied
to the essence and energies of the three Persons.477
With this said, Augustine does not collapse the three divine persons or their intratrinitarian relationships into the absolute unity of the divine essence, nor does he do so
with their relations toward creation. He always keeps distinct what is said of God by way
of essence and what is said of God by way of relationship, because when it comes to “the
things each of the three in this triad is called that are proper or peculiar to himself, such
things are never said with reference to self but only with reference to each other or to
creation, and therefore it is clear that they are said by way of relationship and not by way
of substance.”478 Augustine gives an example of each of these three realities pertaining to
God: “That he is, is said of God with reference to himself; that he is Father is said with
reference to Son, and that he is Lord is said with reference to the creation that serves
him.”479 In other words, what is said of substance in God, what is said of relationship in
God, and what is said of relationship outside of God are not the same. They are not the
same because they denote different and distinct realities pertaining to God.
When it comes to the three persons in particular, Augustine wants to ensure that
they really exist as irreducible realities within the irreducible essence. To indicate the real
existence of the persons—or their subsistentia personarum—he will make an often
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overlooked distinction between the Father and Son being alium and alius. The former can
be translated as “another person,” the latter as “another thing or nature.” Such a
translation is vindicated by Augustine’s own discussion of the term alium at On the Soul
and its Origin 2.9,480 where he writes: “sed quia eum genuit de se ipso, non aliud genuit
quam id quod est ipse. Excepto enim quod hominem assumpsit et uerbum caro factum est,
alius est quidem uerbum dei filius, sed non est aliud; hoc est alia persona est, sed non
diuersa natura.” The distinction between alium and alius will also appear quite
frequently in Augustine’s later works.481 Though perhaps at De civitate Dei 11(ca. 418)
we receive one of its clearest expressions in the service of making known the real
existence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit:
But the Holy Spirit is another person [alium] than the Father and the Son, for he is
neither the Father nor the Son. But I say, ‘another person’ [alium] and not
‘another thing’ [alius], because he, like them, is simple, and, like them, he is the
immutable and co-eternal Good.... For we do not say that the nature of the Good
is simple because it is in the Father only, or in the Son only, or in the Holy Spirit
only. Nor, as the heretics who follow Sabellius have supposed, is it a Trinity in
name only without the real existence of the persons [subsistentia personarum].482
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Even this view of holding to the real existence of the three persons has not escaped the ire
of scholars. In his article, “The Plight of the Relative Trinitarian,”483 Timothy Bartel
claims that any kind of relative Trinitarianism that holds to the real and distinct existence
of the three persons must pay the logical price of abandoning Leibniz’s Law (hereafter
LL), or as it is often referred to as, the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Because
of this Bartel claims that relative Trinitarianism does not pass logical muster and is a
“dead end.”484
LL is summed up by Bartel as follows: “For any x and any y and any property P,
if x=y then x has P if and only if y has P.”485 Since relative Trinitarianism states that the
Father and Son are consubstantial, or sharing in the same nature or substance, it follows
that for it to dovetail with LL it must hold that the Father and the Son have all the same
properties. The problem, however, is that according to both Eastern and Western
orthodoxy the Father possesses a certain internal property as Father that is unique to Him
(ingenerate), not shared by the Son or the Holy Spirit; the Son possesses a certain internal
property that is unique to Him (generate), not shared by the Father or the Holy Spirit; and
the Holy Spirit possesses a certain internal property that is unique to Him (processed), not
shared by the Father or the Son. These internal properties have their corresponding
economic manifestations (pillar of cloud, the Incarnation, tongues of fire, and so on),
which are made known throughout salvation history to the creation to bring it into
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communion with God. These properties are unique to each of the individual persons and
are therefore incommunicable to the others. They are not, in other words, numerically
identical with each other. Bartel specifically takes a closer look at the Son and what he
calls His “incarnational properties.” According to Bartel, if we follow the dictates of LL
it will validate any inference of the form:
“God the Son has incarnational property P;
God the Father lacks P;
Therefore, God the Son is not God the Father.”
Bartel thinks that it must therefore follow from this conclusion “that God the Son and
God the Father are different deities.”486
In my mind this sort of logic chopping engaged in by Bartel, which is meant to
delegitimize relative Trinitarianism, consists of a series of wasted swings. I would argue
that LL only applies to the common deity of Father, Son, and Spirit for at least two
reasons. First, if the scope of application of LL extended beyond the common deity of the
Three to their unique properties as persons, then we would be led headlong into
Sabellianism, or some other erroneous form of theological modalism. Second, the fact
that the Son has certain incarnational properties that the Father does not implies no lack
of deity in the Father or greater deity in the Son. For these properties do not concern the
common deity of Father and Son, but rather in this case the Son’s unique economic
relation to creation in the unified person of Christ. LL completely paints over the
distinction that really exists between God’s internal properties (such as greatness,
goodness, mercifulness, etc.) that are univocally, equally, and identically predicated of
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Father, Son, and Spirit, and those properties, whether internal or external, that are
uniquely predicated of each of the Persons. With the aforementioned distinction, we can
say without contradiction that God the Son, God the Father, and God the Holy Spirit are
one and the same deity, but, very importantly, distinct persons with distinct economic
functions.
With the charge that the relative Trinitarianism that Augustine is proposing flies
in the face of basic logic being sufficiently rebuffed, we must now consider the particular
person of the Holy Spirit, who Augustine views as both another person and the relation
binding the Father and Son together. Here we necessarily have to take a brief theological
and philosophical detour into Augustine’s often misunderstood doctrine of the filioque.
According to Augustine, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as well as from the Son
(the doctrine of ‘double procession’): “Nor, by the way, can we say that the Holy Spirit
does not proceed from the Son as well; it is not without point that the same Spirit is called
[by the scriptures] the Spirit of the Father and the Son.”487 Eastern theologians have
always preferred, of course, the statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father
through the Son, though there are notable exceptions even in the Eastern orthodox
tradition on this point.488 Augustine’s pneumatology, however, is far more nuanced than a
one-sentence expression can convey. While the Father and Son are one single principle
when it comes to the proceeding of the Holy Spirit,489 there is an important qualification
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that must be taken into account that brings Augustine’s position closer to that of the East.
490

This qualification can be found in Book XV of On the Trinity:
only he from whom the Son was begotten and from whom the Spirit principally
[principaliter] proceeds, is God the Father. I have added principally therefore
because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But the Father also
gave this to him, not as though he already existed and did not yet have it [non iam
exsistenti et nondum habenti], but whatever he gave to the only-begotten Word,
he gave in begetting him [sed quidquid unigenito verbo dedit gignendo dedit]. He
so begot him, therefore, that the common gift should also proceed from him, and
that the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both.491

He adds to this argument a litter later on in Book XV:
And he who can understand in that which the Son says: as the Father has life in
himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself (John 5:26), that the
Father did not give life to the Son already existing without life, but so begot him
apart from time that the life which the Father gave to the Son in begetting is coeternal with the life of the Father who gave [sed ita eum sine tempore genuisse ut
uita quam pater filio gignendo dedit coaeterna sit uitae patris qui dedit]; let him
understand that, just as the Father has in himself that the Holy Spirit should
proceed from the Father, it is so to be understood that his proceeding also from
the Son comes to the Son from the Father [de patre habet utique ut et de illo
procedat spiritus sanctus].492
For Augustine, then, the ultimate causal source of the Holy Spirit is still the Father,
because “the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son is traced back, on both
counts, to him of whom the Son is born.”493 While both of the above passages from Book
XV appear to be discussing the internal relations that the Spirit has to the Father
(principally) and the Son, it could be argued that they leave open the possibility for the
doctrine of double procession to apply to both what is said of God ad intra and what is
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said of God ad extra. This in turn would seem to collapse the latter distinction in God,
also known as the theology/economy distinction.
Those in the Eastern Orthodox tradition have been perennially bothered by this
result, because they believe that such an ad intra/ad extra distinction in God must be
maintained to accurately discuss the origin of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity and His
activities outside of the Trinity. It should be noted that the Trinitarian controversies of the
4th C., such as Arianism, were sparked in large part because of a failure to do this,
because of a failure to make a clear distinction between God as Father (ingenerate), Son
(generate), and Spirit (processed) on the one hand, and God the Trinity as economically
manifested in salvation history on the other hand. Rather, the Eastern Orthodox tradition
holds to the idea that only the Father proceeds the Holy Spirit (internally), but Father and
the Son can both be said to send the Holy Spirit (economically), e.g., at Pentacost,
Christ’s baptism, and the transferring of the Spirit to the twelve apostles on the evening
of his resurrection.494 The Father’s sole procession of the Spirit within the Trinity can be
defended by examining not only Scripture, such as Jn 15: 26, but also the creed produced
by the Council of Constantinople in 381.
This Council says regarding the Spirit: “and in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver
of life, who proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is
worshipped and glorified, who has spoken through the prophets.” Note that it does not
speak of the Spirit in its economic function as paraclete or helper. While this creedal
statement concerning the Spirit clearly implies His Divinity, along with and equal to the
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Father and Son, it does not “specify the manner of the Spirit’s origin, or to elaborate on
the Spirit’s particular relationships to the Father and the Son.”495
One could argue that the greatest difference between East and West on the
filioque revolves around how to understand this original creedal language of procession,
and the way key Greek/Latin terms have been used to discuss the Spirit’s origin from the
Father and Its being sent forth into the world. The Greeks, to properly maintain the
theology/economy distinction, will use the Johannine language of ekporeuetai to say the
Spirit “proceeds” from the Father within the Trinity. The members of the North American
Orthodox-Catholic consultation explain that, at the Council of 381, this Gospel text (Jn
15: 26) was slightly altered from “to pneuma ... ho para tou Patros ekporeuetai” to: “to
pneuma to hagion ... to ek tou Patros ekporeuomenon.” This was done so that they could
“emphasize that the “coming forth” of the Spirit begins “within” the Father’s own
hypostatic role as source of the divine Being, and so is best spoken of as a movement out
of (ek) him.”496 Hence we can say that for the Greeks the term ekporeuetai has a technical
and theological meaning that refers to the intra-trinitarian relationship between Father
and Spirit. They will use other words such as proienai to say that the Spirit goes forward
into the world, to refer to the Spirit’s economic mission. By contrast, the Latins use the
words procedere and the related processio to discuss the origin of the Holy Spirit from
the Father and from the Son. The problem is that both of these terms possess the general
meaning of “movement forwards,” but neither of them connote the idea of this movement
coming forth from a definite source or starting-point. Because of the generality of these
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Latin terms, they can be used to refer to “the Son’s generation as well as the breathingforth of the Spirit and his mission in time,”497 which in turn muddies or downright
conflates the theology (God ad intra) and economy (God ad extra) distinction.
Whether or not Augustine is guilty of this in his use of these Latin terms is
something I will not discuss here. What is important to note I think is that, through all of
the East and West debate over the filioque, there is, in both traditions, the commitment to
viewing Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three co-equal persons. Whatever origin of the
Spirit we might theologically prefer, both Augustine and the East view the Spirit as God
from God, and along with the Son “light from light, and true God from true God.”
Augustine will explain that the Holy Spirit is a joint gift of the Father and the Son, or the
act of mutual love that eternally spirates from the Father to the Son and from the Son to
the Father. Since their mutual love for each other is perfect, it must be a person on equal
status with the Father and the Son. If the Holy Spirit was somehow less of a person than
the other two, then the relation between Father and Son would be imperfect, or perhaps
better, their mutual love for each other would be imperfect; which is absurd. Since “love
itself is nothing but a kind of life which couples together or seeks to couple some two
entities, the lover and the loved,”498 God’s perfect love—the Holy Spirit—must be
conceived as “some sort of ineffable communion [ineffabilis est quaedam ...
communio]”499 between the Father and Son, but at the same time as a person co-equal to
the two realities he joins. The only way this is possible is if the Holy Spirit is given in
such a way that he gives himself as God to Father and Son as he is being given from
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Father to Son and from Son to Father. For anything less would break up the perfect unity
of the perfect persons:
Nor because they give and he is given is he, therefore, less than they, for he is so
given as the Gift of God that he also gives himself as God [Ita enim datur sicut
dei donum ut etiam se ipsum det sicut deus]. For it is impossible to say of him that
he is not a master of his own power, of whom it was said: the Spirit breathes
where he will [John 3.8] ... there is no subordination of the Gift and no
domination of the givers, but the concord between the Gift and the givers
[concordia dati et dantium].500
However, Augustine’s view that the Holy Spirit is the “common love (caritatem) by
which the Father and the Son love each other”501 has been heavily criticized in the East,
for it appears to depersonalize the Holy Spirit by reducing the third person of the Trinity
to the mere loving relation between Father and Son. According to Boris Bobrinskoy, both
Augustine and his theological mentor, Ambrose, viewed the Holy Spirit as the bond of
love between Father and Son, thereby making the Holy Spirit less of a Person than the
other two. On their pneumatology, “the Spirit is viewed essentially as the Gift of the new
life flowing from the Father to the Son,” not as a fully-fledged Person.502 Kallistos Ware
also thinks that once one calls the Holy Spirit the ‘bond of love’ between Father and Son,
He becomes depersonalized.503 Suffice it to say that Augustine’s doctrine of the filioque
has not received much positive attention in Eastern scholarly circles. Much of the
criticism it has received, I submit, can be explained by examining not only the Latin term
processio, but also the common historical perception of the category of relation. But as
we shall see, this in turn can be attributed to a more fundamental (and misguided)
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materialistic tendency of the human mind to understand the entirety of reality in bodily
terms. First, however, let us briefly consider relations.
At least as far back as Aristotle, relation was viewed as the weakest of all types of
beings, and least capable of independent existence.504 Aristotle explains this by the fact
that relations presuppose other types of more perfect beings to exist. For example,
relations presuppose substances to make up their terms, and quantity and quality to make
up the nature of those terms.505 Aquinas will later make similar comments on the weak
ontological status of relations, such as his famous statement: “Relatio praedicamentalis
est accidens minimae entitatis.”506 It should come as no surprise, then, that Orthodox
theologians would think that Augustine’s view of the Holy Spirit as the bond of love
between Father and Son depersonalizes the third person of the Trinity.
I have already shown, however, that in the context of the Trinity Augustine does
not understand relation as one of the accidental philosophical categories of being talked
about by Aristotle; the intra-trinitarian relations are expressions of God himself. Speaking
of the Spirit in particular, Augustine writes: “But this communion is consubstantial and
co-eternal ... and this again is a substance, because God is a substance, and God is love
(1Jn 4:16).”507 And at De civitate Dei 11.24 Augustine will explicitly say that the Holy
Spirit is the “sanctitas” of both Father and Son, not as qualitas, but as substantia and
persona in trinitate. Elsewhere, Augustine tells us why there is still great reluctance
among some to accept this view of the Spirit as substantial communio: It is because the
unity between two material bodies does not appear to be a fully-fledged reality when
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compared to the other two realities it joins. After all, if those two realities are separated,
then that unity does not exist anymore, but they go on existing.508 For Augustine, this
view of the matter is one which is distorted by a mind that is weighed down by
materialistic thinking. As he has argued on countless other occasions, since the Holy
Spirit is God, and since the Holy Spirit is love, it follows that the love that binds the
Father and the Son together necessarily is substance.509
To conclude this chapter on God’s essential unity and relational diversity, I think
it appropriate to end with Augustine’s own summary of what he believes he has
accomplished in Books V-VII concerning substantial and relative predication found at the
beginning of Book VIII:
Those things which are predicated relatively the one to the other—as Father and
Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit—are predicated specially in the Trinity
as belonging severally to each person, for the Father is not the Trinity, nor the Son
the Trinity, nor the gift the Trinity: But that whenever each is singly spoken of in
respect to themselves, then they are not spoken of as three in the plural number,
but one, the Trinity itself, as the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit
God; the Father good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; and the Father
omnipotent, the Son omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit omnipotent: yet neither three
Gods, nor three goods, nor three omnipotents, but one God, good, omnipotent, the
Trinity itself, and whatever else said of them, not relatively with respect to each
other, but individually in respect to themselves.510
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Chapter 7
The Common and the Particular: God’s Oneness of Essence and Threeness of
Person according to the Cappadocians

It has been discussed that the Cappadocian Fathers understood the person of the
Father as the ultimate ontological notion in the Trinity, and as the person that is the
source of unity for the entire Trinity.511 But there is also an equally important emphasis in
their doctrinal works on the oneness of the Trinity being a function of the unity of all
three Persons, in their mutual and mutually exclusive causal relations to each other.
While there is certainly truth in saying that the Cappadocian Fathers held to the logical
priority of the Father, in that He is the origin (arche) and cause (aitia) of the Son and
Spirit, they never thought this led to the Father having a genetic or metaphysical priority
over the other two. This point has been well-discussed in the secondary literature,
particularly by Albert Meesters and Joshua McNall.512 My goal in this chapter is not to
critically evaluate the work of scholars on these topics, but rather to briefly sketch how
the Greek-speaking-East and the Augustinian-West agree that the unity of the Trinity is a
function of the shared divine essence, hypostatically manifested in Father, Son, and
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Spirit, in their causal relations to each other. This will be no small achievement. As will
be shown in the next two chapters concerning Augustine’s essence-will distinction and its
practical implications for the problem of theological fatalism, it is a philosophically
necessary first step to not only allow for: 1) multiple and distinct ‘realities’513 to exist in
God along with the essence, but also for 2) the true freedom of man to exist under the
influence of God’s non-essential help. The second point meaning, of course, not that
God’s help is unnecessary for our salvation, but that the grace granted to man comes from
a reality in God not identical to His essence, i.e., from His will and knowledge. I submit
that only by consistently making such a distinction between God’s unity of essence and
the relativity of the persons can any theology, East or West, take the requisite
philosophical steps to make sense of the former divine reality and the latter human
reality. This is something the Cappadocian Fathers, namely Basil the Great (ca. 330-379),
Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 331-395), and Gregory Nazianzen (ca. 329-390), understood all
too well.
One difficulty in attempting to illustrate this commitment of the Cappadocians to
such a distinction, however, is the fact that none of them had a treatise specifically
devoted to considering the Trinity as Augustine did in his De Trinitate.514 Even if the
general point could be argued otherwise, certainly none of them wrote a treatise on the
Trinity of the sustained breadth and depth of Augustine. This makes it so that we must

I am using the term ‘realities’ to broadly refer to the tria onta in God: ousia, energeia, and the
three Trinitarian hypostaseis. In doing this I follow Gregory Palamas, who in his 150 Capita will also refer
to these three by using ta onta. See for example, Capita 75: “There are three realities (triôn ontôn) in God,
namely, substance (ousias), energy (energeias), and a Trinity of divine hypostases (theiôn hupostaseôn).”
Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. Trans. by Robert E. Sinkewicz, C.S.B.
Studies and texts (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies), 83: Ontario, Canada (1988).
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reconstruct their Trinitarian conceptions of God in a somewhat piecemeal fashion from
their various doctrinal works, which I will briefly attempt to do in this chapter, but with
special emphasis on the essence (common)-person (particular) distinction that is so
central to each of their conceptions of God. Much like Augustine, the Cappadocians will
situate their conceptions between those of the Arians/Neo-Arians and Sabellius.515 The
former they accomplish by emphasizing the divine unity, or sameness of essence, of the
three persons. The latter they accomplish by emphasizing the divine plurality of Father as
Generator, Son as Generated, and Spirit as Processed.
We begin with Basil’s theology of the Trinity, which finds mature form in his
three-book Contra Eunomium (finished ca. 363 or 364), but which can also be helpfully
pieced together from his Epistles. The core of Basil’s teaching on the Trinity rests in his
twofold emphasis on the unity and distinction in God. He warns us of the dangers of
emphasizing either one of these two realities in God, writing: “Harsh rises the cries of the
combatants encountering one another in dispute; already all the Church is almost full of
the inarticulate screams, the unintelligible noises, rising from the ceaseless agitations that
divert the right rule of the doctrine of true religion, now in the direction of excess, now in
that of defect. On the one hand are they who confound the persons and are carried away
into Judaism; on the other hand are they that, through the opposition of natures, pass into
heathenism.”516 The former, the “Judaizers,” are those who excessively defend the unity
of God. These are the Sabellians, who do not acknowledge the subsistent representation
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of the persons.517 The latter, the heathens, pass into defect on the “golden mean” scale of
how to represent God as Trinity, because of their division of the divine unity. These are
the Arians/Neo-Arians, who portray the three persons as having different natures from
each other, with the Father’s being the greatest, or that one which can be identified as
truly God.
Contrary to the Sabellians and the Arians/Neo-Arians, Basil believes the orthodox
faith to rest in the idea that Father, Son, and Spirit are one in essence, but distinct in their
particular properties or characteristics. He writes: “According to this [i.e., the Father and
Son sharing one and the same nature or substance], divinity (theotes) is one. That is to
say, it is according to the rationale (logos) of the substance (ousia) that the unity is
thought, but, as in number (arithmos), the difference of each rests in the particular
properties and in the particular characteristics (tais idiotesi tais xarakterixousais).” 518
Contra Eunomium 2.28 further reveals the distinction between ousia and idiomata or
idiotetes:
Particularities (idiotetes), being added onto the substance (ousia) like marks or
forms, distinguish what is common by means of individual characteristics (tois
idiazousi xaraktersi), but they do not cut the identity in nature (homophues) of the
substance. For instance, deity (theotes) is common, fatherhood and sonship are
individualities (idiomata); from the intertwining of each, the common and
particular, there comes to us a grasp (katalepsis) of the truth, so that on the
mention of the unbegotten light we understand the Father, and on that of begotten
517
I say “who did not acknowledge the subsistent representation of the persons” because even
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light we get the notion (ennoian) of the Son ... for this is the character of
individualities, to reveal in the identity (tautoteti) of substance the otherness
(heteroteta).
The added language of the common and the particular when applied to God seen here can
also be found in his Epistles. It is on clear display, for instance, in Epistle 236, 6.1-22,
where he defines the distinction between ousia and hypostasis as that between the
common and the particular:
Ousia and hypostasis have the distinction that the common has with reference to
the particular (to koinon pros to kath hekaston); for example, just as “an animal”
(zoon) has with reference to “a particular human” (deina anthropon). For this
reason we confess one substance for the Godhead, so as not to hand down
variously the notion of being; but we confess that the hypostasis is particular, in
order that our conception of Father and Son and Holy Spirit may be unconfused
and plain. For unless we think of the characteristics that are sharply defined in the
case of each, as for example fatherhood and sonship and holiness, but from the
general notion of being confess God, it is impossible to hand down a sound
definition of faith. Therefore, we must add what is particular to what is common
and thus confess the faith; the Godhead is something common, the paternity
something particular, and combining these we should say: “I believe in God the
Father.” And again in the confession of the Son we should do likewise—combine
the particular with the common and say: “I believe in God the Son.” Similarly too
in the case of the Holy Spirit, we should frame on the same principle our utterance
of the reference to him and say: “I believe also in the divine Holy Spirit,” so that
throughout the whole, both unity is preserved in the confession of the one
Godhead, and that which is peculiar to the persons is confessed in the distinction
made in the characteristics attributed to each.
The most important point we may glean from the above primary texts from Basil is that
any accurate conception of the Trinity which God is will be made up of two elements,
distinct but not divided from each other, namely the common divine essence and the
particular characteristics of the persons. While Basil and the other Greek Fathers are
unanimous in their opinion that the first of these elements cannot be known in any way,
shape or form by humans or the bodiless powers, the latter can be, to the extent that it
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can, through the economic and energetic manifestations of the persons in the divine
missions.
How one may conceive of God in this way is famously discussed by Basil in
Epistle 234 (sent in 376 to his friend Amphilochius), which was written in response to the
Eunomians’ objection that since the divine essence is unknowable, if one worships it, one
worships what one does not know. Part and parcel of this objection is the underlying
Eunomian polemic that if God is truly simple, then all of the perfections we attribute to
Him must be names of His substance. To which Basil responds:
We say that we know the greatness of God, His power, His wisdom, His
goodness, His providence over us, and the justness of His judgment, but not His
very essence (ousia).... But God, he says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him
you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence. The absurdities involved in this
sophism are innumerable. When all these high attributes have been enumerated,
are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His
awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His
providence and His foreknowledge, His bestowal of rewards and punishments,
His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any of these, do we declare his
essence? ... The energeiai are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we
know our God from His energeiai, but do not undertake to approach near to His
essence. His energeiai come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our
reach.519
Basil’s point here is twofold. First, we can be said to know (to eidenai) God in many
different ways according to his justice, creative power, etc. Second, by knowing God in
these many different ways, according to these activities (energeiai), we can form some
idea or concept of God (ennoia). Indeed, “the concept of God (ennoia) is gathered by us
from the many attributes which we have enumerated.... We say that from his activities
(energeiai) we know our God, but his substance itself we do not profess to approach.”520
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It follows that while we cannot know the unity of God from the unknowable and
unapproachable ousia, we can from the energeiai that come down to us.
The difference between essence and energeia in God that Basil is calling our
attention to in order to counter the Eunomians is consistent with his overall philosophical
distinction between knowledge of what a thing is (ti esti) and how it is (hopos esti)
mentioned at Contra Eunomium 1.15.521 To explain this distinction, he gives the
following example: When we say that one man is the son of another man that does not
tell us what he is, but only from whom he came to be. We can speak of both what a man
is and how he is relative to another person, e.g., through the relation of sonship, but these
are not the same. So, too, Basil thinks when we speak of God the Father: we can talk
about what the Father is, even if we do not comprehend His being as God, and how the
Father exists as unbegotten, not coming from either of the other two divine persons.
According to Lewis Ayres, Basil’s account of identity and difference in the
Trinity reveals his indebtedness to many philosophical groups, including Aristotelianism,
Stoicism, Platonism, and Neoplatonism.522 As partial proof of his claim, Ayres does a
quick summary of how similar Basil’s talk of the distinction between ousia and idiomata
or idiotetes mirrors that of the early Stoics belief in there being a difference between a
universal and non-differentiated substrate, what they called “hupokeimenon” or “ousia,”
as the pre-requisite for concrete existence, and its individuating particular qualities, what
they called “idiotetes” or “poiotetes.” Ayres argues that it is likely that Basil was further

Show me what you worship,” I will answer. “Even if there is something I can show you, you aren’t
somebody I can show it to” (Sermon 261.2, 418).
521
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Doctrine” from Phronema, Vol. XXV, 2010, pp. 57-83, where it is noted how Basil clearly drew upon his
own Greek paideia to refute the heresies of his day and formulate his Trinitarian doctrine.
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influenced in his idea of relations as being individuating characteristics by Aristotle
through Porphyry.523 Porphyry famously wrote of Socrates being individuated by his
color, rationality, and his relationship to his father.524 At Contra Eunomium 2.4, Basil
echoes this by writing that Paul is Paul because he is a Jew from Tarsus, because he is a
student of Gamaliel, and because he is a Pharisee who observes the Jewish law. These
characteristics give us some idea of who Paul was as a concrete individual; they give us a
concept of Paul. But what they do not give us is a knowledge of Paul’s nature as a human
being. Whether we are speaking of God’s divine nature or Paul’s human nature, there is
no way of knowing these natures in the abstract, in themselves.525
Basil will also use the distinction between absolute and relative names to discuss
the unity and diversity of God, respectively. At Contra Eunomium 2.9, Basil claims that
absolute names refer to an essence (such as ‘man’), whereas relative names refer to
relationship (such as ‘son’ and ‘the generated one’). The latter thus refer to idiomata.
Ayres views Basil’s use of terminology in this instance as more proof that he specifically
used Neoplatonic and Aristotelian ideas concerning essential and relative terms, within
Stoic parameters, to elucidate a coherent doctrine of God’s unity of essence yet diversity
of persons.526
We turn now to Gregory of Nyssa, who in many ways philosophically refined and
developed his older brother Basil’s theological ideas. Indeed, especially after Basil’s
death, Nyssa would often become an apologist for his ideas against those who would
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threaten the Orthodox faith, even in some cases speaking for him.527 Nowhere is Nyssa’s
willingness to step into his brother’s theological shoes more importantly found, at least
for the purposes of this dissertation, than in his discussion of the common/particular
distinction in God that we briefly covered above in Basil.
Nyssa’s philosophical elaboration of his brother’s distinction can be situated
within another discussion of his pertaining to two types of terms: the first are those that
are predicated of many different subjects and indicate a “common nature” (koinon
phusis).528 For example, the term “Man” is predicated of Paul, Peter and Barnabas. The
second are those that have a more limited scope, referring not to things common (koinon)
but to things particular (idion, idiazon, idiomata).529 As we shall see, it is with this
terminological distinction in hand that Nyssa can argue, without grammatical, logical, or
metaphysical contradiction, that God is one in nature but three in person. While certain
scholars such as Jaroslav Pelikan have objected that since the Cappadocians make this
distinction, they must hold that the divine nature is some “kind of Platonic universal,”
which is borne out by Nyssa’s three men sharing one human nature example,530 I find this
objection to lack its sting. Nyssa ultimately views the divine nature as being
hypostatically manifested in the Father, Son, and Spirit, and not having an independent
existence of its own apart from them. Hence Nyssa would never, as Pelikan argues, view
the divine nature as some kind of abstract universal over and above the three Persons.
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Nyssa’s Ad Graecos provides a particularly good introduction to how the essence
(common)-person (particular) distinction can be properly conceived to exist in God. He
begins this work by making clear that the term God cannot be used to refer to Person, but
rather the one essence of the Holy Trinity:
If the term God were indicative of the Person, then out of necessity when we
speak of the three Persons we would be saying three Gods, but if the term God
signifies the essence, when we confess the one essence of the Holy Trinity we
rightly teach as doctrine that there is one God since the term God refers to one
essence. Therefore it follows that God is one both according to essence and
terminology, not three.531
As an example of how this works, terminologically and metaphysically, Nyssa once again
will talk of three men sharing in one and the same human nature: “since in the case of
Peter, Paul and Barnabas we do not declare there to be three essences since they are of
one essence, how much more so in the case of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit will we not
declare this properly? For if the essence is not to be divided into three according to the
persons, it is obvious that neither should God be, because the term God does not indicate
Person, but rather the essence.”532 He continues on this same point:
As everyone agrees, Peter, Paul and Barnabas are called one Man as far as
humanity is concerned. Consequently, in itself, that is to say insofar as Man is
concerned, there cannot be many of them. To say many “mans” is a misuse of
language and is not said in a proper sense.533
On the other hand, Nyssa believes that it is not improper to say that three or more things
share the same essence, but that they are distinguished by their individual subsistencies.
For “something is distinguished from something else either by essence or by subsistence
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or by both essence and subsistence, and thus Man is distinguished from horse by essence,
whereas Paul is distinguished from Peter by subsistence, and in addition the specific
human subsistence [e.g. Paul] is distinguished by both essence and subsistence from the
specific subsistence of the horse [e.g., Bucephalus].”534
Examining the second kind of distinction drawn between individual human
subsistencies, Nyssa believes that it is accurate to say that Paul and Peter are different
persons because of the unique differences that constitute their subsistencies, e.g.,
“baldness, height, fatherhood, sonship or anything else of this sort.”535 Nyssa will caution
that the common essence of Peter and Paul, i.e., humanity, and the concrete manifestation
of that essence in each of their unique persons is not the same, nor should ever be viewed
as the same. This is so, he tells us, because “if anyone speaks about the individual, i.e.,
the subsistence, he immediately directs the mind of the listener to look for someone
curly-haired, grey-eyed, a son, a father, et cetera. Whereas the term ‘species’ (that is to
say essence) directs the listener to an understanding, namely: a rational animal, mortal,
capable of understanding and knowledge; an irrational animal, mortal, capable of
neighing and the like.”536
Nyssa concludes that, if we are willing to admit that such a distinction between
species and subsistence is rightly made with respect to Man and those that participate in
that essence, respectively, then such a distinction will apply even more so in the case of
God and the three Persons. It follows that with respect to the eternal and divine essence,
we are not able to say “such and such a God,” which would refer to each of the
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hypostases; nor can we say, when referring to the three persons, “God and God and God,”
which would indicate the eternal and divine essence. Such (mis)references would
constitute category mistakes of the highest order. That is why Nyssa thinks that we must
profess one God, according to the unknowable and unapproachable divine essence, but
who is ‘contemplated’537 in the three Persons—Father, Son and Spirit.
According to Nyssa, while we cannot know the divine essence, we can know the
mode of existence (tropos huparxis) unique to each of the three persons. These three
modes of existence (i.e., ingenerate, generate, processed) are known through the causal
relations that the three persons have to each other, and that are revealed to creation in the
missions. In his own Contra Eunomium, Nyssa will explain the tri-unity of God with a
similar example to one we have seen him use before: “things that are identical on the
score of being will not all agree equally in definition on the score of personality. For
instance, Peter, James, and John are the same viewed as beings, each was a man; but in
the characteristics of their respective personalities, they were not alike.”538 At Contra
Eunomium1.22, he then applies this distinction to the Trinity, which he regards as
... consummately perfect and incomprehensibly excellent yet as containing clear
distinctions within itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the persons:
as possessing invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness,
but differentiated by the unique character of each person. This peculiarity
contemplated in each sharply and clearly divides one from the other: the Father,
for instance, is uncreate and ungenerate as well: He was never generated any more
than he was created. While this uncreatedness is common to Him and the Son, and
When Nyssa speaks of ‘contemplating’ God in the three persons, he means a form of knowing
called ‘epinoia’ or ‘conceptualization.’ Nyssa refers to this as “the way we find out things we do not know,
using what is connected and consequent upon our first idea of a subject to discover what lies beyond.”
(Eun.2.182). Once we form an initial idea about something, we add new ideas to that initial idea until we
reach the conclusion of our research. This adding of new ideas for the sake of discovering what lies beyond
just is epinoia. Because epinoia plays a consequent function in our understanding of something, it is proper
to say that its epistemological object, when applied to God, is the energies and not the essence. For the
energies are consequent, or come after, the divine essence in terms of ontological ordering.
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the Spirit, He is ungenerate as well as the Father. This is peculiar and
uncommunicable, being not seen in the other two persons. The Son in his
uncreatedness touches the Father and the Spirit, but as the Son and the Onlybegotten He has a character which is not that of the Almighty or the Holy Spirit.
The Holy Spirit by the uncreatedness of His nature has contact with the Son and
Father, but is distinguished from them by His own tokens. His most peculiar
characteristic is that He is neither of those things which we contemplate in the
Father and the Son respectively. He is simply, neither as ungenerate, nor as Onlybegotten: this it is that constitutes His chief peculiarity.
Nyssa is telling us that each of the persons of the Trinity is unchanging because each is
uncreated. They are all the same, identified, unified, or whatever we wish to call it
because of their uncreatedness. What allows for real intra-personal diversity is the
peculiarity proper to each person and which, therefore, is incommunicable to any of the
others: the Father is ungenerate, the Son generate, and the Holy Spirit is neither
ungenerate nor generate. According to Nyssa, these peculiarities have their basis in the
causal relations that obtain between the three persons, and that within the common and
uncreated divine nature, “as our faith teaches, there is a cause, and there is a subsistence
produced, but without separation, from the cause.”539 The former obviously being the
Father, the latter being the Son. Nyssa will stress that this difference in cause is the only
difference we can point to between Father and Son: “In our view, the native dignity of
God consists in godhead (theotes) itself, wisdom, power, goodness, judgment, justice,
strength, mercy, truth, creativeness, domination, invisibility, everlastingness, and every
other quality named in the inspired writings to magnify his glory; and we affirm that
everyone of them is properly and inalienably found in the Son, recognizing difference
only in respect of unoriginateness.”540 Unoriginateness, or having no cause of existence,
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is peculiar to the Father alone; whereas the Son alone has the peculiarity of being directly
caused by the Father. But in the ‘native dignity of the Godhead itself,’ Father and Son are
one in wisdom, power, goodness, judgement, etc. They are, in other words, one in energy
but two by their causal relations to each other.
Other works of Nyssa serve to highlight the causal differences present amongst
the persons in the Trinity as well. He writes, for instance, in To Ablabius:
While confessing that the nature is undifferentiated, we do not deny a distinction
in causality, by which alone we seize the distinction of the one from the other:
that is, by believing that one is the cause and the other is from the cause. We also
consider another distinction with regard to that which is from the cause. There is
the one which depends on the first, and there is that one which is through that
which depends on the first.541
The one that is “the cause” is the Father; the other “from the cause” is the Son; and the
one that is “through that which depends on the first” is the Spirit. Because of these causal
distinctions, Nyssa is thus able to say without contradiction that, while God’s nature is

on the part of the entirety of creation. But this presents a problem: Because of the epistemological and
metaphysical impossibility of encountering the divine nature, how can we say the Trinity is one God and
not three Gods? Nyssa attempts to prove the unity of the persons and their shared nature from the oneness
of their energy—that reality which is present around the divine nature and which is common to all three
Persons. See, for example, Ad Ablabius NPNF 525, where Nyssa writes of the Godhead (theotes) that it
refers to an energeia and “is so called from thea, or beholding, and that He who is our theaths or beholder,
by customary use and by the instruction of Scriptures, is called theos, or God.” According to Nyssa, this
energy extends throughout all three persons of the Trinity. To deny this is to go against Scripture which
“attributes the act of seeing equally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (Ibid, NPNF 525). Nyssa will cite here
Ps. Ixxxiv.9, Mt.ix.4, and Acts v.3. Not only does Scripture support the unity of the Godhead (and so the
oneness of the Persons and their shared nature), but also the special character of Trinitarian operation: “but
every operation which extends from God to the Creation, and is named according to our variable
conceptions of it, has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy
Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not divided with regard to the number of
those who fulfill it, because the action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but
whatever comes to pass, in reference either to the acts of His providence for us, or to the government and
constitution of the universe, comes to pass by the action of the Three” (Ibid, NPNF 526-527). While we can
say Father, Son, and Spirit are three persons, Their operation with respect to creation is one, because Their
power and will which is the source of that operation is one. We can legitimately hold therefore that the life
They give to creation is one life (not three lives), the judgment They pass on creation is one judgment (not
three judgements), and so on. But neither, then, “can we call those who exercise this Divine and
superintending power and operation towards ourselves and all creation, conjointly and inseparably, by their
mutual action, three Gods.” (Ibid, NPNF 527).
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one and the same, we can indicate in Him a difference in manner of existence (tên kata to
pôs einai diaphoran endeiknumetha).542 Nyssa attempts to concretize the point with an
example that involves asking a husbandman about a particular tree and, specifically,
whether it had been planted or had grown of itself. If he were to answer either that the
tree had been planted or had not been planted, Nyssa rhetorically asks, would that tell us
anything about the nature of that tree? No, it would “leave the question of its nature
obscure and unexplained,”543 but it would tell us how that tree exists. Applying this
insight to the Godhead, Nyssa writes: “when we learn that he [the Father] is unbegotten,
we are taught how he exists (hopos ... einai), and how it is fit that we should conceive
Him as existing, but what He is we do not hear in that phrase.”544 Nyssa wants to make
clear that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each have their own personal property or mode
of origination: the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds
only from the Father. Each of these personal properties tells us what relation that person
has to the others as origin or caused,545 but the essence of God is in no way known from
them.
These personal properties also serve to reveal the inseparable relations present
between the members of the Trinity. According to Nyssa, when it comes to the property
ungenerate, it not only establishes the Father as being from no one, but also that “the
word Father introduces with itself the notion of the Only-begotten, as a relative bound to
it.”546 Nyssa will say as clearly as can be that “the Son must always be thought of with
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the Father (for the title of father cannot be justified unless there is a son to make it
true).”547 A little later on at Contra Eunomium1.39, in response to the Eunomian charge
that the Son at one point did not exist, he further writes: “how can the Son ever be nonexistent, when he cannot be thought of at all by himself apart from the Father, but is
always implied silently in the name Father.” The very meaning of the name Father “is not
understood with reference to itself alone, but also by its special signification indicates the
relation to the Son. For the term ‘Father’ would have no meaning apart by itself, if ‘Son’
were not connoted by the utterance of the word ‘Father.’”548 For Nyssa, it is not only that
the name Father would have no meaning if used by itself, but also that the very being of
the Father qua Father would have no existence by itself, since “without the Son the
Father has neither existence nor name, any more than the powerful without power, or the
wise without wisdom. For Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.”549 Nyssa’s
point in all of these quotations is simple: there would be no Generator without the
Generated; no Generated without the Generator.
All such statements of the Father’s relativity to the Son and the Son’s relativity to
the Father (and the Spirit’s relativity to the Father and the Son) form the philosophical
and theological bedrock of the major distinction found in Nyssa’s theory of relative
predication as a whole, which he believes is so basic and so straightforward that even
children who have just begun their grammatical education grasp it without difficulty, but
is no less important because of that fact: that is, the distinction between absolute and
relative terms. In the following passage, Nyssa explains very well what he takes to be the
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orthodox position on names which can be predicated of God absolutely or relatively, and
those which can be predicated sometimes absolutely and sometimes relatively, depending
on how they are used by the speaker:
God is called Father and King and other names innumerable in Scripture. Of these
names one part can be pronounced absolutely, i.e., simply as they are, and no
more: viz., imperishable, everlasting, immortal, and so on. Each of these, without
our bringing in another thought, contains in itself a complete thought about the
Deity. Others express only relative usefulness; thus, Helper, Champion, Rescuer,
and other words of that meaning; if you remove thence the idea of one in need of
the help, all the force expressed by the word is gone. Some, on the other hand, as
we have said, are both absolute and are also amongst the words of relation; God,
for instance, and good, and many other such. In these the thought does not
continue always within the absolute. The universal God often becomes the
property of him who calls upon him; as the saints teach us, when they make that
independent being their own. The Lord God is Holy; so far there is no relation;
but when one adds the Lord Our God, and so appropriates the meaning in a
relation towards oneself, then one causes the word to be no longer thought of
absolutely. Again; Abba, Father is the cry of the Spirit; it is an utterance free from
any partial reference. But we are bidden to call the Father in heaven, Our Father;
this is the relative use of the word.550
Nyssa views terms such as imperishable, everlasting, and immortal as absolute, then,
because of their completeness, or because of their capability of being used by a speaker
without having to reference some other thing. Whereas terms such as Helper, Champion,
and Rescuer are relative, because they are used with reference to something else—those
helped, those championed, and those rescued. Different still are terms that are both
absolute and relative, depending on their use. Terms such as God and good could be used
in either manner: God is universal, but also called upon by the saints; God is good, but
also called our supreme good. In both cases, the absolute God, the absolute good, can be
brought into a relation with us because of what we choose to do.
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In Nyssa’s theology of the Trinity, there is thus a clear place for both what is
absolute and what is relative with respect to God; the former being the divine nature, the
latter being the divine persons causal relations to each other and their providential
dispensations towards us. This in turn allows Nyssa to walk the theological middle road
that lies between that of Sabellianism and Arianism. He writes in this connection:
Having heard of Father and Son from the Truth, we are taught in those two
subjects the oneness of their nature; their natural relation to each other expressed
by those names indicates that nature; and so do our Lord’s own words. For when
He said, ‘I and My Father are one,’ He conveys by that confession of a Father
exactly the truth that He Himself is not a first cause, at the same time that He
asserts by His union with the Father their common nature; so that these words of
His secure our faith from the taint of heretical error on either side: for Sabellius
has no ground for his confusion of the individuality of each person, when the
Only-begotten has so distinctly marked Himself off from the Father in those
words, ‘I and My Father;’ and Arius finds no confirmation of his doctrine of the
strangeness of either nature to the other, since this oneness of both cannot admit
distinction in nature.551
Like his older brother Basil, then, Nyssa locates the unity of the Trinity in the divine
nature, hypostatically manifested in Father, Son, and Spirit. He views the differences of
the three persons to be a function of their causal properties (i.e., ingenerate, generate,
processed), each of which is incommunicable but also implicative of the other two. In
addition, following Basil, we have seen that Nyssa holds that God’s inherent relationality
finds expression economically in His various providential dispensations towards us,
which not only serve to economically reveal the Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct
persons, but also the oneness of their greatness, power, wisdom, goodness, providence,
justness of judgment, and anything else that is befitting of God.
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The last of the Cappadocian Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen, best explains his
theology of the Trinity in his Theological Orations (ca. 380).552 Like Basil and Nyssa,
Gregory places a clear emphasis on unity and distinction in God. Ayres in fact writes that
“one of the most distinctive characteristics of Nazianzen’s Trinitarian theology is the
manner of his emphasis on the harmony of unity and diversity in the Godhead. For
Gregory, the generative nature of God eternally produces the triunity as the perfection of
divine existence. ”553
This is not an idea that Gregory reasons to, or argues for, but rather takes as a
given of his theological point of view:
Monotheism, with its single governing principle, is what we value—not
monotheism defined as the sovereignty of a single person (after all, selfdiscordant unity can become a plurality) but the single rule produced by equality
of nature (phuseos homotimia), harmony of will, identity of action (tautotes
kineseos), and the convergence towards their source (pros to en ton ex autou
sunneusis) of what springs from unity ... though there is numerical distinction,
there is no division in the being. For this reason, a one eternally changes to two
and stops at three—meaning the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In a serene
and non-temporal, incorporeal way, the Father is parent of the “off-spring” and
originator of the “emanation” ... [but] we ought never to introduce the notion of
involuntary generation.554
And elsewhere he similarly writes:
A perfect Trinity consisting of three perfect (Triada teleian ek teleion trion), we
must abandon the concept of a monad for the sake of plenitude (dia to plousion),
and go beyond a dyad (for God is beyond the duality of matter and form which
constitutes material things), and we must define God as a Trinity for the sake of
completeness (dia to teleion).555
552
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In Oration 42, Gregory conceives of this perfect one-in-three and three-in-one relation
amongst the divine persons as a kind of cleaving together, not as a kind of coalescence in
which the unique characteristics of the divine persons is lost: “The three have one
nature—God. The principle of unity (enosis) is the Father, from whom the other two are
brought forward and to whom they are brought back, not so as to coalesce
(sunaleiphesthai), but so as to cleave together (echesthai).”556
With the principle of unity in the Trinity being provided by the person of the
Father, we now need to ask: What provides the difference of the persons? Much of
Gregory’s positive view on how the Three are distinguished from each other in the
Trinity is found in his critique of the Eunomians and, specifically, their view that the
names of Father/Unbegotten and Son/Begotten denote different realities of different
ontological ranks. Since Gregory’s position closely resembles that of Basil and Nyssa
(and not to mention Augustine), I will keep the following examination of this Trinitarian
topic in his thought brief.
Nazianzen’s response to the Eunomians centers on the fact that they are
fallaciously moving from the use of a conditioned or relative term to an unconditioned or
absolute use of that term: “What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you
mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you
mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same? For example,
Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes of
man, who is the same; and they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the
essence.”557 So too when it comes to Unbegotten and Begotten: Nazianzen believes these
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are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes, characteristics, or
particularities of the divine essence, which is eternally and immutably the self-same.
These terms must therefore point to a difference external to the essence; they point to a
difference with respect to Cause.558 Depending on the use of Unbegotten and Begotten,
they can denote either the same reality (with respect to essence) or different realities
(with respect to Cause); but never the same reality in any way that would destroy the
unique and individual existence of the divine persons, nor different realities in any way
that would divide the divine essence.
For Nazianzen, when using the term Father/Unbegotten with respect to Cause, it
neither names an essence nor an action. Rather, it is the name of “the Relation in which
the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father. For as with us these names make
known a genuine and intimate relation, so, in the case before us too, they denote an
identity of nature between Him that is begotten and Him that begets.”559 Nazianzen
makes clear, however, that we should not conceive this distinction as one of pure reason,
or as a construct of the human mind, with no basis in the reality of God. It is a real
distinction because “He is identical with the Father in essence; and not only for this
reason, but also because He is of Him.”560 In other words, it is a real distinction because
He is related to Him.
The fact that the relation of sonship is unique to the Son alone, i.e., is
incommunicable to the Father, implies no deficiency in the Father. Likewise, the fact that
the relation of fatherhood is unique to the Father alone implies no deficiency in the Son.
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In Oration 31.IX, Nazianzen will further engage in a brief discussion of why the Spirit is
not another son of the Father, and so not a brother to the Son. He discusses this because it
is the Eunomians belief that there must be something lacking in the person of the Spirit,
otherwise He would be another Son. Nazianzen replies that there is nothing lacking in the
Spirit, or to any other of the persons for that matter, because God possesses no
deficiency. Rather, the difference of the persons, or what he believes is the same thing,
their mutual relations to each other, “has caused the difference of their names,” while
simultaneously implying no deficiency of substance in any one of them. It is the “very
fact of being Unbegotten or Begotten, or Proceeding [that] has given the name of Father
to the First, of the Son to the Second, and of the Third, of whom we are speaking, of the
Holy Ghost that the distinction of the three persons may be preserved in the one nature
and dignity of the Godhead.” For Nazianzen, it is these properties that make them really
three persons, and it is their shared Godhead that makes them one essence, which
successfully avoids their unity being conceived in Sabellian terms, or their causal
distinctions from each other leading to the Eunomian division of the Godhead into
separate and unequal persons.
Summing up the overall Cappadocian view on the Trinity would take far more
than a short chapter such as this to do it justice. However, I believe that at the very least I
have shown that they have a combined commitment to a view of the Trinity that is
strikingly similar to that of Augustine. More specifically, both Augustine and the Greek
Fathers held to a theology of God possessing a dual emphasis on unity and diversity, the
common and the particular: the unity of God being provided by the common divine
essence, manifested in the intra-trinitarian life of the three Persons (especially in the
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person of the Father for the Greeks); and the diversity of God being provided by the
particular causal relations of Father to Son, Son to Father, and Spirit to Father and Son.
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Chapter 8
The Augustinian Distinction between God’s Essence and God’s Will

In the previous two chapters, we have considered the distinction found in both
Augustine and his Cappadocian contemporaries between the divine essence and the
divine Persons. We have also seen in chapters 5 and 7 of this dissertation that the GreekEast (for example, in the work of Gregory of Nyssa) makes a further distinction between
the physis/ousia and energeia of God. Those in the East hold that it is through the latter
reality which is “around” the divine nature/essence that we come to know, draw near to,
or experience God the Trinity.
At this point, however, we might well ask: Why make such a fuss over these
abstract and abstruse topics in theology? What advantage can doing this possibly have for
solving the practical problem of predestination, and for positively understanding man’s
true freedom as a creature of God? The beginning of the answer to this complex question
rests in the need for there to be real relations in God. We have seen that the alternative
which denies this is a complete non-starter: If there were no internally distinct and real
relations among Father, Son and Spirit, and if God was only conceived of as an abstract
and undifferentiated essence, then His reality would lack any personal subsistence. There
would only be the completely necessary, unchanging, and eternal divine essence into
which the three persons, their causal relations to each other, and their attributes are
coalesced. It is thus unclear how God’s essence could interact with creation in any cooperative, meaningful, and personal way.
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In this regard, we can say that the divine essence, considered by itself, is
philosophically irrelevant to solving the problem that is the topic of this dissertation. For
an answer we must look instead to the relative reality of God, which is made up of two
distinct sides: the first consisting of the intra-trinitarian relations of unbegotten, begotten,
and procession (ad intra); and the second consisting of the numerous economic relations
that the three persons have towards creatures in heaven and on earth through their divine
energies (ad extra). It does not take an erudite theological wisdom to conclude that the
former relations are also, considered by themselves, philosophically irrelevant to the
problem at hand, since they only obtain because of the internal activities of Father, Son,
and Spirit as they are considered with respect to each other, apart from creation. In short,
these intra-trinitarian activities/relations belong to the ‘realm’ of theology. The problem
of predestination, however, belongs in the ‘realm’ of the divine economy, in which God
as Trinity does not exist apart from creation, but actively, through His will and
knowledge, attempts to continually perfect it and bring it into communion with Him.
As we have already seen in chapter 4, for Augustine and the Eastern Orthodox
tradition, the locus of the economic relations that obtain between God and the time-bound
creature are found in the eternal divine will and knowledge, i.e., in the divine ideas.
Nevertheless, there is still great reluctance on the part of scholars working today to accept
the idea that Augustine mirrors the Eastern Orthodox tradition in this regard and,
specifically, that Augustine’s theology was nuanced enough to even have a distinction
between God’s essential and economic life. In this chapter, I venture to dispel this
stereotype even more forcefully by examining examples from Augustine’s corpus of two
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more ways in which he makes a distinction between God’s essence and/or intra-trinitarian
relations (ad intra) and His will and knowledge (ad extra).
Before discussing these two ways and some texts from Augustine’s corpus which
illustrate them, I think it is important to briefly note the difference in terminology used by
Augustine and the Greek East. As we shall see shortly, Augustine prefers to say we can
make an essence-will distinction in the reality of God, whereas it is traditional of the East
to say we can make an essence-energy distinction.561 I submit that nothing is really lost in
going from the Latin to the Greek or vice versa, however, because the East views the
energy of God to be identical to His will. Gregory Palamas, for instance, states that “the
energy which bestows substance, life and wisdom and which in general creates and
conserves created beings is identical with the divine volitions.”562 And elsewhere he will
rhetorically ask: “what is the will of God, if not an energy of the divine nature?”563 St.
John of Damascus will also identify the divine energies with the divine will, writing: “His
creative and preserving and providing power is simply his good-will.”564 Augustine’s
Cappadocian contemporaries further show agreement on this important point. Basil the
Great, for instance, says that the creation of the world was a result of God’s deliberate

561

While it is traditional for the Greek-East to speak in these terms, there are notable exceptions. In
his article, “St. Athanasius’ Concept of Creation,” Georges Florovsky shows that there is in St. Athanasius’
writings, especially in his Discourses against the Arians, mention of a distinction between the divine
nature/essence and will, or theologia and oikonomia. Athanasius made this distinction “to discriminate
strictly between the inner Being of God and His creative and “providential” manifestation ad extra, in the
creaturely world” (Florovsky, 51). The inner essential being of God is totally independent of creation and
totally necessary (i.e., in the sense that God simply exists as He is, not choosing to be this or that). On the
other hand, His creative and providential manifestation in the creaturely world is a result of the free divine
will.
562
Capita 87. In saying that the divine energy is “identical” with the divine volitions, Palamas is not
arguing for the coalescence of the various energies with the volitions of God. This would lead to numerous
theological paradoxes that Palamas is aware of and careful to avoid. See for example, Capita 100-103.
What Palamas means is that the will is an energy of the divine nature.
563
The Triads III.iii.7.
564
De Fide Orthodoxa, Book II, Ch. 29.

224
choice (aproairetos) or will; and that it did not take place through a necessary activity “as
the flame is the cause of the brightness.”565 Gregory of Nyssa agrees with his older
brother Basil, claiming God’s creative activity to be one of His will (thelesis or boulesis),
not His essence.566 Krivocheine notes in fact that when Nyssa speaks in a trinitarian
context, he will use the term “energy” in the singular to call attention to the fact that the
energy mentioned is that of the three Persons—the life-giving power that comes from the
Father, proceeds through the Son, and is completed in the Holy Spirit. This life-giving
power just is the divine good will: “[the energies of the Three are] a certain unique
movement and communication of the [divine] good will, performed from the Father
through the Son toward the Holy Spirit.”567 We can make this identification of the divine
will with the energy, because “it is manifest that there is no difference between will and
energy in the divine nature.”568 These texts should suffice in proving that when Augustine
will speak of an essence-will distinction in God, as I will show below, he is not speaking
in opposition to the Greeks, who believe that the orthodox faith demands that there be an
essence-energy distinction in God. Rather, they are referring to the same realities in God,
even if they are using a slightly different theological vocabulary.
In addition to his previously discussed distinction between the eternity of the
divine essence and the eternity of the divine ideas, there are two other major ways
Augustine’s essence-will distinction will manifest itself in his corpus. The first of these is
found in the distinction Augustine makes between God’s essential activities of generation
and procession and His creative activity as producer of heaven and earth. In order to
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distinguish these activities in God, Augustine had to make a corresponding distinction
between God’s essence and will, respectively. The alternative, which only takes into
consideration God as He is for Himself (idipsum esse), as I have shown repeatedly, would
be theologically and philosophically absurd: For God as He is for Himself just is His
essence, completely necessary, completely actual, completely simple, and so cannot be
directly and ontologically responsible for what is contingent, partly actual and partly
potential, and complex, i.e., all that is created. In theological theory and practice,
Augustine could not be more opposed to such a one-sided and truncated idea of God.
Evidence of this can be found in both his early and later works, both pastoral and
doctrinal, in which we can clearly witness Augustine assign distinct roles to the divine
essence and to the divine will as two realities that properly pertain to God as God.
For the sake of brevity, I will limit my consideration of primary texts to those that
can be classed as doctrinal,569 starting with a text from Book XII of the Confessions,
which highlights the impassible divide between God as idipsum esse and creation:
And whence could it derive even that sort of being but from you, “the source of
all beings” of any sort? Yet they are all unlike you to the degree of their distance
from you—a distance not in space, since you are not at this or that point, in this
way or that way, but yourself-in-yourself, yourself-in-yourself, yourself-inyourself, “holy, holy, holy,” Lord, the God all-powerful [Rev. 4.8] [itaque tu,
domine, qui non es alias aliud et alias aliter, sed idipsum et idipsum et idipsum,
sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, dominus deus omnipotens]. At the origin, which you
are, you made something of nothing in your wisdom, which is generated from
your essence [in principio, quod est de te, in sapientia tua, quae nata est de
substantia tua, fecisti aliquid et de nihilo]. Yet heaven and earth were made, not
generated from you. Had they been generated from you, they would have been the
equal of your Only-Begotten Son, and therefore equal to you; but it cannot rightly
be said that anything is your equal that was not generated from you. Nor was there
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anything apart from you, God, triune Unity and united Trinity, that you could
have used in creation.570
While God is the source of all created realities, what is created nonetheless remains
radically unlike the divine source from whence it came. Indeed, any sort of created reality
remains always distant from God, not in terms of His place, quality, quantity, etc., as He
is not bound by the categories of space-time, but in terms of who he is “himself-inhimself.”
To maintain this ontological distance of creature from Creator, Augustine believes
we must recognize the distinction between generation and creation: While God the Father
generates his Wisdom (the Son of God) from his essence, he creates heaven and earth ex
nihilo in his Wisdom, with such creation coming about exclusively through the causation
of the divine will. At Confessions 12.4.38, he writes in this connection:
When, our God everlasting, they hear or read the biblical account, they realize
that you stand far above past and present time in your changeless continuity, yet
everything temporally conditioned you have made. Your will, which is yourself,
made everything, not from some new purpose or change of a prior one. You made
it not from your own substance, in your all-forming likeness. You made it rather
from nothing, which is unlike you in lacking all form. Yet it became like you
when you gave it form, turning it back toward you in all its gradated potentials,
assigned to each by its degree of being, so that ‘all you made is good.’
Augustine begins this passage with an apparent antinomy, i.e., God is wholly immutable
and yet He has made all that is temporal and changeable, the resolution of which can only
be accomplished by relying on a different reality in God that is distinct from the divine
essence. This different reality ‘in’ God is His will, which is Himself. Augustine’s claim
that the divine will is “God” invites comparison with the Eastern Orthodox view that the
divine energy is no less “God” than the divine essence, in that it is a reality that properly
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pertains to God as God. The divine energy is distinct but not divided from the divine
essence. However, unlike the utterly transcendent divine essence, the divine energy is
immanent in creation and capable of being participated in by what is created.
In addition, Augustine’s idea that the divine will is responsible for creation,571
while at the same time distinguishing this creative activity from the Generation of the Son
according to the divine essence, finds its roots in the Christian East with St. Athanasius,
who was perhaps the first to extensively argue for the distinction of these activities in
God. He did so especially to combat the Arian idea that the Son’s Generation was an act
of the “will and deliberation”572 (boulhsei kai thelhsei) of the Father. Indeed, Georges
Florovsky notes that Athanasius’ “whole refutation of Arianism depended ultimately
upon this basic distinction between “essence” and “will,” which alone could establish
clearly the real difference in kind between “Generation” and “Creation.”573 But it also
would a fortiori lead to the condemnation of any theological position, such as the Logostheology of the Apologists and Origenism, that failed to distinguish between the
“categories of the Divine “Being” and those of Divine “Revelation” ad extra, in the
world.”574 As Florovsky makes clear, Athanasius’ interest in this distinction was not just
polemical in character. Even before the Arian controversy broke out, Athanasius was
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“wrestling with the problem of Creation,” which he saw as inextricably related to the
foundation of Christian faith: “the redemptive Incarnation of the Divine Word,”575 with
such redemption taking place with the understanding that there is a radical divide or
“hiatus” between God’s Being and the contingent being of what is created. But to make
good theological sense of this divide required the distinction between “Generation” and
“Creation,” and their respective sources in the essence and will of God. Athanasius may
have been one of the first in the Eastern Orthodox tradition to make these distinctions
without divisions in God, but he certainly was not the last. St. Cyril of Alexandria, St.
John of Damascus, St. Gregory Palamas, and St. Mark of Ephesus would all follow in the
footsteps of Athanasius in this regard.576
On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, Book I.4, provides another excellent
example of Augustine speaking of God’s essence as responsible for generating the Son
and spirating the Spirit, whereas God’s will is responsible for creating everything out of
nothing. Here, Augustine notes that everything that God made was very good, “but they
are not good in the same way as God is good, because he is the one who made, while they
were what was made. Nor did he beget them from himself, to be what he is himself, but
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he made them out of nothing, so that they would not be equal either to him by whom they
were made, or to his Son through whom they were made; and that is as it should be.”
Augustine realizes, however, that since creation is not begotten, he will have to answer
the question, ‘How does it come to be?’ What power of production is responsible for its
existence? Augustine answers that, “It is God’s will, you see, that is the cause of heaven
and earth.”577 As a matter of fact, in the Miscellany of 83 Questions, Augustine claims
that whenever God’s causality in relation to creation is mentioned, it is his willing that is
meant. He thinks this point must be emphasized, otherwise some may get the false
impression that somehow creation is generated from God’s essence as the Son is
generated or as the Spirit is spirated, thereby raising creation onto an equal ontological
footing with the divine essence and the three persons in which it is manifested. This in
turn would destroy the Creator-creature distinction—the distinction on which all of our
wisdom rests: “the whole discipline of wisdom, which is for the purpose of instructing
human beings, consists in distinguishing the Creator from the creation and in
worshipping the one as Master and acknowledging the other as subject.”578
Augustine’s desire to safeguard the Creator-creature distinction by denying
creation’s participation in the essence of God can also be seen in his other Commentaries
on Genesis. At the beginning of his Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, for
instance, Augustine reiterates in summary form the central tenets of the Catholic faith:
that God the almighty Father made and established the whole creation through his
only-begotten Son, that is, through his wisdom and power consubstantial and coeternal with himself, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, who is also consubstantial and
co-eternal. So Catholic teaching bids us believe that this Trinity is called one God,
and that he made and created all things that are, insofar as they are, to the effect
that all creatures, whether intellectual or corporeal, or what more briefly
577
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according to the words of the divine scriptures can be called invisible or visible,
are not born of God, [non de Deo nata] but made by God out of nothing, and that
there is nothing among them which belongs to the Trinity except what the Trinity
created—this nature was created.579 For this reason it is not lawful to say or
believe that the whole creation is consubstantial or co-eternal with God.580
Augustine cannot be any clearer that all created things are made and established by God
the Trinity, as a unitary act of Father, Son, and Spirit, but that they are not born of God,
i.e., they are not God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God. Rather, they
are made and established by God the Trinity from nothing, and so they cannot be said to
be consubstantial or co-eternal with Him. Here, admittedly, Augustine is not explicit in
saying that it is the divine will which makes every created thing out of nothing, but it is
implicitly understood that this is the case. After all, if the divine essence is not
ontologically responsible for creation, then something else in the Trinity must be. This
other reality in the Trinity is the divine will, as I have suggested above. We can therefore
say for Augustine that it is not the Trinity in its essential Life that brings creatures into
existence out of nothing and continues to create them even up until now (Jn 5:17), but
rather the common will of Father, Son, and Spirit, which is life for them. It would at least
be a logical conclusion for Augustine to draw, because the intra-trinitarian Life of the
divine persons (i.e., the Father in His essence begetting the Son and the Father in His
essence spirating the Holy Spirit) does not “belong” to created things, nor thus can it be
said to cause them.
We have already seen that Augustine thinks it would be absurd to say that God
created without knowledge, willy-nilly making this or that, with no purposeful number,
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weight, or measure.581 It follows that His creative will was simultaneously directed by
His knowledge of what is fitting for each thing as the kind of thing that it is, both with
respect to its proper nature and as it should be in Him. For there is “no shape, no
structure, no union of parts, no substance whatsoever which can have weight, number,
measure unless it is through that Word, and by that creator Word to whom it was said:
You have ordered all things by measure, number and weight [Wisd. 11.21].”582 God thus
creates willfully, but also knowingly, according to certain measures, numbers, and
weights. Augustine thinks these two activities in God are distinct from each other, not
only from the authority of Scripture (1 Cor 1:24: Christ the power and wisdom of God),
but also from certain philosophical-theological presuppositions to which he is deeply
committed.583 The idea that the common will of the Trinity is responsible for creation, as
well as how the divine will must be distinct without division from the divine knowledge,
is implicit in the above passage from the Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis. But
these points can be reasoned to quite naturally when read within the broader context of
Augustine’s theology of the relation of the Trinity to creation as a whole, which is
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perhaps manifested most clearly in his concept of the divine ideas previously discussed in
chapter 4 of this dissertation.
Books II-IV of On the Trinity provide us with an opportunity to witness yet
another way in which Augustine makes a clear distinction between God’s inner essential
Life—the Life that He lives for himself alone—and God’s economic life—the life that
He lives for creation and its perfection. Generally speaking, these three Books are
concerned with communicating his theology of mission, or with how we should
understand the theophanies of the Old and New Testaments.584 According to Augustine,
the divine missions temporally reveal (but do not constitute) in some kind of visible,
spiritual, and/or intellectual way the eternal processions of the Trinity, i.e., the begetting
of the Son from the Father, and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the
Son. While God in himself always remains beyond the dramatic unfolding of salvation
history for Augustine, the divine missions serve the crucial function of revealing to us the
real distinctions amongst the three persons in the Trinity; they are what make the mystery
of the eternal Triune God knowable, as far as is possible, for believers. Contrary therefore
to the “economic theologians,” such as Justin Martyr and Tertullian, Augustine never
holds that the sendings of the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be identified with the
transcendent mystery of God in himself. While showing the theophanies not to be a direct
manifestation of the divine essence may be an obvious point of orthodoxy in the East, and
one I think that is equally present in the Augustinian-West, there has been much
reluctance to accept this interpretation of the Augustinian view. Possibly the two best
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scholarly examples of this resistant attitude are found in the works of the twentiethcentury theologians Karl Barth and Karl Rahner, whose “essentialist” interpretation of
Augustine’s theology of mission has remained prevalent up to the present day.
In his Church Dogmatics, Barth is quite straightforward in how he interprets the
entire Western tradition’s, including Augustine’s, view of God’s self-revelation to
humankind: “What is God as God, the divine individuality and characteristics, the
essentia or ‘essence’ of God, is something which we shall encounter either at the place
where God deals with us as Lord and Saviour, or not at all.”585 According to Barth, we
can nonetheless encounter God in the world, but there is no real plurality with respect to
His operations, for “God’s essence and His operation are not twain but one. God’s
operation or effect is His essence in its relation to the reality distinct from Him, whether
about to be or already created.”586 Barth only admits a notional (unreal/logical)
distinction between God’s essence as such and His operations, not one at the level of His
Being.
Karl Rahner, on the other hand, argues that Western Trinitarianism is a
fundamentally flawed endeavor, because of the separation it entails between the
economic and immanent trinities. More specifically, he identifies four problematic
aspects in the Western doctrine of the Trinity:
1) The removal of the Trinity from the practical life of faith into the realm of
theological speculation. Rahner will (in)famously say in this connection:
“Christians are, in their practical life, almost mere ‘monotheists’ ... [and] should
the doctrine of the Trinity have to be dropped as false, the major part of religious
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literature could well remain virtually unchanged.”587 I find this claim to be both
sweeping and inaccurate. In the Western Church, we call to mind and worship the
Trinity in every divine service: We make the Sign of the Cross in the name of the
Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the priest will pray at the end of the Eucharistic
Prayer, ‘Through Him, and with Him and in Him, O God, almighty Father, in the
unity of the Holy Spirit, all glory and honor is yours, for ever and ever’; we often
sing hymns of praise throughout the Mass to all three persons of the Trinity; etc.
The point in bringing up these few examples (among many) is to prove that, even
with respect to the major part of religious literature that most affects the “practical
life” of Western Christians, i.e., that part which pertains to the liturgical life of the
Church, Rahner’s claim about the unimportance of the doctrine of the Trinity
rings false. Eastern Christian worship services and spiritual life are also
thoroughly grounded in and expressive of the presence of the Trinity.
2) The emphasis it places on the unity of the divine essence over and above the
diversity of the three divine persons. God is both one in essence and three by
relation, but it is typical of Western theologians to “begin” with de Deo uno,
thereby giving the impression “as if everything which matters for us in God has
already been said in the treatise On the One God.”588 Rahner will say that, while
Aquinas was the first to explicitly separate the oneness of God from His
triuneness, he only did so because of Augustine’s influence. The Greek Fathers,
by contrast, “begin” with the diversity of the three persons and then move on to
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consider the unity of God’s essence.589 Rahner’s second charge is easy to answer,
however, as Augustine neither literally (Books I-IV deal with the divine missions
of the three persons) nor logically (Books V-VII deal with the tri-unity of the
Godhead and how we should speak of it) begins with a narrow focus exclusively
on the oneness of the divine essence.
3) The claim that all of the actions of the three persons ad extra, in the economy
of salvation, are indivisible. It is commonplace to express this doctrine in the
following Latin phrase: opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. Rahner thinks
Augustine is guilty of this charge due to the closeness of the relationship
Augustine posits between the temporal missions (ad extra) and the eternal
processions (ad intra), so close a relationship in fact that he identifies the two.590
As my brief survey of key texts from Books II-IV below will show, however,
Augustine is innocent of this charge as well.
4) The utter disregard of hints as to the Trinitarian being of God, except from the
New Testament.591 Anyone familiar with Augustine’s corpus knows this is
patently untrue. Augustine is perfectly willing in Books II-IV of On the Trinity,
for instance, to discuss which of the three divine persons appeared to Old
Testament figures in various theophanic experiences.
Rahner believes that Augustine is primarily to blame for the above four theological
failings, though he never quotes or cites specific passages from Augustine’s corpus to
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support his criticisms.592 In response to Augustine’s theology, Rahner argues for what in
my mind can only be the complete antithesis of what he takes to be the Western
theological option, holding that “the economic trinity is the immanent trinity” and vice
versa.593 It follows from this axiomatic identification of the immanent and economic
trinities that the Trinity which God is reveals itself to humanity exactly as it is in
Godself.594 Augustine’s position is more nuanced than Rahner portrays it, however,
incorporating the idea that there is a distinction (not a division) between the divine
missions (ad extra), which reveal the personal properties of begetting, begotten, and
procession, and the three Persons as they are related to each other and their shared
essence (ad intra).
What we have encountered in the work of Barth and Rahner are the two main
ways scholars have and still do interpret Augustine’s theology of mission: either 1) it
collapses the inner (ad intra) and outer (ad extra) sides of the Trinity into each other, or
2) it separates these two sides of God, thereby removing God as He is for Himself
(essentially) from God as He is for us (economically). Rather than blindly agree with
either Barth or Rahner, however, we must do our due theological diligence and examine
what Augustine actually has to say with respect to God’s relation to creation, and how He
makes Himself known to it throughout salvation history. Before examining what he has
to say in Books II-IV of On the Trinity with respect to these issues, I want to give a brief
explanation why I will engage in a somewhat out-of-order approach of considering Book
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III first, and then Books II and IV. My reason for starting with Book III is that it, more
than the other two, tells the reader what reality in God is ontologically responsible for all
of the theophanies of the Old and New Testaments—i.e., the divine will—whereas Books
II and IV are more about giving specific examples of theophanies from Scripture. Since
my dissertation as a whole is more concerned with proving that Augustine believed
God’s reality included more than just an abstract and undifferentiated essence, and how
this helps to solve the problem of predestination, my approach to considering these three
central Books in On the Trinity, which will attempt to emphasize this other reality distinct
from the divine essence, should make good philosophical and theological sense.
Augustine mentions the divine will as a distinct reality in God early in Book III,
noting that it and it alone is the cause of everything in creation, ordering every created
thing for the good: “The power of God’s will, after all, extended to producing through
created spiritual agents sensible and perceptible effects in the material creation. Is there
indeed any place where the Wisdom of almighty God does not achieve what she will,
Wisdom who deploys her strength from one end of the universe to the other, ordering all
things for the good (Wis 8:1).”595 Even more explicit in its emphasis on the divine will
having a proper role to play in God is the following text from On the Trinity 3.1.9:
From that lofty throne, set apart in holiness, the divine will spreads itself through
all things in marvelous patterns of created movement, first spiritual then
corporeal; and it uses all things to carry out the unchanging judgement of the
divine decree, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal things, whether they be
non-rational or rational spirits, whether they be good by his grace, or bad by their
own will.... And so the whole of creation is governed by its creator, from whom
and by whom and in whom (Rom 11: 36) it was founded and established. And
thus God’s will is the first and highest cause of all physical species and motions.
For nothing happens visibly and in a manner perceptible to the senses which does
not issue either as a command or as a permission from the inmost invisible and
intelligible court of the supreme emperor, according to his unfathomable justice of
595
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rewards and punishments, favors and retributions, in what we may call this vast
and all-embracing republic of the whole creation.596
The first point Augustine makes is that the divine will is immanent in creation, because it
is responsible for the creating, sustaining, and re-creating of all spiritual and corporeal
things according to God’s salvific purposes, or what Augustine calls here the
“unchanging judgment of the divine decree.” The second point he makes is that the whole
of creation is governed by its “Creator,” or God as related to the creation, namely the
divine will, which is the first cause of all visible things and movements in the creation.
As Augustine will say later, the first and supreme cause of all things created, “like the
rising and setting of heavenly bodies, the births and deaths of animals, the countless
variety of seeds and growths, clouds and fogs, snow and rain, thunder and lightning,
thunderbolts and hail, wind and fire, cold and heat, and so forth” ... and rarer things that
happen in nature, “such as eclipses and comets, monstrous births, earthquakes and the
like” is the “will of God.”597 One should also note how careful Augustine is to say that
we live and move and have our being in our “Creator.” However, the “supreme emperor,”
who is God himself, sitting in his lofty throne, separated from us in holiness, remains
utterly transcendent of what he has created, imparticipable and unknowable.
Augustine makes a distinction between God in Himself and God in His creative
function, or between God’s essence and will, respectively, because of the theological
need to preserve both the integrity of the divine reality ad intra and ad extra—the former
being expressed essentially in the intra-trinitarian divine processions, the latter being
expressed willfully and knowingly in the creation and the divine missions. To give a false
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dilemma to the effect of “either God reveals Himself exactly as He is in Godself, or He
reveals nothing of Himself,” as we saw Barth and Rahner argue, is not something
Augustine is logically willing to accept. Rather, Augustine understands the will of God to
be “God,” albeit God as He makes Himself available to us and, indeed, to the entirety of
spiritual and corporeal creation. Augustine will repeat the same basic point in different
ways and many more times in Books II and IV as he continues to elaborate his theology
of mission.
In Book II, for example, when he is discussing the theophanies of the Old
Testament, Augustine will give a preliminary definition of what it means for something
to count as a divine mission, which he phrases in terms of the distinction between what is
visible and what is invisible:
Since then it was a work of the Father and the Son that the Son should appear in
the flesh, the one who so appeared in the flesh is appropriately said to have been
sent, and the one who did not to have done the sending. Thus events which are put
on outwardly in the sight of our bodily eyes are aptly called missa because they
stem from the inner designs of our spiritual nature. Furthermore, that form of the
man who was taken on is the person or guise of the Son only, and not of the
Father too. So it is that the invisible Father, together with the jointly invisible Son,
is said to have sent this Son by making him visible. If the Son has been made
visible in such a way that he ceased to be invisible with the Father, that is if the
substance of the invisible Word, undergoing change and transition, had been
turned into the visible creature, then we would have had to think of the Son
simply as sent by the Father, and not also as sending with the Father. As it is, the
form of servant was so taken on that the form of God remained immutable, and
thus it is plain that what was seen in the Son was the work of Father and Son who
remain unseen; that is that the Son was sent to be visible by the invisible Father
together with the invisible Son.598
Using the Incarnation as a case in point, Augustine tentatively defines a divine mission as
an event which is put on outwardly, capable of being seen by our bodily eyes, yet
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ultimately having its efficacy on the hidden, spiritual part of our human nature.599 When
it comes to the Incarnation, we can properly say that the coming of Christ was one of the
missions of the second person of the Trinity, both because of His material visibility in the
form of man and because of the internal spiritual help granted to us because of that
mission, namely the potential to have a right relation to God, to be adopted sons and
daughters of the Most High. Augustine is careful to say, however, that it is the invisible
Father and the invisible Son who sent the second person of the Trinity by making Him
visible in the humanity of Christ. The maintaining of the invisibility of the Son is
important, for if it was not, and if the Son’s invisible substance as God was somehow
changed into that of a visible creature, He would no longer be a joint sender of Himself
with the Father. Rather, He would simply be sent, transformed from God into a creature,
thereby ceasing to possess the power to redeem the whole of fallen humanity through the
spiritual renewal we required.600 Thankfully, Augustine tells us, this is not the case: the
Son was visibly sent in such a way that His invisible substance as God remained
unchanged.
Augustine believes that the same kind of visible/invisible distinction can be made
with respect to the sending of the Holy Spirit:
He was visibly displayed in a created guise which was made in time, either when
he descended on our Lord himself in bodily guise as a dove (Mt 3:16), or when
ten days after his ascension there came suddenly from heaven on the day of
Pentacost a sound as of a violent gust bearing down, and there appeared to them
divided tongues as of fire, which also settled upon each one of them (Acts 2:2).
This action, visibly expressed and presented to mortal eyes, is called the sending
of the Holy Spirit. Its object was not that his very substance might be seen, since
he himself remains invisible and unchanging like the Father and the Son; but that
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outward sights might in this way stir the minds of men, and draw them on from
the public manifestations of his coming in time to the still and hidden presence of
his eternity sublime.601
And a bit later on:
The Spirit did not make the dove blessed, or the violent gust, or the fire; he did
not join them to himself and his person to be held in everlasting union. Nor on the
other hand is the Spirit of a mutable and changing nature, so that instead of these
manifestations being wrought out of created things, he should turn or change
himself into this and that, as water turns to ice. But these phenomena appeared, as
and when they were required to, creation serving the creator (Wis 16:24), and
being changed and transmuted at the bidding of him who abides unchanging in
himself.602
Augustine will actually speak of the Spirit’s proprium, or that which he distinctively is, in
the economy of salvation, as the will of God in his De Genesi adversus Manicheos 1.5.8
and 1.7.12.603 Moreover, in his Gn. Litt. 1.5.11, Augustine refers to the Spirit as the love
and benevolence of God, and then strongly implies that these are to be conceived as the
good will of God: “Certainly the Spirit of God was stirring above this creation. For all
that He had begun and had yet to form and perfect lay subject to the good will of the
Creator, so that, when God would say in His Word, Let there be light, the creature would
be established, according to its capacity, in the good will and benevolence of God.”604
So far, we have seen Augustine make similar comments about the sendings of the
Son and Spirit, and how both persons can be properly understood as visible and invisible
to what is created. We might now well ask: What about the Father? According to
Augustine, the Father cannot properly be said to be sent, but that does not prevent Him
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from appearing to His creation when the times and circumstances require: “why should
we not take it to be the Father who appeared to Abraham and Moses, and indeed to
anyone he liked in any way he liked, by means of some changeable and visible creature
under his control, while in himself and in his own changeless substance he remained
invisible?”605 We are made aware of the Father’s presence to His creation many times in
scripture. For example, during the exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt, scripture tells
us: But God went before them by day in a pillar of cloud and showed them the way, and
by night in a pillar of fire; and the pillar of cloud did not fail by day, nor the pillar of fire
by night before the people (Ex 13:21). Augustine thinks it would be nonsensical for
anyone to believe that these manifestations of God the Father to the Jews revealed His
very substance. Rather, he thinks they were actuated when needed by material creation
serving the Creator.606 Scripture also speaks of the Father visibly manifesting His person
to creation in other noticeable ways:
Sinai mountain was smoking all over, because God had come down upon it in fire,
and smoke was rising from it like the smoke from a furnace, and the whole people
was utterly bewildered; and there were trumpet blasts going on very loudly.
Moses would speak, and God would answer him with a voice (Ex 19:18). And a
little further on, after the law had been given in the Ten Commandments, it says,
And all the people could see the voices and the flares and the trumpet blasts and
the mountain smoking (Ex 20:18). And a little further on still, The whole people
was standing far off, but Moses went into the mist where God was; and the Lord
said to Moses etc. (Ex 20:21). What is there to be said here, except that surely no
one is crazy enough to say that smoke, fire, clouds, mist and so forth are the very
substance of the Word and Wisdom of God which is Christ, or of the Holy Spirit?
As for God the Father, not even the Arians ever dared to say such a thing. So all
these occurrences consisted of created things serving the creator and impressing
themselves on the senses of men as the divine arrangements required.607
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Here, as before with the Son and the Holy Spirit, Augustine argues that a real distinction
must be made with respect to the Father’s invisible and unchanging substance and how
He visibly chooses to manifest Himself to what is other than Himself, i.e., spiritual and
corporeal creation. The alternative which holds that the substance of God the Father or
God the Son or God the Holy Spirit is beholden to economic or cosmological motifs is to
Augustine a clear instance of theological stupidity, one avoided even by the Arians, at
least with respect to the Father. How Augustine philosophically argues for this distinction
in Book II to avoid this theological pitfall has been somewhat implicit in one important
respect, namely in terms of its not specifically mentioning the role of the divine will in
the effecting of the theophanies touched upon above. With this said, the Incarnation of
the Son, the dove, gust of wind, and tongues of fire of the Holy Spirit, and the smoke,
voice, fire, and mist of the Father are explicitly revealed to be expressions of the divine
will in Book III, as I have previously noted.
My goal in examining these primary texts from On the Trinity concerning the
revelation of the Son, Spirit, and Father to humankind has been to prove that Augustine
holds the theophanies in the Old and New Testaments to truly reveal God, not as He is as
idipsum esse, but as He is for us. I submit that Augustine understands the theophanies as
revealing God’s will and knowledge (rationes), which will become further evident in our
examination below of two of his Sermons that have to do with the Transfiguration. As I
have said earlier in this dissertation (chapter 4), these rationes are eternal and
unchanging. They are truly said to be with God as Creator. They are life for their
corresponding creatures in the Word. They are not to be identified with creatures. The
Greek-East also holds that the theophanies are not just created effects, or products of the
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divine will and knowledge. They are the volitional-thought (theletiken-ennoian) of
God.608
There is great reluctance, however, to accept this Eastern-friendly interpretation
of Augustine I am suggesting when it comes to the theophanies. In his article,
“Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate: An Eastern Orthodox
Perspective,” Bogdan G. Bucur will limit his consideration of theophanies in Augustine
to a study of passages from the De Trinitate, especially Books I-IV, much as I have done
up to this point. Bucur begins by distinguishing three kinds of theophanies (trin.3.10.19):
1. Those involving angels in performing their divine function as messengers.
2. Those involving angels bringing about a change in pre-existing matter to fulfill a
divine purpose.
3. Those involving a material representation made for a specific occasion, with such
a representation passing away after it has fulfilled its divine purpose.
Bucur states that Augustine believes that the messages of 1) were those of a “real, created
angelic being,”609 but that God still remains the ultimate source of such a theophanic
experience: “The power of the will of God reaches through the spiritual creature, even to
the visible and sensible effects.”610 Bucur then immediately denies that God’s will is
really present in such a theophanic experience, because of the fact that God’s will is only
present insofar as the angel speaks ex persona Dei.611 That is, the effect of this angelic
speaking has only so much of God’s will in it as the angel is speaking out of the person of
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God. Theophanies of the second variety consist of matter being changed, re-ordered,
and/or formed by an angel. In this case it is not the angel but the matter that is used by
God to accomplish some salvific function.612 In doing so, Bucur thinks this matter will
“come to signify something about God and God’s will.”613 Once again, however, the
implication is that such a theophany cannot put us in touch with the reality of God. For
this matter is created and thus can only signify, but not actually connect us to, the
uncreated divine reality. The final kind of theophany consists of God bringing bodies out
of nothing in order to accomplish certain salvific ends, such as we find in Lk 3:22; Acts
2:3; Ex 3:2; Ex 13:21; Ex 19:16; etc. For Bucur, Augustine viewed these bodies as being
“brought into existence by the will of God,”614 citing trin.3.4.9: “the will of God is the
first and highest cause of all the forms and movements of corporeal beings.”
After describing these three kinds of theophanies as nothing more than created
representations of God, Bucur will note the polemical backdrop against which Augustine
formulated his own views on the theophanies in De Trinitate. More specifically, the 4th C.
Trinitarian controversies between the Modalists, Homoians, and supporters of the faith of
Nicaea.615 The latter group attempted to fight back against the Homoian idea that the Son
is inherently visible, and thus changeable, meaning He is less God than the inherently
invisible Father. Pro-Nicenes before Augustine would respond by making a distinction
between the invisible nature of the Son, which does not come down to us, and His visibly
manifesting Himself in the “species” produced by the divine will.616 According to Bucur,
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this is a distinction that carries over into Augustine’s own theological treatment of
theophanies in Books I-IV of De Trinitate, but he attempts to reconcile the existence of
the visible and invisible in a new way from that of his pro-Nicene predecessors, i.e., “by
severing the ontological link between the two, so that the species is no longer ‘owned’ by
the subject of the natura.”617 Bucur thinks this is especially evident of theophanies in
which an angel speaks for God. The angel is created and God speaks His words through
it, thereby making His will known. There is therefore no presence of God Himself in such
an angelic theophany. Rather, there is only “God’s ‘impersonation’ by an angel.”618 I
would agree with Bucur that the visible “stuff” of a theophany (i.e., the ‘species’) is not
part or parcel of God the Son or God the Father’s invisible natura. Their invisible and
shared nature, for Eastern or Western theology at the time of Augustine, does not “own”
the species.
Whether ‘impersonated’ by an angel, or signified by ‘pre-existing’ or ‘created out
of nothing’ matter, God’s substance does not appear, but this does not prevent His will
and knowledge from being made known, and clearly, in these Old and New Testament
theophanies. These theophanies are not owned by His natura, but they are by His will
and knowledge. I would argue that, if anything, this helps to reinforce the idea that
Augustine held to a strict distinction between God’s substance (that does not appear to
creation) and God’s will and knowledge (that are made known at key times throughout
salvation history).

617
618

Bucur, 76.
Bucur, 77.

247
Bucur continues that Augustine’s theology of theophanies “also marks a break
with the transformative character of theophanies,”619 of which the Lord’s Baptism and the
Taboric Light of the Transfiguration deserve special note. According to the Eastern
Orthodox tradition, these are events in salvation history where the divine presence of God
is made known to humans, not through some created intermediary, but directly through
the uncreated energies.620 It follows that these theophanies engender real changes of
salvific importance in those who experience them. A representative example of the
Eastern doctrine of the transformative character of theophanies can be found in
Dionysius’ Divine Names 1.4, where it is written:
“Then [in the next life] ... when we have attained a Christform lot ... we shall
“always be with the Lord” (I Thess.4: 13). In altogether pure contemplations, we
shall be filled with His visible theophany, which shall shine round about us in
most brilliant splendors, as were the disciples in that most divine
Transfiguration.”621
This text from Dionysius’ Divine Names is clear that what the disciples experienced
during the Transfiguration was the uncreated light of Christ’s divinity, His visible
theophany, and that those who have attained a Christform lot will also experience this in
the next life. According to Fr. John D. Jones, in any theophany the “divine hiddenness
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(kpuphioths)” is not revealed—nothing created, angel or man, can experience this ‘we
know not what.’ What can be experienced, however, is a divine name, power, or energy
of the divine. These realities bring us back to God and make us like Him, to the extent
possible, “according to a divine image/icon and similitude/likeness (kata thein eikona kai
homoiwsin).”622 The actual meaning of the term ‘theophany,’ Dionysius tells us, dovetails
with this role that the divine names, power, or energies play in perfecting us: It refers to
“that vision, which manifesting the divine similitude depicted in it as giving form to
unformed realities, raises up those who have such visions to what is divine.”
A theophany therefore grants us access to “divine things themselves” (twn theiwn
autwn),623 through which we become deified. St. Gregory Palamas will insist that this text
from the DN illustrates that there must a continuity between what the disciples
experienced in this life during the Transfiguration and what the blessed will enjoy in the
next. He will claim that “we can never experience or see God through the natural powers
of our intellectual or perceptive capacities.”624 Nor can we experience or see God through
the mediation of any created entity.625 As a result, if we are truly said to experience the
uncreated and divine presence, our sensory and intellectual faculties must be transformed
by God’s grace; they must be enhanced beyond their natural capacities. We must receive
eyes we “did not possess before,”626 or as he will say elsewhere, “eyes transformed by the
power of the Holy Spirit.”627 Palamas will speak of this transformation/enhancement
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occurring not only in the next life,628 but also in certain rare theophanic experiences such
as the Transfiguration, Paul’s rapture in the ‘third heaven,’ and the protomartyr Stephen
seeing the heavens open just before he died.629
Unlike Bucur, Jones does not pass judgment on whether or not Augustine has a
transformative theology of theophanies.630 But we must ask: Is Bucur’s interpretation of
Augustine in this respect an accurate one? Two quick points must be made before I offer
my answer to this question. First, regardless of the transformative power (or lack thereof)
of theophanies, both my comments and Bucur’s on trin.I-IV have shown that there must
be a distinction without division between the nature and will in God. Bucur himself will
say the theophanies are created effects of the divine will, not the divine natura. Second,
when it particularly comes to the theophany atop Mount Tabor, the Transfiguration,
Bucur does not cite any primary texts from Augustine’s corpus to draw the conclusion
that this event does not provide human beings with the chance for a real encounter with
the uncreated will and knowledge of God. Rather, he will rely on the authority of Michel
Barnes. Using the words of Barnes, Bucur concludes that for Augustine “what appeared
in events such as the theophany atop Mt Tabor was created matter being used as an
instrument of communication by the Trinity,” and that “while an encounter with such an
instrument ... was an occasion for faith in God,”631 that is all this event could provide.
Bucur then writes that “it could not, obviously, have any transformative power.”632
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I would argue that the interpretation that Bucur and Barnes give of Augustine on
theophanic experience at the very least fails to recognize primary texts that could be used
to support a more “Eastern” reading of his theology in this regard. As two representative
examples, I will discuss Sermons XXVIII and XXIX, both of which are sermons
Augustine gave on the Transfiguration. In Sermon XVIII, Augustine says that Christ
shone like the sun. He was “the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the
world.”633 Seeing this glorious light, Peter suggested that they all stay on top of Mt
Tabor, free from the trials and tribulations of the world. Peter then offered to set up three
tents—one for Jesus, one for Moses, and one for Elijah. Suddenly, a bright cloud
appeared, overshadowing them. From it, a voice spoke, telling Peter that while he saw
three persons, there was really One: The Word, Christ, the Word of God present in the
Law, and the Word of God present in the Prophets. The voice also said that “This is my
beloved Son.” Augustine is careful to point out, then, that the voice did not say these are
my beloved sons, including Moses and Elijah, but only Christ. For Augustine, in the
Transfiguration, what the apostles experienced in their earthly bodies was Christ himself,
the only begotten Son of God the Father: “Here is the Lord, here the Law and the
Prophets; but the Lord as Lord; the Law in Moses, Prophecy in Elijah; only they as
servants and as ministers. They as vessels; He as the fountain: Moses and the Prophets
spoke, and wrote; but when they poured out, they were filled from him.”634 What they
experienced was Christ as Lord, the source of all creation, the Word of God the Father.
They saw Christ in his divine, uncreated glory: “And in this glory is fulfilled what He
hath promised to them that love him, He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and
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I will love him (John 14:21). And as if it were said, What will you give him, seeing you
will love him? And I will manifest Myself unto him. Great gift! Great promise! God does
not reserve for you as a reward any thing of his own, but Himself.”635 I do not think any
passage in the entire Sermon is more forceful in showing Augustine’s commitment to the
belief that Christ Himself is visibly manifest to all those who love him. Christ does not
reveal himself through some symbol of divinity or created intermediary, but rather,
Augustine tells us, he reveals himself in his true divinity. Sermon XXIX echoes what has
already been said, and makes clear that Christ visibly appeared to the apostles “in his own
Person.”636 It is worth noting that at no point in this Sermon does Augustine feel the need
to refer to some created intermediary or visible symbol to play the role of middle-man, so
to speak, between the disciples and Christ.
I should mention that similar views on the real presence of Christ as Lord in the
Transfiguration are expressed by Augustine in De Genesi ad Litteram and his
Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount.637 Whatever interpretation of these texts one
prefers, there is no denying that Augustine held that the divine nature, by itself, simply
could not account for, either theologically or ontologically, the divine missions as he has
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defined them. We have already examined his tentative definition of them in Book II, but
he gives their definitive definition in Book IV:
So the Word of God is sent by him whose Word he is; sent by him he is born of.
The begetter sends, what is begotten sent. And he is precisely sent to anyone
when he is known and perceived by him, as far as he can be perceived and known
according to the capacity of a rational soul either making progress toward God or
already made perfect in God. So the Son of God is not said to be sent in the very
fact that he is born of the Father, but either in the fact that the Word made flesh
showed himself to this world; about this fact he says, I went forth from the Father
and came into this world (Jn 16:28). Or else he is sent in the fact that he is
perceived in time by someone’s mind, as it says, Send her to be with me and labor
with me (Wis 9:10). That he is born means that he is from eternity to eternity—he
is the brightness of eternal light (Wis 7:26). But that he is sent means that he is
known by somebody in time.638
While Augustine singles out the Word of God to define what constitutes the essence of
His mission, His “being sent,” what Augustine says applies to any of the divine missa.
One of the divine persons can be said to be sent when and only when that person is
“known and perceived by [someone], as far as He can be perceived and known according
to the capacity of a rational soul either making progress toward God or already made
perfect in God.” Augustine’s definition thus makes it clear that a divine mission only
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qualifies as such if it has a concrete and real effect on the believer, meaning that a divine
mission is inherently relational to what is other than God (ad extra). After all, God has no
need of the divine missions. Their existence is only required because there is creation,
and because that creation is in need of its proper perfection or in need of maintaining its
proper perfection in God. Augustine concludes that when the Son is said to be sent, this
cannot be understood in terms of His being begotten by the Father, which is a relation
that in itself has nothing to do with creation. Rather, His being sent can be understood in
two ways: either in terms of His appearing to the world in the form of man in the
Incarnation, or in terms of His being known and perceived by someone in time. Focusing
on the latter understanding of mission more so than the former, Augustine then writes
about the Son and the Holy Spirit: “As being born [sc. generated] means for the Son
being from the Father, so being sent means for the Son being known to be from the
Father. And as being the gift of God means for the Holy Spirit proceeding from the
Father, so being sent means for the Holy Spirit his being known to proceed from the
Father.”639 Here again Augustine does not let us forget that the Son and the Spirit can
only be said to be properly sent if mention is made of who or what they are being sent to,
i.e., spiritual and corporeal creation.
Augustine will also reiterate in Book IV that none of the missions of the divine
persons constitute or reveal the divine essence. To use Bucur’s turn of phrase, they are
not ‘owned’ by the natura: “If you go on to ask me how the incarnation itself was done, I
say that the very Word of God was made flesh, that is, was made man, without however
being turned or changed into that which he was made; that he was of course so made that
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you would have there not only the Word of God and the flesh of man but also the rational
soul of man as well; and that this whole can be called God because it is God and man
because it is man.” And speaking about the Father and the Holy Spirit, Augustine thinks
“surely no one wishes to say that whatever creature it is that produced the Father’s voice
is the Father, or that whatever creature it is that manifested the Holy Spirit in the form of
a dove or in fiery tongues is the Holy Spirit.”640 Whether Augustine views these or the
other missa of Father, Son, and Spirit as transformative of those who experienced them
may still be an open question to Eastern and Western theologians alike, or at least one
that needs further examination before a definite decree is made. Or perhaps in the minds
of others it is an open and shut case. Either way, East or West, we can agree with
Augustine that the divine missa are not expressions of the essential Life of the Trinity,
but rather expressions of the uncreated divine will and knowledge.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: Our Liberty in the ‘totus Christus’

In previous chapters, we have seen Augustine use an essence-will distinction in
God to distinguish between the eternity of the divine essence and the eternity of the
divine ideas (chapter 4), between the generation of the Son/spiration of the Spirit and the
act of creation, and between the internal processions and the divine missa, the latter of
which include the theophanies (chapter 8). Evidence of this distinction in the works of
Augustine notwithstanding, scholars still have reservations when it comes to the
theology-philosophy of Augustine. Some still consider Augustine as leaning more
towards holding the divine essence as providing the unity to the Trinity than the three
divine persons themselves (chapter 5), even though I have shown reason to doubt this
over-simplification of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology (chapter 6). The Cappadocian
tradition, by contrast, emphasizes the unity of the Trinity as coming from the Persons,
and especially the Person of the Father (chapter 7). Regardless of these and other
differences, the Western-Augustinian and Eastern-Patristic traditions held that there must
be real distinctions in God to account for how God necessarily exists for Himself (ad
intra) and how He freely exists for creation (ad extra).
In this concluding chapter, I will examine the latter way God exists in terms of the
Incarnation of the Word and Its extension or prolongation in the Church, understood by
Augustine as the ‘totus Christus’ or ‘whole Christ.’ I will do this because Augustine
believes the Incarnation represents the most radical act of God to freely exist for His
creation, especially for human creation, to effect its redemption and to ensure its liberty
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(libertas) from the thralldom of sin. Indeed, nowhere else do we see the Augustinian
distinction between God’s essence and God’s will applied with greater theological need
than with respect to the doctrine of election by grace as it pertains to Christ, Who is the
only natural Son of God essentially, but Who willingly emptied Himself, taking the form
of a slave (Phil 2:6-8).
I have already alluded to the importance of properly understanding the human
person and its liberty in the context of self-sacrificial service to God (chapters 2 and 3).
But in this chapter, I delve into the deeper relational meaning of Augustine’s notion of
human liberty as total obedience to the providential will of God, exemplified in the
highest way by Christ, the Mediator between God and man, the Head of the Church.
More specifically, I make good on my promise in chapter 1 to find the solution to the
problem of predestination in Augustinian thought, or the problem of divine election in the
Letters of St. Paul, in the person of Christ. I will accomplish this through the exegesis of
key earlier and later texts in the Augustinian corpus that illustrate his Christocentic
anthropology. Given the Augustinian distinction between God’s essence and God’s will,
we are now able to fully appreciate how genuine human freedom, or liberty, is not the
freedom to choose this or that, nor is it the freedom to sin. Rather, our liberty is to will as
Christ wills, i.e., to always and unfailingly obey the will of the Father. The theological
strategy that Augustine employs in the texts I will examine to argue for his idea of human
liberty is rooted in Scripture (especially the Letters of St. Paul), but he will pair this with
appropriate philosophical explanations of the inherent relationality of human beings to
God’s will and knowledge (rationes) and one’s neighbor in the ecclesial Body of Christ.
Much of this dissertation was an attempt to prove via textual analysis and argument that
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Augustine has an essence-will distinction akin to the one we find in the Greek-East. We
are finally able to see the philosophical “pay off,” as it were, of this in specific texts from
Augustine that concern what constiutues a free human response to the will of God:
Christian liberty pertains to the non-essential (ad extra) ‘reality’ of God, i.e., His will or
energy. In addition, we are able to see this unencumbered from philosophical-theological
objections which would attribute to Augustine an essentialist model of God,641 or a
separation between the temporal human will and eternal divine will,642 any one of which
(if true) would make such an examination a complete non-starter.
While we have seen that most scholars, following in the learned footsteps of
Cicero, consider Augustinian “liberty” as negating the possibility of human responsibility
in the realm of moral-political action, I will now be able to argue that this is a result of
their misunderstanding Augustine’s fundamentally Christocentric anthropology and its
emphasis on the real relation between the human will of Christ and His members to the
divine will. Christian liberty lives and moves and has its being in the Church. It is a
liberty that belongs to man “not merely as man, but as a member of Christ. Such a liberty
is designed to bring about, within the deepest recesses of each member of Christ, a union
between God and man that calls Christ to mind.”643 It is a liberty that is defined by the
expression of God’s will in the human will, through the obedience of the latter to the
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former. Even in His most difficult time on earth, this is something Christ the man did to
effect the redemption of all: yet not my will, but yours be done (Luke 22:42).644
Over the course of this dissertation, I have shown that Augustine was not
oblivious to the difficulties attendant on the notion of Christian liberty. These difficulties
arise in its distinctions between God’s grace and free will: “the discussion about free will
and God’s grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is maintained,
God’s grace is apparently denied; whilst when God’s grace is asserted, free will is
supposed to be done away with.”645 Moreover, we know that Augustine will sum up the
mystery of divine and human interaction by relying on St. Paul: there is question not of
him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy (Rom 9:16). If, however,
there is question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, then how can we say that any
human being contributes anything meaningful to their own salvation? These are
variations on the same problem with which this dissertation began: the problem of divine
election by grace found in the Letters of St. Paul and, by extension, the mature theology
of sin and grace of Augustine. One will recall that this was the problem that caused
Augustine to write in Book II of the Retractions: “I labored indeed on behalf of the free
choice of the human will, but God’s grace overcame, and I could only reach that point
where the apostle is perceived to have said with the most evident truth, For who makes
you to differ? And what have you that you have not received? Now, if you have received
it, why do you glory as if you received it not? (1 Cor 4:7).”
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The answer to this problem, which we have seen Augustine hint at in his earlier
and later works, in his preaching and teaching career, is arguably the greatest lesson we
can learn from the entirety of Scripture: “The whole aspect and, if I may so speak, the
entire countenance of the Holy Scriptures is seen, in a mystery very deep and salutary, to
admonish all who carefully look upon it, that he who takes pride should take pride in the
Lord.”(1 Cor 1:31).646 Christ is the center of all theological reflection, and indeed the
whole of Christian teaching can be understood, to the extent that it is possible, in the
person of Christ. 647 Augustine writes elsewhere that, “All this [sc. Scripture] proclaims
Christ, the head that has ascended into heaven and the body that toils on earth to the end
of time.”648 Paul for his part will sum up his entire preaching career as having been a
witness to Christ, for I judged not myself to know anything among you but Jesus Christ,
and Him crucified (1 Cor 2:2). I intend to conclude this dissertation on the liberty of
human beings with the co-operation of divine grace by judging their interaction in the
way Paul and Augustine prescribe, i.e., according to Jesus Christ, and particularly Him
crucified. However, I am aware that to “say about the Mediator as much as would be
worthy of Him would occupy too much space, and indeed no man could say these things
in a befitting manner.”649 That is why I will limit my comments about the Mediator
primarily to a discussion of His liberty consisting of His human obedience to the will of
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Enchir.25.98.
The importance of Christ in understanding the whole of Christian teaching is made apparent in
Paul’s Letters. See for example, Acts 9:3; 22:4; 26:13ff; Phil 3:12; Col 3:11; Gal 3:28; Eph 1:10. Paul and
Augustine will identify Christ as the center towards which all Christian doctrine converges, including
Paul’s doctrine of election by grace. The famous quotation from Romans 8:29, for example, bears this out:
For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, so that
He would be the firstborn among many brethren. For more on the centrality of Christ in Paul and
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the Father. In doing this I follow the theological strategy of the Jesuit priest and
renowned systematic theologian Emile Mersch, who thinks that “we must focus attention
on Christ’s humanity,” because all of the divine commands that are meant to sanctify the
human race, that are designed to make it an “organism of grace,” if obeyed, are present in
the “decree that willed the humanity of Christ, or rather are basically realized in the very
way that humanity exists.”650 Since Christ contains all human perfections within Himself,
because of His total obedience to the will of the Father, Augustine thinks it follows that
“[t]here is no more eminent instance, I say, of predestination than the Mediator Himself.
If any believer wishes thoroughly to understand this doctrine, let him consider Him, and
in Him he will find himself also.”651 Augustine does not make explicit reference to the
Gospel of John here, but he must have had it in mind: If any man will do the will of Him,
he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether I speak of Myself (Jn
7:17). A proper understanding of divine predestination, grace, and human liberty can only
be found in the person of Christ. It cannot be found in abstract thought or abstruse
theological concepts. It will escape the grasp, however learned, of those who do not wish
to live as Christ lived, to will as Christ willed, and love as Christ loved.
We will now examine some early and later works of Augustine in which this
Christocentric anthropology is made known. One of the early and more “philosophical”
works of Augustine where we find this emphasis on the importance of Christ is On the

Mersch, 202. These ‘divine commands’ or the ‘decree that willed the humanity of Christ’ are
expressions of God’s will and knowledge. They are the divine ideas. One of the best commentators on St.
Paul, Ferdinand Prat, S. J., will say that from baptism “special relations with each of the three divine
Persons are derived: a relation of sonship with the Father; a relation of consecration to the Holy Spirit; a
relation of mystical identity with Jesus Christ.” It is this last relation of mystical identity with Christ that
“explains everything,” including the how we ought to conceive of the liberty of man as a creature of God
(F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, II, 320).
651
On the Gift of Perseverance, 67.
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Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life.652 Augustine’s overall goal in writing it is to
defend the harmony of the Old and New Testaments contra the Manichaeans, but I am
more interested in the first Book of this work, which contains a description of how
Christians ought to live. Especially of interest is Augustine’s idea of the true unity of
human nature being found in the rational soul as related to God.
Augustine will begin by discussing the question, ‘What is man?,’ from a rational
perspective. It is clear that he views beginning with authority as superior, however,
because “when we learn anything, authority precedes reason.”653 Why? Because our
“fallen” minds are confounded by intellectual error due to sin and evil. Nevertheless, in
order to appease the weakness of the Manichaeans, “who think, and speak, and act
contrary to right order and insist that, first of all, a reason be given for everything,” he
states that he will submit to their demands and “employ a method of discussion which [he
considers] faulty.”654 According to this rational perspective, Augustine says man is a
union of body and soul. Man cannot be either the body or soul by itself. “For although
they are two things, soul and body, and neither could be called man were the other not
present (for the body would not be man if there were no soul, nor would the soul be man
were there no body animated by it).”655 With this said, there is a pre-eminence that we
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The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, Volume 56. The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of
Life, Trans. by Donald Gallagher and Idella Gallagher. Written in 388 and revised in 390
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mor.2.3.
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mor.4.6. Augustine’s basic view of man being composed of three elements, i.e., spirit, soul, and
body, does not change over the course of his writings. Nor does his view that to these three elements must
be added a fourth: the spirit of Christ, obedience to the Laws of God, or however one wants to put the right
relation between man and God that Augustine takes to be necessary for the former’s perfection. See for
example, de.fide.et.symb.10.23, where Augustine speaks of the “death” of man in terms of falling away
from God (Eccl. 10:14) and the “life” of man in terms of serving the law of God (Rom 7:25), or obeying the
spirit of God (1 Cor 2:14). It is important to note that Augustine will not always use the terms soul (anima)
and spirit (spiritus) in a consistent manner. But he does generally and for the most part take “soul” to mean
the principle of life of all rational and irrational creatures, whereas “spirit” has a dual sense: Sometimes he
uses it according to Scripture, whereas other times he will use it according to what we might call its more
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must acknowledge in the soul, because how we live a good life primarily pertains to the
soul. Good morals or virtues are “acts of the soul.”656 Augustine thus identifies who we
are as persons primarily with the soul, because that is what he takes to be the epicenter of
our ethical action. He will make similar points about the will and mind, or, to use the
expression of the Apostle, the inner man.657
It should come as no surprise that Augustine thinks that we really cannot
understand Christian life solely through an anthropocentric lens, by examining the soul
and body unity that is man and how he is moral/virtuous. Augustine therefore quickly
shifts from the rational perspective to one based in authority and, specifically, the
authority of scripture. The foundation of this new perspective is that God exists and He is

philosophical meaning. In the first sense, spirit “represents the highest faculty of the human soul which
raises man above the lower animals.” In the second sense, it has the Stoical meaning of the “imaginative
power or sense-memory, common to both man and beast.” (Robert P. Russell, ftn 14, p. 325). Etienne
Gilson has also mentioned this difference in vocabulary when it comes to the soul and spirit in Augustine in
his seminal work, L’introduction à l’étude de S. Augustin (3rd ed., Paris 1949), pp. 56-57.
656
mor.5.8.
657
Augustine will interchange the terms ‘soul,’ ‘will,’ ‘mind,’ and ‘inner man’ when appropriate. See
On the Grace of Christ 49, in which he seems to use all of these terms in an equivalent manner to discuss
the place in man where God effects His grace. When it comes to the human will, Augustine often speaks of
it in terms of being the “root” of good or bad action. This is in accord with Scripture, for the Lord says, a
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit (Matt 7:18); and the
Apostle says that greed is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10), indicating that he views love to be the root of
all right action (On the Grace of Christ, 19). Augustine supposes that, if these two trees, one good and one
evil, “represent two human beings, one good and one bad, what else is the good man except one with a
good will, that is, a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one with a bad will, that is, a
tree with a bad root? The fruits which spring from such roots and trees are deeds, are words, are thoughts,
which proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one” (Ibid). These two different
trees, these two different human beings, these two different wills are formed in two different ways. The
good “tree” that bears good “fruit” is formed through the assistance of grace, “for God Himself co-operates
(cooperatur) in the production of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends them by the
agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7)” (On the Grace of
Christ, 20). By contrast, the bad “tree” that brings forth bad “fruit” is deformed by its insistence to rely on
its own inadequate power, thereby separating itself from Him who is the source of all goodness and life.
Augustine will just as readily speak of a person as consisting in what his mind thinks: “What a person
thinks as a person; that, you see, is where the person properly is, in his thoughts.” (Sermon 217.2, 418). It
should come as no surprise that this is yet another theological insight he takes from St. Paul, who would
often make a distinction between the inner (spiritual/mental) and outer (fleshly/bodily) man, and claim that
true personhood consists of this inner man, which, God willing, is renewed from day to day (2 Cor 4:16).
According to Augustine, the inner man (homo interior) consists in the highest and best part of the soul,
namely the mind (mens). See trin.12.1-4.
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the supreme good for man. When we strive after Him, we live good lives. When we reach
Him, we are happy. Augustine has no truck for objections such as God does not exist:
“As for those who may deny that God exists, I cannot concern myself with arguments to
persuade them, for I am not even sure that we ought to enter into discussion with them at
all.”658 Moreover, the work that he is engaging in right now is meant for those who want
to know the way of life of the Catholic Church, and so these are persons who do not deny
God’s existence or claim that He is indifferent to how we act. Quite the contrary: these
are persons who firmly believe that God guides the life of man through Divine
Providence which,
although man had fallen away from its laws and on account of his greed for
mortal things had deservedly begotten a mortal offspring, did not altogether
abandon him.... We shall never be able to understand how great, how admirable,
and how worthy of God this providence is, nor finally, how true all that we are
seeking for, that is, unless we begin with things human and familiar to us and,
through faith in the true religion and the keeping of the commandments, proceed
without forsaking the path that He has prepared for us by the appointment of the
patriarchs, the bond of the law, the predictions of the prophets, the mystery of the
Incarnation, the testimony of the apostles, the blood of the martyrs, and the
conversion of the Gentiles...659
After telling us that we must begin with all of these “things” to achieve an understanding
of Divine Providence, Augustine focuses his attention on Christ. What does Christ say is
the ultimate Good for us? What does He say with respect to how we attain this Good?
The answer to both questions can be found in following the command: Thou shalt love
the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.
(Matt 22:37). Augustine thinks that from these words of Christ we know “what we must
love and how much we must love.... In God is to be found all that is best for us. God is
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our supreme good. We must not stop at anything below Him, nor seek anything beyond,
for the first is fraught with danger and the second does not exist.”660 When we love God,
we are united to Him. This unity, Augustine tells us, should be conceived in a spiritual or
mental way. “We strive after Him by loving Him; we reach Him, not by becoming
altogether what He is, but by coming close to Him, touching Him in a wonderfully
spiritual way, and being illuminated and pervaded utterly by His truth and holiness (At
eum sequimur diligendo, consequimur vero, non cum hoc omnino efficimur quod est ipse,
sed ei proximi, eumque mirifico et intelligibili modo contingentes, ejusque veritate et
sanctitate penitus illustrati atque comprehensi). Following St. Paul, Augustine thinks that
our unity with God through the via amoris cannot be frustrated: I am sure that neither
death, nor life, nor angels, nor virtue, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height,
nor depth, nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the love of God, which
is in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8:38-39).661 We love God through our “soul (animum)
and mind (mentum).” In loving God, our mind becomes “like God” (Deo similis), to the
extent that this is possible, “when it humbly submits itself to Him for enlightenment.”
Indeed, Augustine thinks that the mind achieves its greatest likeness to God “by the
submission which produces likeness,” but it acquires an unlikeness to God when this
desire “turns the mind from obedience to the laws of God, by making it desire to be its
own master, as He is.”662 It is precisely when the human mind humbly submits to God,
when it recognizes it is not sufficient of its own cognitive and conative resources to be its
own master, that it enjoys liberty. Augustine will add that the “more fervently and
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Augustine believes we can find the same basic message in the Old Testament in the words of the
Prophet: It is good for me to adhere to God (Ps. 72.28).
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earnestly the mind does this, the happier and more exalted it will be, and when ruled by
God alone, will enjoy perfect liberty” (Quod quanto fecerit instantius ac studiosius, tanto
erit beatior atque sublimior, et illo solo dominante liberrimus). Augustine mentions once
again that this love of God, which constitutes our liberty, takes place “in Christ Jesus our
Lord” (in Christo Jesu Domino nostro).663
Augustine understands our liberty to take place in Him, because Christ is the
virtue of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). Christ also called Himself the truth
(John 14:6). To love virtue, wisdom, and truth is therefore to live the ideal Christian
life—the life of Christ. Augustine recommends to the Christians reading De Moribus
Ecclesiae Catholicae to love with their whole heart, whole soul, and whole mind
the virtue which is inviolate and invincible, the wisdom which never gives way to
folly, and the truth which is not altered but remains ever the same. It is by this that
we come to see the Father Himself, for it has been said: No one comes to the
Father but through me (Jn 14:6). It is to this we adhere by sanctification
(sanctificationem) for, when sanctified (sanctificati), we are inflamed with that
full and perfect love which prevents us from turning away from Him (qua sola
efficitur ut a Deo non avertamur) and causes us to be conformed (conformemur)
to Him rather than to the world. He has predestined us, as the Apostle says, to be
conformed to the image of His Son (Rom 8:29) (Praedestinavit enim, ut ait idem
Apostolus, conformes nos fieri imaginis Filii ejus).664
Augustine will characterize this full and perfect love qua sola efficitur ut a Deo non
avertamur, which causes us to be conformemur to Him, in terms of the four cardinal
virtues, namely, temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence. It follows that: “temperance
is love preserving itself whole and unblemished for God, fortitude is love enduring all
things willingly for the sake of God, justice is love serving God alone and, therefore,
ruling well those things subject to man, and prudence is love discriminating rightly
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between those things which aid it in reaching God and those things which might hinder
it.”665 We might call this Augustinian virtue ethics, the entire goal of which is to attain
the supreme Good for man, which is God.
Augustine makes clear that this love of God includes love of oneself and
neighbor. Indeed, it is impossible that love of God can exclude the other two. This is
because a man only loves himself in the right way if he attains his supreme Good, and
this is God. We must love our neighbor also, for Christ commands us to love thy neighbor
as thyself. (Matt 22:39).666 Augustine then reasons that, if you love yourself in the right
way when you love God more than yourself, then “what you do on your own behalf, you
must do also for your neighbor, so that he, too, may love God with perfect love.”667 To
love our neighbor is thus to lead him to the same Good we are pursuing. According to

665

mor.15.25. Throughout mor. Augustine will give more detailed descriptions of these virtues as they
pertain to Christian life. In what follows I include a brief summary of the essential aspects of these virtues
according to Augustine. We begin with temperance, which is meant to prevent our passions from
overtaking us, thereby causing us to desire things other than God. Augustine will say this virtue is exercised
by stripping off the old man and putting on the new (Col 3:9-10). That is, strip off Adam, the sinful man,
and put on Christ, the righteous man (mor.19.35). While temperance consists in not desiring worldly things
in an improper manner, the function of fortitude is to give them up. The hardest thing to “give up” in this
life, or what is our “heaviest yoke” is undoubtedly the trials and tribulations that affect our bodies. As
examples of Christian fortitude, Augustine will cite Job (Job 1:2) and the woman who gave over to the
tyrannical executioner every one of seven sons instead of blaspheming God, and who then eventually
underwent the same torture and death (2 Mach 7:1-42) (mor.23.42-43). The essence of justice consists in
serving the Creator and not the creature (Rom 1:25). It consists in not only listening to but taking to heart
the words of Christ: No man can serve two masters (Matt 6:24). Accordingly, Augustine thinks that each of
us must “serve with gladness the Lord whom he loves ... and with respect to all other things, that he govern
those which are subject to him and endeavor to subject the rest.” (mor.24.44). Finally, the function of
prudence is to judge what ought to be desired and what ought to be avoided. Augustine accords prudence a
special place of honor among the virtues already discussed, because without prudence no other temperate,
patient, or just acts can be “accomplished.” Augustine thus understands prudence to be at work in all of the
other virtues, insofar as its job is to “keep constant watch so that we are not led astray by the imperceptible
working of an evil influence” (mor.24.45), which would cause us to be intemperate, impatient, or unjust. It
is temperate, patient, just, and prudent love of God that constitutes “human perfection.” (mor.25.46).
Elsewhere Augustine will say this human perfection is illustrated in the actions of Christ, but especially His
Cross, in which every one of these virtues shines forth to their greatest extent capable for a human being.
See for example, symb.3.9.
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Augustine will make the point elsewhere that, if we do not follow this command of Christ, if we do
not “embrace the multitude and society of men wherein fraternal charity is operative,” then our faith will
bear “less fruit.” (de.fide.et.symb.9.21).
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Augustine, this is what is meant by the saying of Scripture, Bear one another’s burdens,
and in this way will you fulfill the law of Christ (Gal 6:2).668 In one of the most creative
analogies he ever uses, Augustine will compare the bearing of one another’s burdens with
how deer swim across a channel:
When deer swim across a channel to an island in search of pasture they line
themselves up in such a way that the weight of their heads carried in the antlers is
borne by one another thus: the one behind, by extending its neck, places its head
on the one in front. Moreover, because there must be one deer which is at the head
of the others and thus has no one in front of itself to lay its head on, they are said
to take the lead by turns, so that the one in front, wearied by the weight of its
head, retires to the end of the line, and the one whose head it was supporting
while traveling in the lead takes its place. In this way, bearing one another’s
burdens, they traverse the channel until they come to solid ground.669
In an effort to find continuity between the Old and New Testaments, Augustine will state
that perhaps this behavior of deer is what Solomon had in mind when he said: Let the
deer of friendship and the foal of your affections converse with you (Prov 5:19).
Augustine thinks that the reason why we must bear the burdens of others is because of
Christ and, specifically, the “thought of how much the Lord has endured for us.” Just as
Christ did not deem it satisfactory to only look after Himself, but took away the burden of
our sins, so, too, we should imitate Him in “willingly bear[ing] one another’s burdens.”670
Book I of On Christian Instruction (396-397)671 will similarly place Christ at the
center of Christian morality. Near the beginning of this work, we get a discussion of the
famous use/enjoyment (uti/frui) distinction. There are some things which should be
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On Christian Instruction trans. by John J. Gavigan. This work has received high praise. See for
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enjoyed, some things which should be used, and others which are to be enjoyed and used.
Speaking of the first two kinds of things, Augustine writes: “Those which are to be
enjoyed make us happy. Those which are to be used help us as we strive for happiness.”
The inversion of this distinction among things cannot but lead to unhappiness, for if we
strive “to enjoy the things which we are supposed to use, we find our progress impeded
and even now and then turned aside.”672 Augustine is here thinking of our enjoyment of
“lesser goods,”673 which we ought to use as stepping stones to reach our highest good.
Augustine will identify our highest good not with God as He essentially is, but with the
three Persons, as they are accessible to us: “The proper object of our enjoyment,
therefore, is the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Same who are the Trinity, one supreme
Being, accessible to all who enjoy Him.”674 How, though, are we able to enjoy God the
Trinity? Augustine answers that the mind must be cleansed. We may consider this
cleansing to be a “sort of traveling or sailing to our own country,” because it is not a
“moving from place to place, but by a holy desire and lofty morals.”675 No cleansing of
the mind such as this would be possible, however, without the Incarnation of Christ, in
which the second Person of the blessed Trinity deigned “to share even such great
weakness as ours and show us the way to live according to human nature, since we
ourselves are human.”676 Augustine will refer to Christ in the form of his humanity as the
only Way (Jn 1:10) by which we can travel back to God, but also as our final destination,
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“die to this world.” (I.20.19); the entire temporal dispensation is something that we ought to use, “but not
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insofar as He is the Word. Or as he will say: “Therefore, although He Himself is our
native land, He made Himself also the Way to that native land.”677 Elsewhere he adds
that this humble action on the part of Christ was free, i.e., willed by Him: “what more
generous or more merciful thing could He do, who was willing to abase Himself for us as
the Way by which we might return to Him.”678
Augustine therefore believes and understands Christ, the God-man, to constitute
the full meaning of what Christian life should be. When it comes to the Incarnation in
particular, Augustine notes that there is a curative symmetry between Christ as our
medicus and medicine and we as Christians:
Just as medical care is the road to bodily health, so this Care has received sinners
to heal them and make them strong again. And as physicians bind up wounds in
an orderly and skillful manner, so that even a certain beauty may join the
usefulness of the bandage, so the medicine of Wisdom, by assuming humanity,
accommodated Himself to our wounds, healing some by opposite remedies and
others by like remedies. A Physician, in treating an injury to the body, applies
certain opposites, as cold to hot, wet to dry; in other cases he applies like
remedies, as a round bandage to a circular wound or an oblong bandage to an
oblong wound, not using the same bandage for every limb, but adapting like to
like. Likewise, the Wisdom of God, in healing humanity, has employed Himself
to cure it, since He is both the physician and the medicine.679
Not only in the Incarnation, but also in His Resurrection from the dead and His
Ascension into heaven Christ “shows us forcibly how willingly He who had the power to
take it up again laid down His life for us.”680 Augustine will say that it is for the express
purpose of building up His Church here and now that Christ has willingly done all of
these things for our salvation. To the extent possible, we must imitate Christ in these
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ways “without complaint” and “even with joy,”681 because the Church is the body of
Christ (Eph 1:23). It is His spouse (Eph 5: 23ff). As such, Christ as Head recapitulates
those in His body, though they do not have the same functions or gifts (Rom 12:4), “by
the bond of unity and charity—its health, so to speak.”682 Augustine does not shy away
from saying that this consolidation process of the Church by Christ and His members
often consists of disciplinary action, or the cleansing of the mind of His members through
various trials and tribulations. But these are to act as medicine for them, so that when the
body of the Church is joined to Christ as Head,683 His spouse the Church will not have
spot or wrinkle or any such thing (Matt 16:19).
That Augustine talks specifically of cleansing the mind is significant, for it is in
the mind that we are created in God’s image. The nobility of man comes from the fact
that he is created to the image and likeness of God (Gen 1: 27), “not insofar as he is
housed in a mortal body, but in that he is superior to brute beasts because of the gift of a
rational soul.”684 Hence Augustine will conclude that “man is most excellent at that time
when his whole life tends toward the unchangeable Life and clings to Him with all its
affection. However, if He loves himself for his own sake, he does not refer himself to
God, but, since he has turned to himself, he is not turned toward something
unchangeable.”685 Because he is not turned toward something unchangeable, he therefore
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Christ as Head and Christ as members. As Christ is the Head of the Body that is the Church, we may
similarly call the Father the Head of Christ. According to Augustine, the Father “does not have His origin
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loves a lesser good. Later in his theological career, Augustine will discuss in exacting
detail how the whole mental and willful life of man must be referred to God in his
psychological analogies for the Trinity.686 For Christian life, then, the doctrine of the
imago Dei was of great importance. How do we restore the image of God in us? How do
we attain to the likeness of God? We do so through the rule of love: “Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself,” but God “with thy whole heart, and with they whole soul, and with
thy whole mind.” We have all of our thoughts, all of our willings, and all of our life from
Him. We are made in the image of God and according to His likeness, so Augustine
thought we ought to direct all of these to Him. God is the only reality (for lack of a better
word) that should be “loved for His own sake.”687
But without Christ the doctrine of the imago Dei would be meaningless and
ineffectual. It would be incapable of being realized in Christian life within the unity of
the Church. We need Christ to be our Road and Reward, Way and Destination. Since
Christ “wished not only to show Himself as the reward of those who have arrived at Him,
but also, to those who were only coming to the beginning of their journey, to show
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These psychological analogies are described most famously in Books VIII-XV of On the Trinity,
but reference to them can be found elsewhere. See for example, Conf.13.3.12; Gn.litt.imp.16.61. Generally
speaking, they are meant to show that just as there is a threefold unity in man, who is one substance in a
threefold aspect, in the various faculties and actions of the soul, so, too, God, in a much higher way,
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it understand and love him. Or to say the same thing more briefly, let it worship God, who is not made, by
whom because itself was made, it is capable of and can be partaker of him; wherefore it is written, Behold
the worship of God, that is wisdom (Job 28:28) (trin.14.12.15; CCSL 50A.442-43). Augustine concludes
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intellegere Deum, dilligere Deum. Augustine is careful to use active verbs here to reinforce the idea that we
are most like the Trinity when we are actively remembering God, actively understanding God, and actively
loving God.
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Himself as the way, He willed to assume human flesh. So there is also this verse: The
Lord created me in the beginning of His ways (Prov 8:22), so that those who wished to
come might begin from Him.”688 The balance Augustine strikes between understanding
Christ in these two senses, in the form of His humanity and in the form of His divinity, to
speak of the function of grace to bring us together on the road to salvation in order to
sanctify us, is mirrored in the Letters of St. Paul. But as Mersch notes, Paul does not give
us an exact formula to understand the relation between Christ as our Road and Reward,
Way and Destination. Rather, it is sometimes the case that “Christ’s humanity scarcely
appears in this work of union; it is God who gathers men together and draws them to
Himself, with some intervention on the part of Christ’s humanity that is not clearly
defined.689 At other times the humanity of Christ appears as the great means employed by
God to save men.690 This latter case seems to be more frequent.”691
According to Mersch, we see the same doctrine being supported in the Eastern
Church, especially in the work of Cyril of Alexandria. Cyril thought that the Christ’s
humanity could give life to the entire human race because it was united to the Word. It is
not because of what it is in itself that allowed Christ’s humanity to enliven the human
race he joined to Himself in the Incarnation. Rather, it is because of what it is in the
Word—the Light and Life of men.692 These insights about the two-natured Christ from
Paul and the Doctors of the Early Church, East and West, became crystallized into dogma
at the Council of Chalcedon (451):

688

I.34.38.
Cf. Rom 3:24-27; 5:1-11; 6:23; 13:25ff.; Gal 4:4-7; Eph 1:3-14; Col 1:13-20.
690
See Rom 5:11-21; 6:1-11; 1 Cor 1:30ff.; 6:15-20; 2 Cor 5:14-21; 8:9; Gal 2:19ff.; 3:26-29; Eph
1:18-22; 2:4-10; 13-22; 3:1-10; 4:3-16; Phil 3:14, 17, 21; Col 1:26ff.; 2:2-19; 3:1-4.
691
Mersch, 200.
692
See In Ioan., I, 9.
689

273
Following in the footsteps of the holy Fathers, we all with one accord teach belief
in one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. We declare that He is perfect in
divinity and perfect in humanity, that He is true God and true man, composed of
rational soul and body, that He is consubstantial with the Father in divine nature
and consubstantial with us in human nature, “in all things like as we are, without
sin” (Heb 4:15); that before all ages He was born of the Father according to His
divine nature, and in these latter days was born of the Virgin Mary, Mother of
God, for our sake and for our salvation, according to His human nature; that one
and the same Christ, the only-begotten Son our Lord, must be acknowledged as
existing in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, undividedly, inseparably,
with no suppression of the distinction between the natures on account of the
union, but rather with the individuality of each nature safeguarded and coming
together in one person and subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but
one and the same Son and only-begotten God the Word, Jesus Christ the Lord.693
Christ has two perfect natures, human and divine, each of which exists unconfusedly,
unchangeably, undividedly, and inseperably from the other. They are united in the Person
of the Word, not in the natures themselves, and so there is nothing contradictory in their
union with each other. Each of the natures of Christ, “though in union with the other,
performs actions proper to itself: the Word does that which belongs to the Word, and the
flesh does that which belongs to the flesh.”694 Because of the unity of His human nature
with His divine nature, Christ in the form of His humanity exists according to a
perfection (perfectio), or to use a word more often employed by Augustine, an
amelioration (melioratio),695 that even the best of fallen humanity do not. Christ was
unable to die, unable to sin, unable to abandon the good. Mersch is clear that this
melioratio of Christ’s human nature, which made it unable to do these things, is primarily
the result of the divine action of the Word.696 If this divine action were to be suspended or
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withdrawn from the assumed humanity, then so would its perfection. Others such as
Msgr. Fulton Sheen will refer to this unity of Christ’s human nature with His divine
nature as a form of instrumental causality.697
To understand how this dependence relation between the assumed humanity and
the Word functions, Mersch offers up a comparison. Consider the illumination of the air
by the sun. The light is a “property of the air.” It is “intrinsic to the air.” However, the air
is only illuminated when it is in “contact with the sun,” or when it is “penetrated by the
sun.” Suspend or withdraw the light shed by the sun and there is no illumination of the
air. According to Mersch, this proves that “the illumination in the air is a sort of
diminished continuation and participation of the sun’s illumination; it is, so to say, the
brilliance of the sun as realized and expressed by the air in its own way.”698 The
brilliance of the sun belongs to the air, but only because the sun unceasingly causes it,
because the sun communicates its brilliance to the air. Augustine will also use light and

anything that is created, to be a function of its internal coherence or unity, which is given to it by God
(DGnI.10.32). Mersch continues that the perfection of Christ in particular has no meaning or possibility
“except in expressing in one nature the union with the other nature and in formally causing the first nature
to be a united nature.” Thus, while the Word may be the primary cause of Christ’s human nature to be
united with His divine nature, the unity between Christ as man and Christ as God can only be real if they
are both related to each other, if they are united in one Person. Mersch claims that, either we can think of
this entity of union “in thinking of the union, in believing in the Incarnation, and in envisaging the two
natures, or else what we have in mind is not it at all.” (Mersch, 215). We may refer to this perfection, or
entity of union, as “divinization, grace, fullness of grace,” or whatever other way Christian tradition refers
to it (Mersch, 221).
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air to discuss the unity and distinctness of the two natures, God and man, that occurs in
the Incarnation. In Epistle 137, Augustine observes that “there are some who request an
explanation of how God is joined to man so as to become the single person of Christ, as if
they themselves could explain something that happens every day, namely how the soul is
joined to the body so as to form the single person of a man.” He continues later on:
For as the soul makes use of the body in a single person to form a man, so God
makes use of man in a single person to form Christ. In the former person there is a
mingling of soul and body; in the latter person there is a mingling of God and
man; but the hearer must abstract from the property of material substance by
which two liquids are usually so mingled that neither retains its special character,
although among such substances light mingled with air remains unchanged.
Therefore, the person of man is a mingling of soul and body, but the person of
Christ is a mingling of God and man, for, when the Word of God is joined to a
soul which has a body, it takes on both the soul and the body at once. The one
process happens daily in order to beget men; the other happened once to set men
free.
Augustine concludes that we must understand the union of a soul and body to form man,
and the union of the divine Logos with a soul and body to form Christ, along the lines of
how light is mingled with air, not as we would two liquids that are mingled together in
such a way that neither one retains its unique character. Light illuminates the air, so that
it, too, shines like the light; but at no point in this illumination process does air stop being
air or light stop being light.699 So, too, when Christ wills the divine will. His will remains
His own and God’s will remains His own; and they each remain wholly their own and
wholly each other because of their relation to each other.
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Lest we get any idea that this made Christ the man’s contribution insignificant or
irrelevant to the Word’s taking on of human nature in order to perfect it, we must add that
“the divine action has to be received in the human nature, and quid-quid recipitur,
recipitur ad modum recipientis.”700 That is, the divine action of the Word must be
received according to the capacity of Christ’s human nature. It follows that with respect
to His human nature the unifying process cannot be merely passive, external, or material.
Nor can it be one devoid of consent. Quite the contrary: “the human nature [of Christ]
had to be intensely active in receiving it, even though this activity itself was received.
The reception had to be accomplished in the deepest center, the very root of the nature,
and hence had to be brought about in a suitable way, that is, through an act of immanent
spontaneity; to lay hold of the human nature as it is, the reception had to take place in that
nature’s inner source of activity, which is liberty.”701 Liberty is the essential core of
human nature, and so the divine action of the Word had to be in consonance with it in
taking on the nature. Christ the man had to consent to be one Person with the Word. If
there were no such consent, then the union would be “violent” and would not be “human
in its term.”702 In The Theology of the Mystical Body, Mersch will attempt to clarify this
free unity of man with God in the person of Christ in terms of “filiality.” For the human
nature of Christ to be the human nature of the Son, the perfection bestowed upon it, due
to its union with the Son, had to have been “designed to fit it to be the Son’s humanity, to
equip it to act in a way that is becoming of the Son while yet acting in accordance with its
own nature; how could such perfection be other than ‘filial?’”703
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Just as the grace of union is “filial” or fitting to Christ’s human nature, and so
cannot destroy the inner core of that nature, i.e., its liberty, so, too, must be the grace of
headship. Christ as Head of the Church enjoys true liberty in His carrying out of the role
of mediating our sanctification through the power of the Holy Spirit. But if this is so,
Mersch adds, Christ must “influence the lives of Christians by a grace that is essentially
‘filial.’”704 The grace that Christ imparts to Christians exists because of His action, which
is an amelioration for us. The perfection it effects in us is “the simple prolongation in
Christ’s members of the personal union with God and the Son that is fully realized in the
head and that affects the members according to the measure of their union with the
head.”705 Thus, the more united someone is with Christ, the more perfect they are, and so
the more free they are; the less united someone is with Christ, the less perfect they are,
and so the less free they are. On the eve of His death, Christ prays to the Father that we
might enjoy this active, internal, spiritual, and freeing unity: That they may be one, as we
also are.... That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee; that they also
may be one in us.... That they may be one, as we also are one: I in them and Though in
Me; that they may be made perfect in one. (Jn 17: 11, 21ff.)
According to Augustine, the grace that Christians possess is a derivation of the
grace of headship conferred on Christ through His unity with the Son. Our predestination
and adoption as sons of the Most-High, therefore, must be seen in continuity with
Christ’s eternal relation of sonship to the Father: “God calls many to be His sons, in order
to make them members of His only-begotten, predestined Son.”706 Mersch believes that
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what Augustine teaches better than any other theologian is the “living, interior, and, as
we should say today, psychological unity that brings Christians and Christ together in a
single organism, a single man, a single Christ.”707 It is this “interior” emphasis of
Augustine that allows him to argue that we and Christ constitute a single man.
The Sermons and Commentaries of Augustine bear this out rather well, as Mersch
points out. The following indented passage, as well as the footnotes, are from pages 350351 of his Theology of the Mystical Body:
Since we are He708 and He is we,709 and since we belong to Christ710 and are
Christ,711 we must have His Father as our Father712 through the action of the same
Spirit713 who has brought about the birth of the Son in our midst. For the
incarnation of the Word who is the Son continues on in the mystical body through
the Spirit. ‘The Word incarnate is called the nuptials, for in the man who is
assumed the Church is joined to God.714 ... In this man, the Church also is
assumed by the Word.’715
The multiple pleas for oneness that Christ makes in his sacerdotal prayer are answered in
the mystical body through the grace of the Holy Spirit. The apostles, disciples, and the
faithful are capable of being one body, one Church, one life, one mind, one will, but they
cannot accomplish this on their own. They need a unifying principle which will make
them come together in unity under the Headship of Christ. And they received just such a
unifying principle on the day of Pentacost. Through the grace of the Holy Spirit, they
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became the founding members of the Church, with Christ as its Head, the Holy Spirit as
its soul, and they as its body. Augustine likens this to what the soul is to the body of man:
“What the soul is to the body of man, that the Holy Ghost is to the body of Christ, which
is the Church.”716 While the Head of the Church now sits at the right hand of the Father
in heaven, and the individual members of the Mystical Body come into being and pass
away, “the Church remains one because that which gives it its abiding personality is the
Pentacostal Spirit.”717 The individuality of the members of the Church is not lost because
they share in It. Christ makes this clear in the words he spoke the night before He died: I
will not leave you orphans: I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world seeth Me
no more. But you see Me: because I live and you shall live.718 In that day you shall know
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that I am in My Father, and you in Me, and I in you. (Jn 14: 18-20). Christ did not say I
am My Father, you are Me, and I am you. He keeps distinct all of the parts of the
Mystical Body by saying I am in My Father, and you in Me and I in you.
We and Christ constitute a single man, because we are all possessed by the same
Pentacostal Spirit, but we and Christ are different, because we all possess different
functions in the single man that constitutes the ‘whole Christ’: “That one man is assumed,
whose head is Christ ... he is the one assumed. He is not outside us; we are in His
members.... Let us abide in Him and be assumed; let us abide in Him and be the elect.”719
Here we have Augustine explicitly making a connection between the doctrine of the
mystical body and the doctrine of election. If we abide in Christ, if we become one of His
members, if we are assumed by Him, then we are elect. If we do not abide in Christ, if we
do not become one of His members, if we are not assumed by Him, then we are not elect.
The words of Jesus come to mind: I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes
to the Father except through me (Jn 14:6). To be elect, or what means the same thing, to
come to the Father, we must be sons of God in Christ through the grace of the Holy
Spirit. With this said, our sonship is different from that of Christ. We may be called sons
of God, “but He is God’s Son in a different sense.... He is the only Son, we are many. He
is one, we are one in Him. He is born, we are adopted. He is the Son by nature, begotten
from eternity; we are made sons by grace in time.”720 While there is a difference, there is

as we, through the influence of his grace, reproduce His own life in ours.... Christianity reveals that we are
called in some way to prolong His Life, Death, and Resurrection in our lives, because of our solidarity with
Him.” (298-299). We know what to do then, but how can we successfully accomplish this re-living of
Christ’s Life, Death, and Resurrection? In a word: obedience. We must exercise humble obedience to what
the Father in heaven wills for us, namely, to restore the image and likeness of God in us. To achieve this
lofty goal, one that Christ did in the form of his humanity, we too must be willing to be “obedient unto
death, even to death of the Cross.” (Phil 2:8).
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also a close-knit unity, for our sonship by grace and His Sonship by nature become one in
Christ. It is in Him, “redeemed as we are by His blood and washed clean by Him, [that]
we are sons and are the Son; for though we are many, we are one in Him.”721 We are
“members of the only-begotten Son of God.”722
Because of how strong our unity is with Christ, Augustine will tell us that for God
to love the Son completely, He must love His adopted sons along with Christ. God cannot
love the Son and not love us.723 In a similar way, if we are to love God the Father and
God the Son with all of our heart, soul, and mind, then we must love the other members
of the Body of Christ that make up the totus Christus. Love of God and love of neighbor
cannot be separated from each other:
For God’s sons are the body of God’s only-begotten Son; and since He is the head
and we are the members, the Son of God is one. Therefore he who loves the sons
of God, loves the Son of God; and he who loves the Son of God loves the Father.
Nor can anyone love the Father unless he loves the Son; and whoever loves the
Son, loves also the sons of God. Which sons of God? The members of the Son of
God.724
Augustine will insist that when we love our brothers and sisters, who are members of the
Body of Christ, we must love Christ Himself, who is the Head of that Body; and when we
love Christ, we love the Son of God, for Christ is the Word; and so when we love the Son
of God, we cannot help but love the Father, whose Word He is. Love does not admit of
divisions:
Choose the object of your love; the rest will follow. Perhaps you say: I love God
alone, God the Father. You are wrong; if you really love, you do not love the
Father alone; no, if you love the Father, you also love the Son. Very well, you
may reply, I love the Father and I love the Son. But I love only God the Father
and God the Son, our Lord Jesus Christ who ascended into heaven and sits at the
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right hand of the Father, the Word by whom all things were made, the Word who
became flesh and dwelt among us; I love no one else. You err; for if you love
Him, the head, you also love the members; and if you do not love the members,
you do not love the head either. Let no one bring in a distinction between love and
love, for love is of this nature: as it is a joining together in one, it makes one and,
as it were, fuses together everything embraced by it. Take some gold, melt the
whole mass, and a single ingot comes forth.725
It is when our love of God and neighbor is total, complete, and undivided that we can
properly say we are of one spirit with Christ. For this kind of love joins us together and
makes us one with Him and each other in such a way that there is one mystical person,
the whole Christ. Since we are one person with Christ, we share in His predestination:
For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of
His Son, so that He would be the firstborn among many brethren (Rom 8:29).
Yet not all are one person with Christ, and so they do not share in His
predestination. To become conformed to His image, so that we are one person with Him,
we must fight. More specifically, we must fight the desires of the flesh. Hence Augustine
will characterize Christian life as a combat.726 In the Christian Combat (397), Augustine
will say that anything that we do to combat the desires of the flesh, or concupiscence
(cupiditas), is an imitation of Christ.
Near the beginning of this work, Augustine will contrast the mediation to life
provided by Christ and the mediation to death provided by the devil. By a good life of
virtue, humility, and godliness we become one with Christ. We become ‘like’ Him. On
the other hand, “so by a bad life of wickedness, pride, and ungodliness do we become
ourselves one with the devil. That is to say, we become like the devil and, just as our
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body is subject to us, so we are made subject to him.”727 To avoid this subjection to the
devil, or perhaps better, slavery, we must fight against the desires of the flesh that would
lead us away from God. Augustine will cite the Apostle as saying in this connection: I so
fight as not beating the air; but I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest
perhaps after preaching to others, I myself should be found rejected (Eph 2:2). The
chastisement of the body the Apostle speaks of is merely an imitation of Christ. Hence
why he recommends us to imitate him as he is an imitator of Christ: Be imitators of me as
I am of Christ (Phil 3:20).
Augustine anticipates that some will now ask how we are to keep our flesh in
check, and whether or not this is a free choice of the will:
Lest anyone pose the very question of how we are to bring our body into
subjection, I reply that it is easy to understand and do, provided we are already
living in subjection to God by a good will and unfeigned charity; for every
creature, willingly or unwillingly (velit nolit), has been made subject to its one
God and Lord. This is a reminder to serve our Lord God with an undivided will
(tota voluntate). The just man serves Him in a spirit of freedom (liberaliter), but
the unjust man serves him like a shackled slave (compeditus servit). Yet, all are
subject to divine Providence. Some conform with filial obedience and cooperate
with (faciunt cum) Providence in the performance of good, while the rest are cast
into chains, like slaves, being dealt with according to their merits.728
Augustine believes Christ in the form of his humanity to be the best example of a person
who kept the flesh in check, who lived in subjection to God with a good will and
unfeigned charity, who served God with an undivided will and a spirit of liberty, and who
conformed himself to God with filial obedience. All of this is made clear in the sacred
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Scriptures, which “testify concerning His Son who, in the words of the Apostle,” was
born of to Him according to the flesh of the offspring of David (Rom 1:3).729 Any
suggestion that the Son did not assume our human nature must be condemned. For
Augustine, “He assumed a complete human nature, joining Himself to man’s intellectual
nature through the soul, and, through the soul, uniting Himself to the body.”730 Because
he assumed a complete human nature, Christ also had to combat the flesh.
Yet Christ totally and completely obeyed the will of the Father, and He did so
with a decisive spontaneity, evidenced in the command He gives us to follow: Let your
speech be, “yes, yes;” “no, no.” (Matt 5: 37). The Apostle speaks of this also: There was
not in Him now “yes” and now “no,” but only “yes” was in Him (2 Cor 1:19).731 The
decisiveness of Christ’s human will is a result of being the Father’s Word: “What is the
Father’s doctrine, if not the Father’s word? Therefore Christ Himself is the Father’s
doctrine, if He is the Father’s Word. But the Word cannot be the Word of no one, but has
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10.11.
18.20. Augustine held that the human nature assumed by the Word for His earthly mission had a
human intellect and human will. To say otherwise is the same as saying “He was not a man.” (19.21). There
is ample evidence that Augustine maintained this view throughout his earlier and later theological career.
For example, in de.fide.et.symbolo (393), Augustine tells us that the Son took upon Himself a “complete
human nature, namely, body, soul, and spirit ... [and that] we should be on our guard against any notion that
any particular component of our nature had no share in the assumed nature and its unrelated to our
salvation.” (4.8). In the Enchiridion (ca. 421), Augustine will claim that it is wrong to say “that any part
was lacking in that human nature He put on, except that it was a human nature altogether free from any
bond of sin.” (10.34).
731
One of the better philosophical-theological explanations of why Christ’s will is so decisive is given
by Emile Mersch, who believes its decisiveness is due to its “totality.” According to Mersch, when Christ is
willed, “He is willed in his entirety, by a decree that is one even in its term, because in Christ it forms the
unity of this term.” Everything that exists thus has its proper place and right order in the decree that willed
Christ. Because Christ was willed by a total and unified will—the will of the three persons—He is totality
and unity. It follows that “those who are Christ’s members are willed by the prolongation of Him and
insertion into Him,” into the unity that He is. This is a unity grounded in love, not only in the love that God
has for mankind, but also the love that we have for God and neighbor. Indeed, the “will that wills Christ,
who is totality, may be conceived as a total will which includes all the special decrees that affect each man
and cause each man to save himself.” (Mersch, 278). It is this totality of will, its unity, its undividedness, its
total goodness, that lead to the decisive spontaneity of Christ to always say “yes” to good and “no” to evil.
When we will the will of Christ, we, too, are able to let our “yes” mean “yes” and our “no” mean “no.”
730
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to be the Word of someone, and the doctrine that He announced is Himself and not just
His, because He is the Word of the Father. What is so much yours as you? And what is so
little yours as you yourself, if what you are belongs to another?”732 We may now want to
ask: Can this filial obedience of Christ, testified to in the sacred Scriptures, instantly
willing to do the will of the Father, allow for His free co-operation with the Father?
Could He have ever said ‘no’ to the Father, or would such an ability to say ‘no’ even
matter to His liberty? 733 What about in our case as Christians? Can our total and complete
obedience to the divine will allow for our free cooperation? Augustine will answer as we
saw him answer in his Sermons and works sent to the semi-Pelagians: “Man would not be
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In Ioan. 29.
In relation to these questions concerning Christ’s inability to sin, inability to die, and inability to
abandon the good, we can ask another: If Christ only ever in fact said ‘yes’ to the will of the Father, then
what would Augustine make of the temptations of Christ after His baptism detailed in Mk 1:12, 13; Mt 4:
1-11; and Lk 4: 1-13? Were they not really temptations because Christ could not have succumbed to them?
Perhaps the pericope in the Gospel of Matthew, according to which Jesus asks the Father three times to be
delivered from the cup of His passion (Mt 26: 39, 42, 44), gives us the best means to reflect on these kinds
of questions in Augustine and come up with a plausible answer. For Augustine, in the Garden of
Gethsemane, Jesus could in a sense be said to have “wished for something other than what the Father
willed” (Contra Maximinum 2.20; PL 42). But elsewhere in his Commentaries on the Psalms he will go on
to explain what exactly this means and how this does not jeopardize the sinless liberty of Christ, but rather
illustrates the weakness of the members of His ecclesial Body: “How did our Lord marry two wills so that
they became one in the humanity he bore? In his body, the Church, there would be some people who, after
wanting to do their own will, would later follow the will of God. The Lord prefigured these people in
himself. He wanted to show that though they are weak, they still belong to him, and so he represented them
in advance in his own person. He sweated blood from his whole body, as a sign that the blood of martyrs
would gush from his body, the Church.... He revealed the human will that was in him, but if he had
continued to insist on that will, he would have seemed to display perversity of heart. If you recognize that
he has had compassion on you, and is setting you free in himself, imitate the next prayer he made: Yet not
what I will, but what you will be done, Father (Mt 26:39). (En.in Ps.93.19; CCSL 39.1319). It is important
to add, however, that Christ is the Head of this Body, and so Augustine will continue that: “[Jesus] took on
sadness this way as he took on flesh. He was sorrowful, as the Evangelist says. If he was not sorrowful
when the Evangelist says, 'My soul is sorrowful, etc.,' then too when he says, 'Jesus slept,' he did not sleep;
or when he says, 'he ate,' he did not eat; and therefore nothing sensible will remain, so that it could even be
said that his body was not real. Whatever is written about him, therefore, is true and happened. Therefore
he was also sorrowful, but he assumed true sorrow willingly, as he assumed true flesh” (Ibid). Augustine
would thus unequivocally defend all of the natural ‘aspects’ of Christ’s humanity (e.g., His hunger, faith,
desire to make persons righteous, fear of death, etc.), and they are no less ‘real’ for Him because He did not
insist upon them and thereby go against the will of the Father. For an excellent comparison of Augustine
with other patristic writers on how to specifically interpret Jesus’ actions in Gethsemane, see “Ancient and
High-Medieval Interpretations of Jesus in Gethsemane: Some Reflections on Tradition and Continuity in
Christian Thought,” by Kevin Madigan. The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (1995), pp. 157173.
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perfect if he were to obey God’s commandments out of necessity, and not by his free
will. This is a very simple matter, as far as I can see.”734
As in De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine will state that the spiritual environment
in which we exercise our freedom is the Church, made up of the Head and the Body. The
unity holding the Church together is twofold, in that the Body of the Church is one in
nature, and the Spirit of both Head and Body is the one Spirit of Christ. Augustine writes
in this connection:
For, though the Body of the Church is one in nature, anyone can discern what a
great difference there is between the Head and the other members. If that Man is
the Head of the Church, by whose assumption ‘the Word was made flesh and
dwelt among us,’ the other members are all the saints by whom the Church is
made perfect and entire. Now, the soul gives life to and quickens our whole body,
but, in the region of the head, the soul perceives sensations of life, sight, sound,
smell, taste, and touch, but in the other members, only the sensation of touch. And
on this account, in carrying out their functions (operandum), all the members are
subject to the head. But, the head occupies a higher position in order to take
counsel (consulendum), since, to a certain extent, it plays the role of the soul
itself, which takes counsel (consulit) for the body; for all the senses are to be
found in the head.735
Here, then, we receive another psychological analogy for understanding the unity present
in the Church. The soul in relation to the head perceives the sensations of life, sight,
sound, smell, taste, and touch, whereas the soul in relation to the other parts of the body
only perceives the sensation of touch. Since all the senses are to be found in the head, it
occupies a higher position than the body and takes counsel for it. So too in the Church as
totus Christus: All goods for Christians can be found in Christ, the Mediator between

10.11. Not only does our freedom come from our wills, but also from God’s omnipotence itself. In
chapter 2 of this dissertation, we saw Augustine argue for the omnipotence of God in a way that requires
the nature of our wills as free to be respected. The argument he gave centered on the fact that ‘God cannot
contradict his own will.’ And since God created the will of man to be free, it follows that He cannot now
override that freedom through His grace. In short, grace cannot contradict nature. The same basic argument
is repeated elsewhere in Augustine’s corpus. See for example, Enchir.24.95 and Symb., 1.2.
735
20.22.
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God and man. All the cognitive and conative resources needed for right-living are in
Christ, who not only “enjoys the benefit of Wisdom Itself, by which all men are made
wise, but also is the very personification of Wisdom.”736 We as Christians do not possess
these goods by ourselves as if they were our private possessions. We possess them in
common with each other, together with Christ.737 Christ is the Wisdom and Power of God
(1 Cor 1:24), but He is also our wisdom and power as acting members of the Church,
carrying out our different functions (operandum). Because Augustine views the wisdom
and power of Christ to be uniquely ours as members and uniquely His as Head, any
implication that the Body of Christ just passively reflects His wisdom and power a la
Protestantism must be avoided.738
Augustine will systematize many of the insights we have gleaned about Christ and
Christian liberty in his On Faith, Hope, and Charity or Enchiridion (ca. 421).739 It is clear
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20.22.
For a similar discussion of the unity of the Body of Christ in Augustine, see pages 56-57 of this
dissertation.
738
As is well-known, Protestants hold that the justification of Christians is a kind of “juridical
imputation” and “legal fiction.” That is, when God looks upon the members of the Church, He sees
“nothing in them but the justice of Christ” (Mersch, 158), and He regards this justice as if it were their own.
Luther will preach this message of Christian passivity in the face of the justice of Christ in many of his
sermons. See for example, Sermo de duplici iustitia, 1519, in Werke (Weimar, 1884), II, 146: “By faith in
Christ the justice of Christ becomes our justice, and all that is His and He himself becomes ours.... He who
believes in Christ, cleaves to Christ and is one with Christ, having the same justice as He.” See also In
epistolam ad Galatas commentarius, 1535 (ibid, XL, I, 197): “Therefore we are not said to be formally
holy, as a wall is said to be white because of its inherent whiteness. Inherent holiness is not enough. Hence
Christ is our whole sanctity.” And finally, see Tischreden, 2933 (Weimar, 1914), III, 96: “We wish to
remain in the justice that is in the category of relation and not of quality, that God may regard us as pious
and righteous; we cannot regard ourselves as such.” Enarratio psalmi Ll, in D. Martin Luthers Werke
(Weimar, 1914) XL, 2, p. 324. Luther will not assign a meaningful role to Christians in the working out of
their own salvation, because he thinks they are, in the deepest recesses of their souls, sinners who can do
nothing to alter their situation. Following Luther and Calvin, Protestants take original sin to have
completely corrupted human nature. Or as Luther says, “natural things [including human beings] are
wholly corrupt in the sight of God.” Enarratio psalmi Ll, in D. Martin Luthers Werke (Weimar, 1914) XL,
2, p. 324.
739
Translated by Bernard M. Peebles, who writes of this work: “it is his only systematic treatment of
the Church’s doctrine as a whole, and, coming late in his career as a bishop, shows that fulness of
understanding and precision of analysis which his long years of pastoral care and active combat against
heresies had produced in him. It is no wonder, then, that the Enchiridion has been drawn upon heavily as a
synthesis of Augustinian teaching from the days of Peter Lombard (if not before) to our own times” (359737
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from his Retractions that Augustine had a high opinion of this late work: “In this, in my
opinion, I have adequately covered how God is to be worshipped, a worship which
Divine Scripture defines as man’s true wisdom.”740 Augustine calls for no emendations or
additions to be made to it. Though originally meant to be a short handbook on the faith
and the creed, the Enchiridion became quite long and contains Augustine’s definitive
definition of Christian liberty. Chapters 8-14 of the Enchiridion discuss the liberty of man
in terms of obedience to the divine will (which Augustine thinks is how God ought to be
worshipped and man’s true wisdom), an obedience necessary to enter the Kingdom of
Heaven, to be a member of the totus Christus.
At the beginning of Chapter 8, Augustine ventures “to learn what are the causes
of good and evil, so much of them, at least, as is required for the path which leads us to
the kingdom where there will be life without death, truth without error, happiness without
sorrow.”741 In other words, he aims to discuss the causes of good and evil as they pertain
to rational, free action. We learn that the cause of all good things is the goodness of God,
whereas the cause of evil things can be traced to the “desertion from the unchangeable
good on the part of the will of the changeable good (boni mutabilis voluntatem), first in
the case of the angels and then in that of man.”742 It is from the voluntas of men and
angels that comes all the evil of the rational nature, which includes “ignorance of duty,”
“lust after harmful things,” “error,” “pain,” “fear,” and “unwholesome delectation.”743

360). In The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, Volume 27, Robert P. Russell O.S.A. agrees with
Peebles and notes that “Augustine’s most complete and systematic handling of the subject of faith and the
Creed is to be found in his Enchiridion, or Handbook, On Faith, Hope, and Charity” (312). There is a
continuity in his views in De fide et symbolo (393) and the Enchiridion (ca. 421), though these works are
separated by almost thirty years (Russell, 313).
740
Retractions II.89.
741
8.23.
742
8.23.
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8.24.
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Augustine will later describe the sin of angelic and human creation as it not doing what
God willed, “but what it willed.”744 However, in the case of man in particular, he was
also punished by the death of the body. We this in the Book of Genesis in the fall of
Adam and Eve. God gave Adam fair warning of this punishment should he disobey His
command (Gn 2:17 and 3:19). God also endowed Adam with “free will (libero arbitrio).”
Yet He put Adam “under obedience and pain of death,” placing him in this paradisal
state, “as if giving him a foreshadowing of life to come.”745 According to Augustine,
“God would have been willing to maintain even the first man in that state of salvation in
which he had been placed and, at a fitting time, after the generation of children, to lead
him, without intervention of death, to a better state, where not only would he have been
unable to sin but even to have the wish of sin.”746 Of course, Adam did not obey the
command of God, and so he did not rise to a better life. Oh unhappy fall! Augustine
thinks that this desertion of God by Adam represents the nature of man misusing its
power to reject and disobey the “command of its Creator (praeceptum sui Creatoris),
which it might have easily heeded, which had profaned the image (imaginem) of the
Creator that was within it by insolently turning away from His light.”747 How was this
rejection, disobedience, profaning, and insolent turning away on the part of man
accomplished? Augustine answers that it was through a misuse of his libero arbitrio.
In Chapter 9, Augustine will continue to discuss the misuse of human free will, as
well as its proper use in terms of the person of Christ. When man misuses his free will,
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26.100.
8.25.
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“Quapropter etiam primum hominem Deus in ea salute in qua conditus erat, custodire voluisset,
eumque opportuno tempore post genitos filios sine interpositione mortis ad meliora perducere, ubi jam non
solum peccatum non committere, sed nec voluntatem posset habere peccandi” (28.104).
747
8.27.
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this results in a kind of death (perdidit) for himself and it. Or as Augustine will say: “nam
libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidit et ipsum.”748 He compares this kind of
death with a man who freely chooses to commit suicide. If a man kills himself, he must
have been alive to do so. But now that he is no longer alive, he cannot restore himself
back to life. So, too, when it comes to a man who has sinned through an evil use of his
libero arbitrio: “sin is victorious and his free will is lost (victore peccato amissum est
liberum arbitriu).”749 When Augustine says free will is “lost” (amissum), he does not
mean “totally destroyed,” “incapable of being repaired,” or “gone forever.” He clarifies
immediately by saying “lost” in the sense being “enslaved” to sin. Augustine will quote
St. Peter in this connection: for by whatever a man is overcome, of this also he is the
slave (2 Pt 2:19). It follows that if man is overcome by sin, he is the slave of sin.
Augustine reasons that, since what St. Peter says is
... surely true, what liberty, I ask, can a slave have except when it pleases him to
sin. For that service is liberty which freely does the will of the master.
Accordingly, he is free to sin who is the servant of sin. Wherefore, no one is free
to do right who has not been freed from sin and begins to be the servant of justice.
And such is true liberty because he has the joy of right-doing, and at the same
time dutiful servitude because he obeys the precept. But, for the man sold into the
bondage of sin, where will that freedom of right-doing come from unless he be
redeemed by Him who said: If the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed?
(Jn 8:36).750

748

9.30.
9.30.
750
9.30: quae cum vera sit, qualis, quaeso, potest servi addicti esse libertas, nisi quando eum peccare
delectat? Liberaliter enim servit, qui sui domini voluntatem libenter facit. Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber
est, qui peccati servus est. Unde ad juste faciendum liber non erit, nisi a peccato liberatus esse justitiae
coeperit servus. Ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti
obedientiam. Sed ad bene faciendum ista libertas unde erit homini addicto et vendito, nisi redimat cujus
illa vox est, “Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis?
749
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We have already witnessed Augustine say that being pleased to sin, or misusing free will,
leads to an unwholesome delectation. True liberty cannot consist in this disordered desire.
It is servitude to the wrong master, and so results in a loss of our free will.
There are five components to the Augustinian definition of true liberty given in
the above passage. Augustine is quite clear that 1) that service is liberty qui sui domini
voluntatem libenter facit. It is a service that requires us to 2) esse justitiae coeperit
servus. It involves 3) recti facti laetitiam, but at the same time 4) pia servitus propter
praecepti obedientiam.751 Finally, true liberty for man is only possible because of 5) the
redemptive activity of the Son. It this last component that Augustine emphasizes above
the others, for if the Son’s redemptive activity does not join itself to the free will of man,
he is not able to do what is right.752 As Christ says, I am the vine; you are the branches. If
you remain in me and I in you, you will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do
nothing (Jn 15:5). Augustine thinks that the importance of (5) can also be found in the
writings of St. Paul. For example, Eph 2:8-10, where Paul mentions the importance of
Christ for understanding how we are able to perform good works: For his workmanship
we are created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God has made ready beforehand
that we may walk in them (Ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati in Christo Jesu in
operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus). Augustine takes this to
mean that we will only be “truly free” (vere liberi) when God “forms and creates (format
et creat) us, not as men (homines)—for that He has already done—but to be good men
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The joining of (3) and (4) together are important, because mere obedience to the law is not
sufficient for salvation. According to Augustine, we must take joy in or love following God’s
commandment, for although it “appears sometimes to be kept by those who do not love Him, but only fear
Him; yet where there is no love, no good work is imputed, nor is there any good work, rightly so called;
because whatsoever is not of faith is sin (Rom 14: 23), and faith worketh by love (Gal 5:6).” (On The Grace
of Christ, 27).
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(boni homines), which He now accomplishes by His grace.” The re-formation and recreation of men into good men, or this ‘amelioration’ (melioratio) of human beings, takes
places “in Christ Jesus” (in Christo Jesu), where we shall become a “new creature” (nova
creatura).753 Augustine does not mean a “new creature” in the sense of fundamentally
changing our human nature into some other superior nature, angelic or otherwise, but
rather according to the words of the Apostle: Create a clean heart in me, O God (2 Cor
5:17; Ps 51:10).754
We encounter a similar position in the Old Testament. In the Book of Proverbs, it
is written: The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways (Prov. 8:22).755 Augustine
interprets the phrase ‘in the beginning of his ways’ as meaning the Head of the Church,
Christ, “in His assumed human nature.”756 It is Christ in the form of His humanity that we
have an example of a “pattern of life,” or a “sure path by which we may come to God.”757
Christ’s pattern of life, which is the path by which we may come to God requires the
virtue of humility, one which pre-eminently shines forth in the temporal mission of
Christ. The Word “deigned to exemplify in His own Person that humility which is the
path over which we have to travel on our return [to God]; for he did not think it robbery
to be equal to God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave (Phil.2: 6-7).”758 In
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9.31. St. Paul will say that this is a kind of second creation (cf. Gal 6:14; Eph 2:8ff.; Rom 8:18-23
and 12:2), one which is as gratuitous as our creation from nothing, but even more glorious (cf. 2 Cor 4:6
and 5:17ff.). See also Mersch, 273.
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Augustine views the heart to be the “true temple of God” in us. (de.fide.et.symb.7.14). Undergoing
an amelioration of the heart, no matter how great it may be, does not constitute a change in nature. Even
Christ, who was perfectly man, did not stop being a man because of the perfection of His humanity.
Christ’s human nature was not somehow changed into His divine nature. Instead, the perfection He
received made Him ‘man’ in the fullest sense of the term.
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The Vulgate substitutes “possessed” (possedit) for “created” (creavit).
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de.fide.et.symb.4.6.
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line with the main theme of the Book of Proverbs and the entire Old Testament, i.e.,
attaining wisdom by humbly obeying the will of God,759 Augustine will cite the next
verse of Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (Phil.2: 8): He Humbled himself, becoming
obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. Both the Old and the New Testaments
teach us that wisdom requires humility, humility requires obedience, and obedience leads
to death, but also life everlasting.
As in his earlier doctrinal works outlining the correct Christian faith, Augustine
will note that, “if a man has attained the age of reason, he cannot believe (credere), hope
(sperare), or love (diligere) unless he wills (nisi velit), nor attain to the prize of God’s
heavenly call (Phil 3:14) unless he runs voluntarily (nisi voluntate cucurrerit).”760 How,
though, can we reconcile this affirmation of the importance of the will with the claim that
there is question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy
(Rom 9:16)? Augustine answers that this just points to the need for both the will of man
and God showing mercy, though the latter takes primacy over the former: “The will of
man alone is not enough, if the mercy of God be not also present—then neither is the
mercy of God alone enough, if the will of man be not also present.”761 The dynamic
relation between the mercy of God and the will of man Augustine mentions here remains
perfectly consistent with his doctrinal teachings on sin and grace (chapter 2 of this
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Augustine will also characterize the obedience mentioned in the Old Testament in terms of fear of
the Lord and goes so far as to say that this obedience constitutes the real existence of any person. Augustine
approvingly quotes the Book of Ecclesiastes in this regard: Fear God, and keep His commandments: for
this is every man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every despised person, whether it be
good, or whether it be evil (Eccl 12, 13:14). Augustine writes of this quotation, “What truer, terser, more
salutary enouncement could be made? Fear God, he says, and keep his commandments: for this is every
man. For whosoever has real existence, is this, is a keeper of God’s commandments, and he who is not this,
is nothing.” (City of God 20.3). See also 83 Questions, 71.1.
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dissertation) and his preaching on human freedom (chapter 3 of this dissertation). We
must freely co-operate with God’s grace—or ‘consent’ to it—for it to be effectual in our
lives. Augustine believes that God’s offer to give grace, which is an offer he extends to
the whole of humanity, does not have a positive effect on an individual until it has been
given. But for it to be given, it must be received; and for it to be truly received, it must be
willingly accepted. I have previously shown that Augustine’s conception of this cooperation between the gift-giver (God) and gift-receiver (man) is philosophicallytheologically the same as the Eastern Orthodox tradition’s notion of sunergia.762
The will of man alone fails to accomplish (non implet) the good,763 but since
God’s mercy alone accomplishes all good whatsoever, His will remains primary. When it
comes to our good works, we ought to “ascribe all to God, who both makes the good will
of man ready to be helped (adjuvandam) and helps (adjuvat) it when it has been made
ready.”764 But it must be emphasized again that it is only with his ‘consent’ that God
‘makes the good will of man ready to be helped and helps it when it has been made
ready’ in Christ Jesus, whose workmanship we men are, and in whose good works,
understood broadly in terms of His life, death, and resurrection, we must walk
(ambulemus) to be made good men (boni homines). Our calling as Christians therefore is
to be like Christ, to in a sense re-live His life, death, and resurrection.
We can only fulfill this calling with the help of God, and “this is by the grace of
God through Jesus Christ our Lord (haec est gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum
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See footnote 72 of this dissertation, where I show the results of my lexical study comparing the
meaning of cooperatio in Augustine with sunergia in the Cappadocians. There I find that the meaning of
these two terms and their respective philosophical-theological uses to which they are purposed are, for all
practical purposes, identical.
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Recall Augustine makes the same distinction between ‘not consenting to bad desires’ and
‘accomplishing the good.’ See chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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nostrum).”765 It is by this grace that we become like Christ. It is how we become sons of
God (Rom 8:14). As we saw in chapter 1 of this dissertation, Augustine thinks it is in the
person of Christ that “we have the grace of God shown forth in a manner altogether
sublime and clear. What had the human nature in the man of Christ deserved that it
should be taken up, in a fashion without parallel, into the unity of the person of the only
of God? What good will, whose firm and good intention, what good works had gone
before to make that man worthy to become one person with God?”766 The answer to both
questions is none whatsoever. Grace does not depend on merits. Even for the Son of man
grace retains its gratuitous or freely-given quality, and it is this grace “which enabled the
man Christ to be free from the possibility of sin (per quam factum est ut homo Christus
nullum habere posset peccatum).”767 Augustine will insist that it is the person of Christ
that fully reveals the reality of the freely-given grace of God as it relates to human nature,
“for he took up (assumptus) humanity in such a way that it was transformed for the better
(melius), and it was filled out (formaretur) by him in a manner ... [that is] inexpressibly
excellent (ineffabiliter excellentius).”768 We can see this in the plan by which Christ was
born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary:
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83 Questions, 73.2. Augustine is careful to say that this assumption of humanity by the Son is
according to “habit” (habitus), but in a very particular sense of this term, so as not to imply any changes in
the actual natures of man or God. He defines the sense of habit he is using as that “the very things added [to
other things] are changed in order to produce a habit and are in some way shaped by the things for which
they produce the habit.” Augustine gives clothing as an example. When it is laid out or thrown on the
ground, it does not have the form which it has when it is pulled over the head, arms, torso, legs, and other
members of the body. But when it is put on, “it receives a shape which it did not have while off, although
the members themselves, with the clothes on or off, remain in the same state.” (83 Questions, 73.1). For
Augustine, the Son was “clothed with a humanity” by somehow “uniting” (uniens) and “adapting”
(conformans) it to His divinity (83 Questions, 73.2). In other words, the Son assumed humanity in such a
way as to “fill it out,” “better it,” “complete it,” but not in such a way as to make it in something that it is
not—whether that be some superior intellectual nature or God Himself. God and man are one Person in
Christ, Who is perfectly God and perfectly man.
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Since, then, a thing may be born of something, yet in such a way as not to be its
son, and, again, since not everyone who is called son is born of him whose son he
is said to be, surely the plan by which Christ was born of the Holy Spirit, but not
as son, and of the Virgin, yet as son, manifests to us the grace of God. For it was
by this grace that a man, without any antecedent merits, in the very inception of
his existence, was so united in one person to God the Word that the very same
person was the Son of God who was Son of man, and the very same person was
Son of man who was Son of God. Thus, in the taking on of the human nature, the
grace itself somehow became so natural to the man as to admit no possibility of
sin.769
Augustine thinks that the distinction between Christ being born of the Holy Spirit, but not
as son (non sicut filius), and Christ being born of the Virgin Mary, but as son (sicut
filius), is crucial in understanding how grace makes any man, including Christ in the form
of his humanity, better in the sense of not being able to sin.
Christ was a special case, however, because in the very beginning of his existence
(in ipso exordio naturae suae quo esse coepit) His human nature was so united to His
divine nature that they became one in the second Person of the blessed Trinity. As a
result, we as Christians may say that Christ is the Son of God and the Son of man, but He
is one and the same Person. The unity in Christ between His two natures in His singular
Person is accomplished by grace (the “grace of union” as it is often called). It is a grace
that became so natural (naturalis) to Christ in the form of his humanity that He could not
sin.770
Though Augustine does not discuss it here, I believe what he has said about Christ
being born of the Holy Spirit, from the beginning of His existence, fits rather nicely with
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the idea found in his Commentaries on the Gospel of John that Christ was always twiceborn. He was born of the Spirit, but not as son, and born of the Virgin Mary, but as son.
Because of always being twice-born and, specifically, because of His unity of Person
provided by the Word through grace, Christ the man could not sin. He could not but do
the will of the Father,771 to which He was obedient even unto death on a cross.
All men are born of the flesh, but not all are born of the Holy Spirit. In the
Gospel of John, this was the lesson that Christ attempted to teach Nicodemus, who went
one night to visit the Lord to learn about salvation. Christ says to him, “Amen, Amen I
say to thee, unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.” Nicodemus
was puzzled by these words of the Lord. He did not understand how someone could be
twice-born. “How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his
mother’s womb, and be born again?” In response, Christ points out that there is more to
being human, more to being free in will, than what can be found in the reality of the
flesh: “Amen, Amen I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh;
and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit. Wonder not that I say to thee, you must be
born again. The Spirit breatheth where He will; and thou hearest His voice, but thou
knowest not whence He cometh, and wither He goeth; so is everyone that is born of the
Spirit” (Jn 3: 5ff). The Spirit breathes where He wills, and so is everyone that is born of
the Spirit. However, those who live according to the flesh may be physically alive, but
they are spiritually, mentally, and willfully dead. As St. Paul says, the widow who lives
for pleasure is dead even while she lives (1 Tim 5:6). Even those such as Nicodemus,
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who are by all accounts naturally good men, cannot be said to be alive unless they are
born again of the Spirit.
In the relevant portions of his Tractates on the Gospel of John (Tractate 11),
Augustine will describe Nicodemus as one of those who believed in Christ’s name,
because they saw the signs and miracles which He performed. Nicodemus calls Him
Rabbi, Master. He says Christ is a teacher that has come from God. But Christ did not
“trust” Himself to Nicodemus. For Augustine, only “to them who have been born again
does Jesus trust Himself.” Those such as Nicodemus, who are not born again, are
“catechumens,” in that they “believe in the name of Christ.” They may even bear the
cross of Christ on their forehead, not being ashamed of His crucifixion. However, they do
not understand the divinity of Christ, and the Spirit of unity that He imparts to all of those
who are born again. Augustine writes: “Let us ask him [sc. Nicodemus], ‘Do you eat the
flesh of the Son of man, and drink the blood of the Son of man?’ He knows not what to
say, because Jesus has not trusted Himself to him.”772 Those who are born again not only
believe, but also understand that Christ is God the Son, the Word made flesh. They
understand the statement, which I might add imposes a limitation on their wills, except a
man eat my flesh, and drink my blood, he shall not have life in him (Jn 6:54). Augustine
thinks the way in which we are first incorporated into the life of Christ, so that we may
eat His flesh and drink His blood, is through the waters of baptism. Indeed, “by His
baptism He brings over them that believe; all their sins, the enemies as it were that pursue
them, being slain, as all the Egyptians perished in that sea.”773
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When the Lord speaks about the necessity of being born again, Nicodemus fails
to understand that the Spirit is speaking to him. He still thinks in terms of the flesh. More
specifically, “he thinks of his own flesh, because as yet he thinks not of Christ’s flesh.”774
We might say that Nicodemus failed to have the Pauline revelation that we are all one
body in Christ, and so when Christ said, except a man eat my flesh, and drink my blood,
he shall not have life in Him, he could not profit from it.775 As is the case with most of
fallen humanity, Nicodemus only understood those who are born once, according to their
own mortal flesh.776
Perhaps this focus on being born of the Spirit is why Augustine will follow his
discussion of Christ’s inability to sin with a disclaimer on the importance of the lifegiving waters of baptism for all Christians, whether young or old:
He, by the likeness of sinful flesh in which He was crucified, showed that,
whereas no sin was in Him, still in some sense He died to sin, in dying to the flesh
in which was the likeness of sin; and that, while He Himself had never lived the
old life of sin, He made His resurrection the symbol of our new life, quickened
out of the old life of sin in which we had been destined to die. Such is the
meaning of the great sacrament of baptism which is solemnized among us: that
those who attain to this grace die to sin (moriantur peccato), just as we say He
died to sin, in that He died to the flesh (quia mortuus est carni), that is, to the
likeness of sin (peccati similitudini); and that they live through being reborn at the
font, whatever may be the age of the body, just as He lived rising again from the
tomb (et vivant a lavacro renascendo, sicut ipse a sepulcro resurgendo, quamlibet
corporis aetatem gerant).777
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Christ had no need for rebirth in the Spirit, for He was always born of the Spirit.778 We
see this especially in the Gospel of Matthew 3:14-15, when Jesus comes to John to be
baptized. John recognizes Jesus’ holiness, saying, I need to be baptized by you, and do
you come to me? Jesus replies: Let it be so now, for thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all
righteousness. Jesus saw His life, death, and resurrection as fulfilling all righteousness.
We might ask: fulfilling all righteousness for whom? Not for Himself, of course, because
He had no sin for which He had to repent or confess. Rather, the fulfillment of
righteousness He speaks of is for all human beings which are His workmanship, and in
whose good works we must walk in order to be righteous men like Him.779 Christ is able
to transmit His righteousness to us, or fulfill all righteousness, because He constitutes a
single person with us—a persona mystica. He is the Head of this person, we are the
Body. What the Head possesses (righteousness), so, too, do the members, but only
through the Head.
Augustine will stress that Christ underwent His baptism and death, “not through a
pitiable necessity (non miseranda necessitate), but rather through the mercy of His will
(sed miserante potius voluntate susceptum est), that One might take away the sin of the
world.”780 In other words, His submission to be baptized and die for our sins were free
and merciful acts, not coerced and necessitated acts. Christ’s entire life from his birth to
his death was freely chosen by Him for our salvation: “At the opportune moment, when
He willed, when He knew, then He was born; for He was not born without willing to be
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born.... God was born when He willed it, and when He willed it He died. He was born as
He willed to be born, of a virgin; He died as He willed to die, on the Cross. Whatever He
willed, that He did.”781 Near the end of Chapter 14, Augustine concludes that Christ’s
entire life should serve as a model for Christians here and now, this side of heaven.
Augustine asks: “What, then, was wrought upon the cross of Christ, in His burial, in His
resurrection on the third day, in His ascension into heaven, in His sitting at the right hand
of the Father was so wrought as to serve as a model for the life which the Christian here
leads, and in reality, not simply as a mystical showing-forth in words (ita gestum est, ut
his rebus non mystice tantum dictis, sed etiam gestis configuraretur vita christiana quae
hic geritur).”782 Following St. Paul, Augustine will consider each of these aspects of
Christ’s life as requiring Christians to follow suit, or perhaps better, to walk in these good
works themselves. His crucifixion requires a crucifixion of our flesh with its passions and
desires (Gal 5:24). His burial requires us to be buried with Christ by means of baptism
into death (Rom 6:4). His resurrection requires that, just as Christ has arisen from the
dead through the glory of the Father, so also we walk in newness of life (Rom 6:4). His
ascension and sitting at the right hand of the Father requires us to seek the things that are
above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God (Col 3:1).
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Augustine believes that it is only by living the life of Christ that we can attain
everlasting life for ourselves. Does this fact necessarily impose limits on the lives we can
profitably lead to work out our own salvation? Does this fact necessarily require sacrifice
and even death783 on our part? Augustine would answer yes to both questions, but this is
not a pitiable kind of necessity, or one in which the nature of the will as free is destroyed.
Rather, it is a limitation on the nature of the will that will lead to its full realization, along
with the entire nature of the human being of which it is a power. It is a limitation that
makes us better, freer, and more alive. Msgr. Fulton Sheen will draw on Augustine to
make this point in a particularly forceful manner, noting that it is in the Church that this
renewal of human nature and its powers takes place. According to Sheen, one of the
characteristics of the Church, understood as totus Christus, is its undeniable freedom, i.e.,
the freedom of its Head and its members. Some may view the authority of the Church,
passed down from Christ to the Apostles, and from the Apostles to Bishops, as a
restriction on their freedom to do what they want. Others may even see this Apostolic
authority as a form of enslavement. But for Sheen this is a mistake on their part. Liberty
does not mean the ability to disregard law, to do what one wants, or to reject all authority.
Instead, “obedience to law is the condition of all freedom.”784 Sheen gives the following
examples to this effect:
Aviators are free to fly only on condition that in the construction of their machine
they respect the law of gravity; we are free to use words only on condition that we
accept the standard meaning of those words and the authority of the dictionary;
we are free to drive automobiles on the street only on condition that we obey the
traffic laws; an artist is free to draw a triangle only on condition that he respects
its intrinsic nature and draw it with three sides.... Every traveler who follows a
road submits to a restriction of his freedom. The road limits his freedom, for if it
783

The death Augustine speaks of may include martyrdom, but it can generally be understood as death

to sin.
784

Sheen, 205.

303
were not for it, the whole forest primeval would be his road; but in submitting to
the limitation of a road he finds he is more free to travel.785
The same reasoning is applicable, Sheen thinks, when it comes to the laws of the Church.
These laws are no doubt limitations placed upon us, but they are placed upon us by
Christ, through the Apostles and their episcopal successors. As the Head of the Mystical
Body786 that is the Church, Christ only commands Christians to obey laws that are meant
for their perfection. He commands Christians to walk in His good works, to travel back to
God the Father through Himself, for He is the only Way by which we can come to the
Father. We may conclude “that the more we obey the laws which make for our
perfection, the more free we become; and the more we disobey those immanent laws
which make for our development the more enslaved we become.”787 Sheen will use an
example to explain. Suppose I thought freedom to be exception from the laws of health.
In that spirit of false liberty, what if I thought eating as much as I wanted to and drinking
as much as I wanted to, whenever I wanted to, was freedom? What would happen to my
life? I would become unhealthy, weak, and less able to enjoy my life. We might say this
is an example from the “physical” order of how freedom cannot be equated with license,
but Sheen thinks that we can observe similar truths in the “intellectual” order and,
ultimately, in the laws and life of Christ himself:
The more I submit myself to the truths of geography, the more free I am to travel;
the more I bow down to the necessities of mathematics, the more free I am to
know the stars and the secrets of the universe; and, on the contrary, the more I
reject the truths of history, the more I become enslaved to ignorance.... [W]e have
been called to be the children of God, partakers of His divine knowledge. It
follows then that the more I submit myself to the laws of Christ and His Church,
which is the Kingdom of God on earth, the more my perfection grows and the
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more my freedom increases.... [W]hen I bow down my will to the law of Calvary,
I do not surrender my liberty any more than an acorn loses its nature when it dies
to itself to be reborn in the oak; when I obey the truth of the teaching authority of
the Church I no more relinquish my freedom than I relinquish my freedom of
writing when I submit to the laws of grammar. When I obey the commands of the
Mystical Body of Christ, I am obeying that which makes me perfect not only in
my body, because it subjects it to reason, not only in my mind, because it subjects
it to the higher knowledge of faith, but perfect in my being, body and soul,
because it leads me to perfect union with Him who is God.788
The Truth present in the laws and life of Christ, while demanding sacrifice, imposing
restraints, and limiting our freedom, will grant us genuine liberty. As the Lord himself
says, The Truth shall set you free (Jn 8:32). But the Truth is Christ, and so we must obey
“only what Christ wills,” we must think “only what He thinks,” and we must love “only
what He loves.”789
Perhaps St. Paul says it best: Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ
Jesus (Phil 2:5). We also know from Paul that letting this mind of Christ be in us, or
possessing a Christ-form mind, goes beyond external imitation of what He did in His
earthly ministry. It is conforming ourselves to His entire life,790 but especially to his
humility in the Incarnation. For when Paul says, Let this mind be in you, which was also
in Christ Jesus, he continues: who emptied (kenosis) Himself, taking the form of a
servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as man (Phil 2: 5-7). That
you may be filled unto all the fullness (pleroma) of God (Eph 3:19). We find out, then,
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that genuine liberty is the freedom to live as Christ humbly chose to live, so that we
might also be filled with the fullness of God. It is this liberty that makes one a Christian.
Again, following the apostle, we can say without reservation over any possible loss of our
freedom: I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me. And that I live now in the flesh: I live in
the faith of the Son of God who loved me and delivered Himself for me (Gal 2: 19-20).
And in nothing shall I be confounded, but with all confidence, as always, so now also
shall Christ be magnified in my body, whether it be by life or by death. For to me, to live
is Christ; and to die is gain. (Phil 1:20-21). Emile Mersch describes this as the reduction
of “ourselves and our thought to the thoughts and consciousness of Christ.”791 In this
reductive process, Christ is the primary actor. Christ draws us to Himself; He makes us
one in Him; He grants us life through Him. But we still must act along with Christ. The
activity we need to perform in order to accomplish this reduction of ourselves and our
thought is cooperative with that done by Christ. We are even able to say that it is its
effect, as long our activity is good. Mersch relies on Augustine to make this point: “The
members of Christ must understand, and Christ must understand in His members, and
Christ’s members must understand in Christ; for head and members are one Christ.”792
Augustine will argue that this double understanding of Christians in Christ and Christ in
Christians demands a double passion:
How great must the surface of a man’s body be, if he can be killed by all men?
But here we have to understand that there is question of us, of our Church, of
Christ’s body. Jesus Christ is one man, head and body; the Savior of the body and
the members of the body are two in one flesh and in one voice and in one passion;
and when wickedness will have passed, they will be one in repose. The passion of
Christ is not in Christ alone; or rather, it is in Christ alone. For if you take Christ
as head and body, the passion of Christ is in Christ alone. But if you take Christ as
the head alone, the passion of Christ is not in Christ alone. If you, any person now
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listening to me, are among Christ’s members, or even if you are not among my
auditors (although actually you hear me, if you are one of Christ’s members),
whatever you suffer at the hands of those who are not among the members of
Christ, was lacking to Christ’s sufferings. This is why your suffering is now
added, because it was then lacking. You are filling out the measure, you are not
making it flow over. You are suffering as much as ought to be your contribution
to the complete passion of Christ, who has suffered as our head, and who now
suffers in His members, that is, in us. Each of us, in his little way, is paying into
this common treasury what he owes, and we all contribute our share according to
our means. The measure of suffering will not be full until the world comes to an
end.793
Our full conformation to Christ will take place in the next life, and will consist in the
inability to sin and the inability to even wish to sin. Augustine believes that there “he will
not be able to will evil, and yet he will not be deprived of his free will. In fact, his will
will be much more free, in that it will be in no way subject to sin. For the will is not to be
blamed, nor should we say that it was no will or that it was not free, when we so will to
be happy that we not only do not will to be wretched, but are quite unable to wish to be
(postea vero sic erit, ut male velle non possit; nec ideo libero carebit arbitrio. Multo
quippe liberius erit arbitrium, quod omnino non poterit servire peccato. Neque enim
culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic
volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus).794
Only then will we understand how good a human being is which is “capable of not
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sinning, though one would be better which was incapable of sinning.” Only then will we
understand how good that immortality is in which man was “capable of not dying, though
that which is to be is of a higher order, in which he will be incapable of dying.”795 These
men who are incapable of sinning and who are incapable of dying will have “no will to
sin.”796
Have any of fallen humanity accomplished the good works of Christ in such a
way as to perfect themselves to the point where there can be no further addition, to where
they are exactly as good as God wants and knows them to be in Christ, to where they
have no will to sin? Augustine answers no, once again citing the apostle as proof. Out of
all men, there is none in the present life who were privy to as many great revelations as
Paul. Yet Paul himself says, Lest I should be exalted above measure through the
abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of
Satan to buffet me. For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that He would take it away
from me. And He said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made
perfect in weakness (2 Cor 12:7-9). Augustine takes it to be obvious that, “if there were
already in the apostle that perfection of love which admitted of no further addition, and
which could be puffed up no more, there could have been no further need of the
messenger of Satan to buffet him.”797 The very fact that the messenger of Satan was able
to buffet him proves that the love of God and neighbor that Paul possessed was not yet
perfect. It was still in the process of being strengthened by God day by day (2 Cor 4:6).
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Not only that, but we must not forget how imperfect Paul was when he was
known by the name Saul. The case of the radical conversion of Saul of Tarsus is
recounted in Acts 9 and is discussed by Augustine many times in his Sermons to teach his
flock about the literal self-sacrifice required to be one of Christ’s followers. In Sermon
116.7 (418),798 for example, Augustine explains to his congregation that before his
conversion Saul had no good merits whatsoever; he was in fact “crazy with fury” in his
zeal to uphold his ancestral traditions, in the name of which he persecuted Christians; he
was bloodthirsty and hateful. Yet on the road to Damascus, Saul received a divine
intervention in the form of a question from God: Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?
(Acts 9:4). While Saul could not harm the head of the body of Christ in heaven, he was
nonetheless harming its members here on earth. But what good was this doing Saul? It is
hard for you to kick against the goad (Acts 26:14). Augustine takes this to mean that in
persecuting the members of Christ, in kicking against the goad, Saul was really only
harming himself. God’s question to Saul made him realize that we are all part of one
body, whether we be Christian or Jew, man or woman, slave or free. It made him realize
that the universal ontological community of nature we all possess, insofar as we are all
human beings, should be joined with an economic effort on our part to effect an equally
universal moral communion, in which we know and love the same ultimate Good that is
God the Father and Christ whom He has sent, through the love of the Holy Spirit. The
realization of the strong community that is shared among human beings, and that is meant
to be strengthened through knowledge and love of God and neighbor, was not forced
upon Saul. It was merely sparked by a question, to which Saul could either freely answer
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back as Saul was wont to do, or as we know St. Paul did.799 God’s intervention did not
take away Saul’s will to choose the kind of life he wanted to live, the character he wanted
to develop, or the choices he wanted to make. Rather, all it did was free Saul from the
many sinful obstacles preventing him from confessing God in his heart.
What St. Paul accomplished in freely turning to God is something that we can too,
provided we let God into our hearts by believing in Him and Christ whom He has sent.
The way we do this is by denying ourselves so that we may confess God. Saul denied his
self, his “Saul-ness,” and became St. Paul. As we have seen, the apostle will recommend
that we imitate this self-sacrifice, but only insofar as he himself imitates Christ (Phil
3:20). Augustine thinks that we all must exercise the same kind of self-sacrifice exercised
by Paul, and that Christ speaks of in the Gospels, e.g., at Jn 12:25: Whoever loves his soul
let him lose it; and at Mt 10:39: And whoever has lost his soul on my account will find it.
Or in Augustine’s own words, “deny yourself, man, woman, so that you may be made an
angel. Deny yourself, mortal creature, so that by confessing God you may earn the right
to live forever. Look here; you love this temporal life; you don’t want to deny it, and you
wish to deny God; God, whom you’ve denied, whom you have refused to confess,
withdraws from you; and you will continue to have the temporal life, which you refused
to deny.”800 One ought to recall St. Paul’s distinction between the psychikoi/pneumatikoi,
which fits well with Augustine’s claim that, while God wants you to live the eternal life
of the angels—to be pneumatikoi—He will nonetheless respect your decision to remain
living the temporal life you love by denying God. But having made this decision, God
will justly withdraw from you. He will leave you as the psychikoi you have chosen to be
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and are naturally on your own. To deny God therefore is to deny yourself the
amelioration of your human nature required to enjoy eternal life. In a related Sermon, we
receive an extremely succinct definition of the meaning of deny yourself that links it with
Augustine’s idea of liberty. According to Augustine, “Deny yourself” means “Don’t you
live in yourself,” and “Don’t you live in yourself” means “Don’t do your own will, but
that of the one who is dwelling in you.”801 How can the words of Christ not come to
mind? Yet not what I will, but what you will be done, Father (Mt 26:39).
It is the person of Christ, His thoughts, His willings, His actions, and His love,
that is the answer to the problem of predestination in Augustine’s mature theology of sin
and grace—the answer that he would give to his Christian contemporaries, i.e., most
notably the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles—and that has been continually decried
since then as leaving no space for the liberty of man under God’s providentially guiding
hand. Christ was totally free, because He wholeheartedly says “yes” to the Father, even
“yes” to death on a cross. He was totally free because He totally willed the will of the
Father. To the wisdom of men, this may appear as irreligious and ugly nonsense. But as
the apostle says, the wisdom of God confounds the wisdom of men (1 Cor 1:27). It is our
Way and our Truth and our Life and our Liberty. For all who walk in the footsteps of
Christ, who live the way that He humbly chose to live, some understanding of the
mystery of how God’s grace perfects human nature in free co-operation with it is
achievable. For those who do not, no such understanding will be gained. In the words of
Fr. Mersch, citing heavily from the Gospel of John, the mystery of divine and human
interaction may be
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... above our understanding (Jn 1:18; 5:37; 3:12; 6:46; 17:25); but in Christ it
draws near to us and becomes something familiar. Jesus never speaks of it as a
cold and distant truth made known to us to humble our minds. On the contrary,
He exhibits it as a light (1:9; 3:19-22; 12:32ff., 44ff.), as a life (1:4; 3:16), as a
vision that God grants us (6:44; 14:7; 17, 19; 15:26;16:13). Our part is to open our
minds to the light that is offered (1:6, 10; 3:19, 32; 5:34, 38), to believe (20:21),
to love (8:42; 14:20-23), to obey the commandments (7:17; 15: 10), to make
ourselves docile (5:24; 6:37, 40, 44, 65; 8:47), above all to attach ourselves to
Christ (7:28; 8:19; 14:6, 20; 17:2, 3, 7, 8, 24); then we shall acquire a certain
understanding of the incomprehensible. This understanding is not the fruit of an
accumulation of concepts, but comes from living contact with the living truth,
because I live, and you shall live (14:19).802
We are only free when we willingly attach ourselves to Christ. For Augustine, freedom in
the sense of total independence, or complete control over one’s self-development, is
illusory; and freedom in the sense of the freedom to sin, or in having alternative options
for doing, thinking, and willing what is evil, is using the term freedom in an equivocal
sense, like when one speaks of a slave as free, or when one speaks of someone who is
dead as if he is alive. In short, such a person is not even talking about the same reality as
Augustine, but rather a false “freedom” not deserving of the name. As Augustine learned
all too well from St. Paul, Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in wantonness and
impurities, not in strife and envying; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no
provision for the flesh and its desires (Rom 13: 13-14). This is the true liberty of man and
his eternal life.
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